Gertrude L. Brawner v. Pearl Assurance Company, Ltd.

Good Law
267 F.2d 45·1958 U.S. App. LEXIS 6075
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitDecember 18, 195815993California2,079 words

Opinion

Opinion

Fee, J.

In this case, this Court is again confronted with the confusion which follows the filing of motions for summary judgment by plaintiff and defendant, respectively. Again it is reiterated that such a situation does not parallel that where both parties file motions for directed verdict. In the latter instance, each party is held to agree that there is no disputed question of fact and that the case is to be decided on the principles of law. In contrast, by definition, a summary judgment cannot be granted if there be a disputed question of material fact. This determination does not depend upon what either or both parties may have thought about the matter.

In the instant case, plaintiff held a policy of fire insurance issued by Pearl Assurance Company, Ltd., upon certain buildings on a piece of real property in the City of Los Angeles, described by street address, whereby the Assurance Company agreed to indemnify plaintiff against loss by fire thereon. While plaintiff owned the real property, the buildings insured were damaged or destroyed by fire. We hold it to be self-evident that upon these admitted facts plaintiff had the burden of proving not only that she had sustained a loss,…

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