MEMORANDUM DECISION DENYING DEFENDANTS’ CITY OF SONORA, CHIEF OF POLICE MACE McINTOSH AND OFFICER HAL PROCK’S MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT (Doc. 58)

Before the Court is the motion of Defendants City of Sonora, Chief of Police Mace McIntosh and Officer Hal Prock’s motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) and for a more definite statement.

Plaintiff filed the FAC pursuant to the Memorandum Decision filed on September 22, 2009, 691 F.Supp.2d 1123 (E.D.Cal.2009) (“September 22 Memorandum Decision”). As “Facts Common to All Causes of Action,” the FAC alleges:

The FAC alleges causes of action for false imprisonment (Second Cause of Action), battery (Third Cause of Action), intentional infliction of emotional distress (Fourth Cause of Action), excessive force in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Eighth Cause of Action), and Monell liability (Ninth Cause of Action).

Defendants move to dismiss these causes of action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Alternatively, Defendants move for a more definite statement.

A. MOTION TO DISMISS.

1. Governing Standards.

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of the complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir.2001). Dismissal is warranted under Rule 12(b)(6) where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or where the complaint presents a cognizable legal theory yet fails to plead essential facts under that theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir.1984). In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must assume the truth of all factual allegations and must construe all inferences from them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir.2002). However, legal conclusions need not be taken as true merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations. Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir.2003). “A district court should grant a motion to dismiss if plaintiffs have not pled ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Williams ex rel. Tabiu v. Gerber Products Co., 523 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir.2008), quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 , 127 S.Ct. 1955 , 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). “ ‘Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’ ” Id. “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiffs obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic, id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 . A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. at 556 , 127 S.Ct. 1955 . The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully, Id. Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’ ” Id. at 557 , 127 S.Ct. 1955 . In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 1937 , 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), the Supreme Court explained:

Immunities and other affirmative defenses may be upheld on a motion to dismiss only when they are established on the face of the complaint. See Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 759 (9th Cir.1999); Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir.1980) When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court may consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached to the complaint, documents relied upon but not attached to the complaint when authenticity is not contested, and matters of which the court takes judicial notice. Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 705-706 (9th Cir.1998).

2. Qualified Immunity.

Defendants move to dismiss the Eighth Cause' of Action on the ground that the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from liability for damages under Section 1983.

The Eighth Cause of Action, after incorporating all preceding allegations, alleges that Defendants McIntosh and Prock “subjected Plaintiff to unreasonable seizure of his person without reasonable or probable cause,” “wrongfully caused Plaintiff to be restrained, arrested, confined and/or detained, which amounted to a seizure of Plaintiffs person,” “intentionally effected this seizure of Plaintiff by use of unlawful and excessive force against him, a minor child at the time,” that the “force used by Defendant officers against Plaintiff was not objectively reasonable under the circumstances,” and that Plaintiff was physically and emotionally harmed thereby.

Qualified immunity serves to shield government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 , 102 S.Ct. 2727 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). In Pearson v. Callahan, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 808 , 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009), the Supreme Court summarized the purpose of qualified immunity:

Deciding qualified immunity normally entails a two-step analysis. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 , 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151 , 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). First, “taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officers’ conduct violated a constitutional right?” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 , 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151 , 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). If the court determines that the conduct did not violate a constitutional right, the inquiry is over and the officer is entitled to qualified immunity. However, if the court determines that the conduct did violate a constitutional right, Saucier’s second prong requires the court to determine whether, at the time of the violation, the constitutional right was “clearly established.” Id. “The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Id. at 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151 . This inquiry is wholly objective and is undertaken in light of the totality of the specific factual circumstances of each case. Id. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151 . Even if the violated right is clearly established, Saucier recognized that, in certain situations, it may be difficult for a police officer to determine how to apply the relevant legal doctrine to the particular circumstances he faces. If an officer makes a mistake in applying the relevant legal doctrine, he is not precluded from claiming qualified immunity so long as the mistake is reasonable. If “the officer’s mistake as to what the law requires is reasonable, ... the officer is entitled to the immunity defense.” Id. at 205, 121 S.Ct. 2151 . In Pearson , the Supreme Court ruled that “while the sequence set forth [in Saucier ] is often appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as mandatory.” Pearson, id. at 818. “The judges of the district courts and the courts of appeal should be permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Id. In Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 , 125 S.Ct. 596 , 160 L.Ed.2d 583 (2004), the Supreme Court reiterated:

543 U.S. at 198-199 , 125 S.Ct. 596 . However, as explained in Wilkins v. City of Oakland, 350 F.3d 949, 956 (9th Cir.2003), cert. denied sub nom. Scarrot v. Wilkins, 543 U.S. 811 , 125 S.Ct. 43 , 160 L.Ed.2d 14 (2004):

Defendants argue that this action should be dismissed before discovery in order to preclude expenditure of significant time and money:

Defendants argue that qualified immunity has been established in connection with the detention and handcuffing of Plaintiff and his transportation by Officer Prock in the police vehicle to Plaintiffs uncle’s home.

