Elkins
Elkins v. Superior Court
Opinion
concurrence Opinion
Werdegar, J.
I agree that the superior court’s local rule and trial scheduling order were inconsistent with statutory provisions of the Evidence Code and Code of Civil Procedure, particularly the hearsay rule of Evidence Code section 1200. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1354—1363.) I also agree the trial court abused its discretion in excluding petitioner’s exhibits; because the rule and order were inconsistent with state law, enforcing these invalid measures to exclude virtually all of a party’s evidence was necessarily an abuse of discretion. But given the existence of the local rule and order at the time of trial, I would not conclude that the trial judge acted arbitrarily or unduly “mechanically” in excluding petitioner’s evidence. (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 1365.) The trial court excused one breach of the order (petitioner’s late submission of his exhibits) and explained to petitioner the other (failure of petitioner’s declaration to establish the foundation for his exhibits). The court then offered petitioner an opportunity to cure the violation, an opportunity petitioner, for whatever reason, did not pursue. Despite petitioner’s sudden offer to give up his interest in the family home,…
lead Opinion
George, J.
Petitioner Jeffrey Elkins represented himself during a trial conducted in marital dissolution proceedings instituted by his wife, Marilyn Elkins (real party in interest), in the Contra Costa Superior Court. A local superior court rule and a trial scheduling order in the family law court provided that in dissolution trials, parties must present their cases by means of written declarations. The testimony of witnesses under direct examination was not allowed except in “unusual circumstances,” although upon request parties were permitted to cross-examine declarants. In addition, parties were required to establish in their pretrial declarations the admissibility of all exhibits they sought to introduce at trial.
Petitioner’s pretrial declaration apparently failed to establish the evidentiary foundation for all but two of his exhibits. Accordingly, the court excluded the 34 remaining exhibits. Without the exhibits, and without the ability through oral testimony to present his case or establish a foundation for *1345 his exhibits, petitioner rested his case. As the court observed, the trial proceeded “quasi by default,” and the court’s disposition of the parties’ property…
Opinion
Law Offices of Marjorie G. Fuller, Marjorie G. Fuller, Fullerton, and Shara Beral Witkin, Irvine, for Southern California Chapter of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, Northern California Chapter of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, Los Angeles County Bar Association, Los Angeles County Bar Association Family Law Section, Orange County Bar Association, Honorable Donald B. King, Honorable Sheila Prell Sonenshine, Honorable J.E.T. Rutter and Honorable Richard Denner as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.
Horvitz & Levy, David S. Ettinger, Encino; Eisenberg and Hancock and Jon B. Eisenberg, Oakland, for Respondent.
Fancher & Wickland, Paige Leslie Wickland; Harkins & Sargent and Daniel S. Harkins for Real Party in Interest.
Fox and Bank, Ronald S. Granberg, Salinas, Dawn Gray, Grass Valley, Linda Seinturier, Redding, Kathryn Fox, Bakersfield, Brigeda D. Bank; and Stephen Temko, San Diego, for Association of Certified Family Law Specialists as Amicus Curiae upon the request of the Supreme Court.
Lee C. Pearce, Walnut Creek, for the Family Law Section of the Contra Costa County Bar Association as Amicus Curiae upon the request of the Supreme Court.