Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, a Corporation v. Margaret L. Grant

Peter Grant, now deceased, on the 11th day of August, 1954 made application to appellant, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, on a form furnished by it, for a policy of life insurance. The application was delivered to an agent of the appellant with Part A relating to the applicant’s situation filled out, along with a. check in payment for the first full month- *308 3y premium. Applicant Grant was told by the agent of appellant that he would need a medical examination as covered by Part B of the application, and it was agreed that applicant Grant would call Dr. Blaisdell, appellant’s examining physician, to arrange an appointment. An appointment was made but applicant Grant died before he could be examined on August 13, 1954, as a result of an accident.

The widow of applicant Grant, the beneficiary named in the application for insurance, in due time made demand for payment of the insurance. Appellant refused payment upon the ground that at the time of the death of Peter Grant it was under no obligation to pay insurance.

While numerous specifications of error are set forth dealing with alleged errors in admissions and exclusions of evidence and the making of incorrect findings in…

I respectfully dissent. The Ransom case cited in the opinion was based on different language in the application than the language found in the instant case. In Ransom, the California court held that the language used was ambiguous and that “the ambiguity must be resolved against defendant.”

In the instant case I see no ambiguity.

The application contained Parts A, B, and C. Part A was signed by the applicant, in which he made application for a certain type of insurance and in which he gave his occupation as an airplane crop duster and answered other questions asked by the Company. Part B is to be filled out by the applicant in the presence of the medical examiner. It is designated at the top “Applicant’s Statements to the Medical Examiner.” Part C is entitled “Medical Examiner’s Report on ..........” and is to be signed by the medical examiner at the completion of the applicant’s medical* examination. These three parts of one document comprise “the application.” They are all portions of one piece of paper, which piece of paper was exhibited to the Court.

In the instant case there was no evidence of any statement by the agent that the applicant was covered when he signed Part A.…

I concur. The court divides on the question whether the words: “and if this application is approved at the Company’s Home Office” etc., state a condition precedent or only a condition subsequent. Ransom v. The Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company, 43 Cal.2d 420 , 274 P.2d 633, 636 , held that similar language in that policy was not a condition precedent. I am satisfied that the California Court, were it ruling on this policy, would say that the language just quoted stated a condition subsequent. As the California Court said of that Company: “had it wished to make clear that its satisfaction was a condition precedent to a contract, it could easily have done so by using unequivocal terms.” If the approval of the application is a condition subsequent, it can not matter whether the final approval *311 mentioned relates to all three parts of the application.

What most definitely convinces me that the California Court would reach this result on these facts is its clearly expressed approval in Ransom of the decision in Gaunt v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 2 Cir., 160 F.2d 599, 601-602 . There the language of the application was substantially the same as that which was used here.…

268 F.2d 307 METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, Appellant, v. Margaret L. GRANT, Appellee. No. 16130. United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit. June 16, 1959. Knight, Boland & Riordan, Burton L. Walsh, John J. Quigley, San Francisco, Cal., for appellant. Wyckoff, Parker, Boyle & Pope, Harry F. Brauer, Philip T. Boyle, Watsonville, Cal., for appellee. Before POPE, ORR and HAMLIN, Circuit Judges. ORR, Circuit Judge. 1 Peter Grant, now deceased, on the 11th day of August, 1954 made application to appellant, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, on a form furnished by it, for a policy of life insurance. The application was delivered to an agent of the appellant with Part A relating to the applicant's situation filled out, along with a check in payment for the first full monthly premium. Applicant Grant was told by the agent of appellant that he would need a medical examination as covered by Part B of the application, and it was agreed that applicant Grant would call Dr. Blaisdell, appellant's examining physician, to arrange an appointment. An appointment was made but applicant Grant died before he could be examined on August 13, 1954, as a result of an…