In Re Sakarias

In 1990, petitioners Peter Sakarias and Tauno Waidla were each, in separate trials, convicted of first degree murder with special circumstances and sentenced to death in the killing of Viivi Piirisild. We affirmed each of their convictions and sentences on automatic appeal (People v. Sakarias (2000) 22 Cal.4th 596 [ 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 17 , 995 P.2d 152 ] (Sakarias); People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690 [ 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396 , 996 P.2d 46 ] (Waidla)), but issued orders to show cause in response to their petitions for writs of habeas corpus, on claims the prosecutor, in each trial, had presented factual theories inconsistent with those presented at the co-defendant’s trial. In response to Waidla’s petition, we also specified a procedural issue: whether claims of error under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 ] (Miranda) are cognizable on habeas corpus. On receipt of the returns and traverses, we consolidated the two causes for consideration and decision and appointed a referee to hear evidence and make factual findings. The referee has now issued his report, and the parties have filed briefs on the merits.

The evidence at petitioners’…

Concurring and Dissenting.—I concur in the judgment except insofar as it orders vacation of petitioner Sakarias’s death judgment. As to Sakarias, I respectfully dissent.

Sakarias conspired with petitioner Waidla to rob and kill Avo and Yiivi Piirisild, their former benefactors. They invaded the Piirisilds’ home, lay in wait, and ambushed and murdered Yiivi. During a prolonged and horrific assault, numerous blows and wounds were inflicted with a knife and a hatchet. Sakarias admitted he used both weapons on the victim. As planned, the killers carried away property from the Piirisild residence. When later apprehended, Sakarias denied remorse and insisted he and Waidla wanted to kill Avo as well. The majority concede, as they must, that Sakarias’s guilt of capital murder is conclusive, and that ample evidence supports his jury’s decision to sentence him to death.

Yet the majority say Sakarias’s due process rights were prejudicially violated as to penalty when, in their separate trials, Prosecutor Ipsen, acting *172 in “bad faith,” sought to enhance each petitioner’s culpability by attributing the same single antemortem hatchet-chopping wound to each killer. Ipsen’s bad faith is…

Certiorari Denied October 11, 2005. See 126 S.Ct. 430 .

In 1990, petitioners Peter Sakarias and Tauno Waidla were each, in separate trials, convicted of first degree murder with special circumstances and sentenced to death in the killing of Viivi Piirisild. We affirmed each of their convictions and sentences on automatic appeal ( People v. Sakarias (2000) 22 Cal.4th 596 , 94 Cal. Rptr.2d 17 , 995 P.2d 152 ( Sakarias ); People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690 , 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396 , 996 P.2d 46 ( Waidla )), but issued orders to show cause in response to their petitions for writs of habeas corpus, on claims the prosecutor, in each trial, had presented factual theories inconsistent with those presented at the codefendant's trial. In response to Waidla's petition, we also specified a procedural issue: whether claims of error under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 ( Miranda ) are cognizable on habeas corpus. On receipt of the returns and traverses, we consolidated the two causes for consideration and decision and appointed a referee to hear evidence and make factual findings. The referee has now issued his report, and the parties have…