This action was originally filed in the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of Los Angeles, but was removed to the United States District Court on the ground that Frank U. Noon, a defendant, was an officer of an agency in the Executive Branch of the Government of the United States, that is, Supervisory Agent for the Home Loan Bank Board, and that all acts done Tby him were done as an officer of the United States. Jurisdiction in the United States District Court was claimed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1442 (a) (1).

In the complaint originally filed, the plaintiffs set forth four causes of action, h>ut the appeal now before us relates -only to the third cause of action.

The Complaint

It is alleged in the complaint that the plaintiff, Dorothy Howard, owns certain real property in Los Angeles, and that in 1948 she secured a loan from the Broadway Federal Savings and Loan Association and executed a promissory note secured by a deed of trust on the property. It is then alleged that the defendants unjustly, maliciously and unlawfully conspired to deprive plaintiff of her real property and caused to be prepared and recorded in the Los Angeles County Recorder’s Office a purported Notice of Default under the trust deed, and that this Notice of Default remained a cloud on plaintiff’s title until cleared by action in the California courts. It is also alleged that the defendants published a notice of trustee’s sale of the real property in question in a Los Angeles newspaper. It is claimed by plaintiff that she was not in default upon the note at the time the notice of default and the notice of trustee’s sale were published and that these notices were false and that the defendants knew them to be false. As a result therefrom, plaintiff claims that her enjoyment, use and disposition of the property in question was greatly limited, her interest depreciated, the value of the property decreased and that the property was rendered unmarketable. She sought and prayed for damages.

The Defense

The defendants in their answer pleaded as a defense that the cause of action alleged in the third count was barred by § 340, subd. 3 of the California Code of Civil Procedure which places a one year statute of limitations on actions for libel and slander. 1 It was stipulated that the *31 third count is for the recovery of damages for slander of title, but the plaintiffs contend that the applicable statute of limitations is that set forth in § 338, subd. 2 of the California Code of Civil Procedure which places a three year statute of limitation on an action for trespass or injury to real property. 2 It is admitted that this action was commenced more than one year after the claimed injury to the plaintiff’s property. The matter of the applicable statute of limitations was submitted to the trial court, and the court ruled that the one year limitation of § 340, subd. 3 applied to the third cause of action. As a result the third cause of action was ordered dismissed with prejudice. This appeal followed.

The Question Presented

The sole question presented on this appeal has to do with the applicable statute of limitations, whether it is § 340, subd. 3 or § 338, subd. 2 of the California Code of Civil Procedure. This question has never been passed upon specifically by the California courts, and in this situation the question is primarily one of state law. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York, 326 U.S. 99 , 65 S.Ct. 1464 , 89 L.Ed. 2079 . The defendants, appellees here, argue that inasmuch as this question has not been passed on in this setting by the California courts, this Court should rely on and apply general principles found in cases from other jurisdictions 3 and in this regard, it is urged that the overwhelming weight of authority is that an action for slander of title is governed by statute of limitations applicable to actions for slander and libel generally.

The real nature of the action must be kept in mind, so as to avoid the error of assuming that the law of personal slander governs. See Prosser, The Law of Torts, 2d Edition, § 108.

Although the appellate courts of the State of California have not passed on the question of the applicable statute of limitations, the Supreme Court of California, in dealing with a venue question under 392 of the Code of Civil Procedure, said, in Coley v. Hecker, 206 Cal. 22 , 272 P. 1045, 1047 ,

The Court then went on to say

This language of the highest court of the state is entitled to great weight, and this view of “slander of title” as an injury to property is repeated in Smith. *32 v. Stuteman, 79 Cal.App.2d 708 , 181 P.2d 123, 124 . In the Smith case the question was whether an action for slander of title survived the death of the defendant, § 574, Probate Code. The question there was whether a trespass on real property which survives the death of a defendant includes an action for slander of title. In holding that it did, the Court pointed out that trespass has a broadened meaning today and now includes consequential injuries to realty such as an action for slander of title, as well as direct physical injuries.

We quote from Smith v. Stuteman, 79 Cal.App.2d 708 , 181 P.2d 123 , 124:

In the face of this reasoning by the California courts, it would seem that an action for “slander of title” to real property is within the three year limitation applicable to “an action for trespass or injury to real property” rather than within the one year limitation provision [§ 340, subd. 3]. The trial judge was in error in holding that this action was controlled by § 340, subd. 3, which deals with personal injuries, such as libel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment, seduction and injuries resulting from negligence.

The cases cited by the appellee do not compel a contrary decision. Woodward v. Pacific Fruit & Produce Co., 165 Or. 250 , 106 P.2d 1043 , dealt with an interference in business relations, and though the Court chose to denominate the action as one for slander of title, it is not similar to the case now before the Court. Buehrer v. Provident Mutual Life Ins. Co., 123 Ohio St. 264 , 175 N.E. 25 , involves a distinction limiting a suit for trespass to only those cases involving a physical injury, a position which California rejects in Smith, supra. Bush v. McMann, 12 Colo.App. 504 , 55 P. 956 , dealt with an injury to personal property. McDonald v. Green, 176 Mass. 113 , 57 N.E. 211 , classifies a slander of title with personal slanders, a position the California courts clearly reject in Coley and Smith, supra. Walley v. Hunt, 212 Miss. 294 , 54 So.2d 393, 397 , turns on a particular Mississippi statute which includes “all actions for slanderous words concerning the person or title '* * * ” and hence has no application here. Carroll v. Warner Bros., D.C., 20 F.Supp. 405 , involves an injury to personal property or business relationships. In the decisions in Old Plantation Corp. v. Maule Industries, Fla., 68 So.2d 180 , and Carey v. Beyer, Fla., 75 So.2d 217 , the applicable statutes did not specify a special statute of limitations for injuries to real property as is done in the State of California.

The judgment of the District Court is reversed.

. § 340 Civ.Proc.

. § 838 Cal.Civ.Proc.

. United States v. Marshall, 9 Cir., 230 F.2d 183 .