Storm

This case involves issues, previously unaddressed by this court, which arise under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 ( Miranda ) and its progeny. During an investigation of his wife's homicide, defendant agreed to take a polygraph test. At the police station, he received Miranda warnings and waived his rights, but then said he wished to consult a lawyer before speaking further. Rather than cease questioning immediately, as Miranda and Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (Edwards) require in a custodial setting, the polygraph operator encouraged defendant to keep talking. During this interlude, defendant admitted he killed his wife, claiming an assisted suicide.

Defendant was allowed to leave the station. Two days later, detectives came to his home. After assuring him he would not then be arrested, they interviewed him again without new Miranda warnings. Defendant provided a more detailed version of his assisted-suicide story. The detectives then departed as they had promised.

Defendant was charged with premeditated murder. The trial court excluded all his station house statements made after he…

This case involves issues, previously unaddressed by this court, which arise under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [ 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , 10 A.L.R.3d 974 ] (Miranda) and its progeny. During an investigation of his wife’s homicide, defendant agreed to take a polygraph test. At the police station, he received Miranda warnings and waived his rights, but then said he wished to consult a lawyer before speaking further. Rather than cease questioning immediately, as Miranda and Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477 [ 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 ] (Edwards) require in a custodial setting, the polygraph operator encouraged defendant to keep talking. During this interlude, defendant admitted he killed his wife, claiming an assisted suicide.

Defendant was allowed to leave the station. Two days later, detectives came to his home. After assuring him he would not then be arrested, they interviewed him again without new Miranda warnings. Defendant provided a more detailed version of his assisted-suicide story. The detectives then departed as they had promised.

Defendant was charged with premeditated minder. The trial court excluded all his station house…

Few persons would welcome the prospect of suppressing a murderer’s uncoerced confession. Often, and quite possibly in this case, such a confession affords the primary evidence linking the suspect to his crime. But cases do occur in which suppressing such a confession becomes not only an unwelcome and distasteful option but a constitutional necessity. This is such a case. As I will explain (post, at pp. 1046-1047), the majority’s contrary holding will remove any incentive on the part of law enforcement officers to comply with federal constitutional decisions requiring them to terminate an interrogation once the suspect requests counsel.

The United States Supreme Court long ago admonished that once a suspect invokes his right to counsel, further interrogation must cease until counsel is afforded him, or until the suspect himself initiates further communication. (Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 484-485 [ 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1885 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 ] (Edwards); Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 474 [ 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1627 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , 10 A.L.R.3d 974 ] (Miranda)) Indeed, Miranda could hardly be clearer on the point: “If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the…

I concur in the majority’s holding that defendant’s second confession was not obtained in violation of Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 484-485 [ 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1885 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 ] (Edwards), which requires that once a suspect in custody invokes the right to counsel, the police must cease all interrogation unless the suspect initiates further conversation.

Unlike the majority, however, I would not address defendant’s additional claim that even if his second confession was not obtained in violation of Edwards , that confession was involuntary because it was the tainted product of his earlier, custodial confession. Because, as the majority concedes, defendant did not raise this claim below (maj. opn., ante, at p. 1028, fn. 10), he has not preserved it for our review. (People v. Michaels (2002) 28 Cal.4th 486, 511-512 [ 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 285 , 49 P.3d 1032 ]; People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 339 [ 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 296 , 914 P.2d 846 ].) Therefore, I see no need here to apply the voluntariness analysis this court articulated in People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005 [ 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225 , 929 P.2d 544 ].

I would apply the voluntariness analysis of People v. Bradford,…

I respectfully dissent. Justice Chin’s eloquent dissent illuminates the deep flaws inherent in the majority’s reasoning. Beyond what *1040 he has written, there is little to add. I write separately simply to emphasize that, regardless of the degree of one’s enthusiasm concerning the prophylactic protections afforded by Miranda v. Arizona (165) 384 U.S. 436 [ 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , 10 A.L.R.3d 974 ] (Miranda), we are obligated to follow that decision as long as it remains the law. We should not countenance a ruse whereby Miranda is given judicial lip service—obeyed in name but not in fact. Unfortunately, the court’s opinion today will encourage precisely the sort of subterfuge by some law enforcement investigators, with the ensuing violation of constitutional rights, that Miranda sought to end. (See Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 454-455 [ 86 S.Ct. at p. 1617 ] [noting the various techniques in which law enforcement interrogators are trained to deflect, if not defeat, a subject’s professed desire to speak with an attorney]; People v. Peevy (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1184, 1205-1207 [ 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 865 , 953 P.2d 1212 ]; see also People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, 445 [ 20…