People v. Johnson

Certiorari Granted in Part December 1, 2003. See 124 S.Ct. 817 .

Case Dismissed May 3, 2004. See 124 S.Ct. 1833 .

CHIN, J.

During jury selection, each party is entitled to a limited number of peremptory challenges. (Code Civ. Proa, § 231.) However, exercising peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors solely because of group bias, for example, on racial grounds, violates both the California Constitution { People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 , 148 Cal.Rptr. 890 , 583 P.2d 748 ( Wheeler) ) and the United States Constitution ( Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 ( Batson ).) Both Wheeler and, later, Batson established procedures for courts to follow when one party objects to the other party's peremptory challenges. Defendant contends that California's procedures violate Batson in two respects.

First, although both Wheeler and Batson require the objector to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory use of peremptory challenges before the other party must explain its challenges, Wheeler used two terms—"strong likelihood" and "reasonable inference"—to describe the necessary showing of group bias; Batson used the single term, "an…

I concur in parts I., II.A. and II.C. of the majority opinion. With respect to the proper standard of proof for establishing a prima facie showing under People v. Wheeler (1978) *1329 22 Cal.3d 258 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 890 , 583 P.2d 748 ] and Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 [ 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 ], I dissent and join part II. of Justice Kennard’s dissenting opinion.

A peremptory challenge is presumed to have been based on valid grounds. If a defendant seeks to rebut this presumption, claiming that a prosecutor is improperly using peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors solely because of group bias, the defendant must first establish a prima facie showing of discriminatory use. 1 (Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 [ 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 ] (Batson); People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 890 , 583 P.2d 748 ] (Wheeler).) If the trial court finds that a prima facie case has been established, it will ask the prosecutor to explain the basis for the peremptory challenges. If, after hearing the explanations, “the court finds that the burden of justification is not sustained as to any of the questioned peremptory challenges, the presumption of their validity is rebutted . . . and it must dismiss the jurors thus far selected.” (Wheeler, supra, at p. 282 .)

This case presents two issues concerning motions based on Wheeler and Batson objecting to prosecutorial peremptory challenges: (1) Should this court use comparative juror analysis—comparing the challenged jurors with others who were not challenged—in…

During jury selection, each party is entitled to a limited number of peremptory challenges. (Code Civ. Proc., § 231.) However, exercising peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors solely because of group bias, for example, on racial grounds, violates both the California Constitution (P eople v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 890 , 583 P.2d *1306 748 ] (Wheeler)) and the United States Constitution (Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 [ 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 ] (Batson)). Both Wheeler and, later, Batson established procedures for courts to follow when one party objects to the other party’s peremptory challenges. Defendant contends that California’s procedures violate Batson in two respects.

First, although both Wheeler and Batson require the objector to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory use of peremptory challenges before the other party must explain its challenges, Wheeler used two terms— “strong likelihood” and “reasonable inference”—to describe the necessary showing of group bias; Batson used the single term, “an inference of discriminatory purpose.” (Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 94 [ 106 S.Ct. at p. 1721 ]; Wheeler, supra,…