Hurtado

Resolving a question we left open in People v. Torres (2001) 25 Cal.4th 680, 686 , footnote 2 [ 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 824 , 22 P.3d 871 ], *1182 we hold that before a defendant can be committed or recommitted under the Sexually Violent Predators Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq. (SVPA)), 1 the trier of fact must find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant is likely to commit sexually violent predatory behavior upon release. Thus, the judge or jury trying the case must determine not only whether the defendant is likely to “engage in sexually violent criminal behavior” (§ 6600, subd. (a)), but also whether that behavior is likely to be directed “toward a stranger, a person of casual acquaintance with whom no substantial relationship exists, or an individual with whom a relationship has been established or promoted for the primary purpose of victimization.” (§ 6600, subd. (e).)

The Court of Appeal here reached the same conclusion, and held that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury to determine whether defendant was likely to commit future predatory acts. The Court of Appeal also concluded, however, that under the facts of this case the error was…

I accept the majority’s statutory construction linking commitment as a sexually violent predator (SVP) to the risk of future “predatory” acts. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600, subd. (e); see id., §§ 6600, subd. (a)(1), 6604.) 1 1 also agree with the majority that failure to so instruct defendant’s jury was harmless, and that the challenged commitment order should not be reversed on this ground. I write separately, however, to question the majority’s explicit holding that the demanding Chapman 2 standard of prejudice must apply—a holding that seems both unjustified and unnecessary in this case. I briefly address each point in turn.

The standard of prejudice to be applied in civil commitment proceedings to the form of error found here is more complicated than the majority suggests. The analytical framework appears in People v. Cahill (1993) 5 Cal.4th 478 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 582 , 853 P.2d 1037 ] (Cahill), which the majority fails to discuss in detail.

The general rule in this state is that in order to find “a miscarriage of justice” warranting reversal of the judgment (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13), the reviewing court must believe “it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to…

Resolving a question we left open in People v. Torres (2001) 25 Cal.4th 680, 686 , footnote 2, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 824 , 22 P.3d 871 , We hold that before a defendant can be committed or recommitted under the Sexually Violent Predators Act (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 6600 et seq. (SVPA)), [1] the trier of fact must find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant is likely to commit sexually violent predatory behavior upon release. Thus, the judge or jury trying the case must determine not only whether the defendant is likely to "engage in sexually violent criminal behavior" (§ 6600, subd. (a)), but also whether that behavior is likely to be directed "toward a stranger, a person of casual acquaintance with whom no substantial relationship exists, or an individual with whom a relationship has been established or promoted for the primary purpose of victimization." (§ 6600, subd. (e).)

The Court of Appeal here reached the same conclusion, and held that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury to determine whether defendant was likely to commit future predatory acts. The Court of Appeal also concluded, however, that under the facts of this case the error was…