Richard Watts v. United States

This is an appeal from a conviction for knowingly and wilfully transporting a stolen automobile in interstate commerce, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2312 . Appellant urges reversal on two grounds. He contends that the trial court erred in allowing into evidence a confession he made after his arraignment before a United States Commissioner pursuant to Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C.A. 1 on the theory that the confession was but a summation of inculpatory statements obtained during an allegedly illegal delay between arrest by state officers and arraignment. And he maintains that the trial judge’s dismissal of counsel in the course of trial, pursuant to appellant’s own request, was a deprivation of the right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution. These contentions seem to us to be wholly devoid of support either in law or in fact.

Appellant, driving an automobile with California license plates, was picked up for speeding by an Arizona state highway patrolman somewhere southeast of Seligman, Arizona. Two other men were in the car. When unable to produce either a driver’s license or a registration certificate, appellant was asked to accompany…

(concurring specially in affirmance of the judgment) .

I concur in the affirmance of appellant’s conviction. I also concur in the court’s opinion rejecting appellant’s contention that his waiver of his constitutional right to assistance of counsel was *13 not given intelligently or voluntarily. But my reasons for rejecting appellant’s argument with respect to the McNabb-Mallory rule are different from those relied upon by the court. The point was not raised below and I am unwilling to decide it upon the present record which was not prepared for that purpose. We have discretion, of course, to remand the case for further hearings on the question. But it does not appear from anything presented to us that appellant’s claim is of sufficient substance to warrant the exercise of such discretion.

Accordingly, since I think the McNabb-Mallory issue is not available to appellant, I do not consider whether “evidence obtained by state officers, even during a delay which would have violated Buie 5(a) if perpetrated by federal agents, is not admissible in federal courts under the McNabb-Mallory rule.” See Hanna v. United States, 1958, 104 U.S.App.D.C. 205 , 260 F.2d 723 .

273 F.2d 10 Richard WATTS, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee. No. 16300. United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit. December 10, 1959. Rehearing Denied January 22, 1960. Martin H. Schulman, Tucson, Ariz., for appellant. Jack D. H. Hays, U. S. Atty., Mary Anne Reimann, Asst. U. S. Atty., Tucson, Ariz., for appellee. Before BONE, BARNES and BAZELON, Circuit Judges. BONE, Circuit Judge. 1 This is an appeal from a conviction for knowingly and wilfully transporting a stolen automobile in interstate commerce, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2312 . Appellant urges reversal on two grounds. He contends that the trial court erred in allowing into evidence a confession he made after his arraignment before a United States Commissioner pursuant to Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C.A. 1 on the theory that the confession was but a summation of inculpatory statements obtained during an allegedly illegal delay between arrest by state officers and arraignment. And he maintains that the trial judge's dismissal of counsel in the course of trial, pursuant to appellant's own request, was a deprivation of the right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the…