Pillor

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS AND GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE

On May 6, 2005, the Court heard oral argument on defendant’s motion to dismiss his indictment under 18 U.S.C. § 228 , the Child Support and Recovery Act, and his motion to strike the “mandatory presumption” contained in 18 U.S.C. § 228 (b). Having carefully considered the arguments of counsel and the papers submitted, the Court hereby DENIES the motion to dismiss and GRANTS the motion to strike for the reasons set forth below.

I. Motion to Dismiss Indictment

Defendant moves to dismiss the indictment on grounds that 18 U.S.C. § 228 exceeds Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause. Defendant argues that the Ninth Circuit’s decision upholding the constitutionality of the statute, United States v. Mussari, 95 F.3d 787 (9th Cir.1996), has been “fatally undermined” by United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 , 120 S.Ct. 1740 , 146 L.Ed.2d 658 (2000).

The Court finds that 18 U.S.C. § 228 does not offend the Commerce Clause. The five circuits that have addressed this issue since Morrison have concurred in this assessment. See United States v. Klinzing, 315 F.3d 803, 806-07 (7th Cir.2003); United…