Defendants argue that Officer Prock’s conduct in handcuffing Plaintiff was objectively reasonable under the circumstances because Officer Prock was summoned to the school and informed that Plaintiff was “disruptive” and “out of control”:

Defendants further argue that, even if Officer Prock’s conduct was not reasonable, he is entitled to qualified immunity because his conduct would have been the result of mistaken judgment made in good faith and not a knowing violation of the law:

Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendants had a right to come to the school to investigate the report of an allegedly “out of control” and “disruptive” student. However, after Defendants arrived at the school, Plaintiff argues that the decision to handcuff Plaintiff violated Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment rights because, based on the allegations of the FAC, Plaintiff was no longer acting in an out of control or disruptive manner. Plaintiff relies on Gray ex rel. Alexander v. Bostic, 458 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir.2006), cert. denied, 550 U.S. 956 , 127 S.Ct. 2428 , 167 L.Ed.2d 1129 (2007), as authority for his position.

In Bostic , an elementary school student brought a Section 1983 action against a deputy sheriff who served as a school resource officer (SRO), the sheriff, and others, arising from the detention and handcuffing of the student during a physical education class. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District Court’s denial of defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity. In Bostic , a p.e. coach believéd that Gray was not doing jumping jacks with the class; when Gray failed to comply with the coach’s order that she do so, the coach told her to come to the wall; when Gray did so, she allegedly told the coach that she punch or hit the coach; although Gray denied that she stated she would punch or hit the coach, she did not dispute that she would do something physical to the coach. Deputy Bostic witnessed the exchange between the coach and Gray. Deputy Bostic escorted Gray from the gym, told Gray to turn around and placed her in handcuffs. Gray stood with the handcuffs on for five minutes. On appeal, the student, Gray, argued that Deputy Bostic used excessive force in detaining her because he lacked a right to detain her at all. 458 F.3d at 1304 . The Eleventh Circuit applied the reasonableness standard articulated in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341-342 , 105 S.Ct. 733 , 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985), to school seizures, by law enforcement officers:

The Eleventh Circuit ruled that, because Deputy Bostic witnessed Gray’s threat in a school setting, stopping Gray to question her about her conduct was reasonable. Id. at 1305. The Eleventh Circuit then ruled:

458 F.3d at 1305-1306 . The Eleventh Circuit then addressed whether Deputy Bostic’s violation of Gray’s Fourth Amendment rights violated a clearly established constitutional right:

458 F.3d at 1307 .

Plaintiff asserts that two facts which raise the level of intrusiveness of an investigatory seizure are the use of handcuffs and the detention of a suspect in a police vehicle, citing Bennett v. City of Eastpointe, 410 F.3d 810, 836-840 (6th Cir.2005).

In Bennett , African-American bicycle riders who were stopped by police brought a Section 1983 action alleging Fourth Amendment violations. The Sixth Circuit addressed qualified immunity from liability when the youths were handcuffed and detained in the back of the police car during the Terry stop:

Plaintiff also cites Tekle v. United States, 511 F.3d 839 (9th Cir.2007). In Tekle , a team of twenty-three federal law enforcement agents executed search and arrest warrants for Tekle’s parents, suspected of narcotics trafficking and tax-related offenses. When the officers executed the warrants, the mother told the officers that her eleven-year-old son was in the garage. When the officers opened the garage, the officers told Tekle to put his hands up. Tekle did not realize the officers were addressing him and turned to run into the house. The officers again told Tekle to turn around with his hands up. Tekle turned around and started walking out of the garage with his hands up. One of the officers told Tekle to get on the ground, so he lay face down on the drive way. The officer held a gun to Tekle’s head, searched him and handcuffed him. The officer lifted Tekle from behind by the chain of the handcuffs and took him out to the sidewalk, where Tekle sat, still handcuffed, until his father was brought out of the house, approximately fifteen minutes later. After the father was brought out, the officers removed the handcuffs from Tekle. On the issue of qualified immunity, the Ninth Circuit ruled:

511 F.3d at 850 .

Defendants argue that Tekle is not controlling because there “is no claim that Officer Prock prolonged the detention, or that he did anything except place the plaintiff in handcuffs and transport him in a police vehicle to his uncle.”

Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ attempted distinction of Tekle is without merit: “It is 9th Circuit law that the need for force must be weighed against the force used, and minor children who are cooperating with and outnumbered by po lice pose, at best, a minimal need for force.”

Defendants are not entitled to dismissal of the alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment based on the handcuffing of Plaintiff and transporting him while handcuffed to his uncle’s home. According to the allegations of the FAC, Plaintiff became unresponsive to school staff, sat down on a bench in the school playground, folded his arms on his chest, and refused to make eye contact. Although the FAC alleges that the police were told by school staff that Plaintiff was an “ ‘out of control’ juvenile who was ... causing a disturbance at the school,”’ when the officers arrived, Plaintiff was allegedly sitting on the bench with his head down. The FAC alleges that when the officers made contact with Plaintiff, he was calm and cooperative and complied with instructions to stand up from the bench. It is alleged that Plaintiff was surrounded by three police officers and two other adults and that, when asked why Plaintiff was being handcuffed, the Chief of Police responded that it was protocol to do so. There is nothing in these allegations allowing an inference that Plaintiff posed a danger to anyone or that Plaintiff would flee the school. The FAC alleges that Defendants were provided with Plaintiffs contact information in his IEP. Given these allegations and the case authority cited above, it is arguable that the handcuffing of Plaintiff violated his Fourth Amendment rights and, at the time of the violation, the constitutional right was clearly established.

Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Eighth Cause of Action on the basis of qualified immunity from liability is DENIED.

3. Monell Liability.

Defendants move to dismiss the Ninth Cause of Action against Defendant City of Sonora for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

After incorporating all preceding allegations, the Ninth Cause of Action alleges:

Local government entities and local government officials acting in their official capacity can be sued for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief, but only if the allegedly unconstitutional actions took place pursuant to some “policy statement, ordinance, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers ....” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 , 98 S.Ct. 2018 , 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Alternatively, if no formal policy exists, plaintiffs may point to “customs and usages” of the local government entity. Id. A local government entity cannot be held liable simply because it employs someone who has acted unlawfully. Id. at 694 , 98 S.Ct. 2018 . See also Haugen, 351 F.3d at 393 (“Municipalities cannot be held liable under a traditional respondeat superior theory. Rather, they may be held liable only when action pursuant to official municipal policy of .some nature caused a constitutional tort.... [T]o establish municipal liability, a plaintiff must prove the existence of an unconstitutional municipal policy.”).

To prevail in a civil rights claim against a local government under Monell , a plaintiff must satisfy a three-part test:

Id. at 690-92 , 98 S.Ct. 2018 . There are a number of ways to prove a policy or custom of a municipality. A plaintiff may show (1) “a longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the ‘standard operating procedure’ of the local government entity;” (2) “the decision-making official was, as a matter of state law, a final policymaking authority whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy in the area of decision;” or (3) “the official with final policymaking authority either delegated that authority to, or ratified the decision of, a subordinate.” Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1147 (9th Cir.2005). The Ninth Circuit has held that a municipal policy “may be inferred from widespread practices or evidence of repeated constitutional violations for which the errant municipal officers were not discharged or reprimanded.” Id.

A municipality may still be liable under Monell for a single incident where: (1) the person causing the violation has “final policymaking authority;” (2) the “final policymaker” “ratified” a subordinate’s actions; or (3) the “final policymaker” acted with deliberate indifference to a subordinate’s constitutional violations. Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231 (9th Cir.1999).

While Plaintiff concedes that written Handcuffing Policy does not state that all detainees must be handcuffed, the FAC alleges that the Chief of Police maintained a practice and custom of ignoring the written policy and requiring all detainees, regardless of the circumstances, to be handcuffed. Plaintiff cites Rendon v. City of Fresno, 2007 WL 2302340 at *4 (E.D.Cal., Aug. 8, 2007):

Defendant City of Sonora’s motion to dismiss the Ninth Cause of Action is DENIED. The allegations of the FAC suffice to state a claim for Monell liability. Whether Plaintiff can prove Monell liability depends on the facts, which must be resolved at summary judgment or trial.

4. Second Cause of Action for False Imprisonment.

Defendants move to dismiss the Second Cause of Action for false imprisonment for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

“The elements of a tortious claim of false imprisonment are: (1) the nonconsensual, intentional confinement of a person, (2) without lawful privilege, and (3) for an appreciable period of time, however brief.” Easton v. Sutter Coast Hosp., 80 Cal.App.4th 485, 496, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 316 (2000). Defendants contend that dismissal is required because “the officers were acting reasonably and with lawful privilege of protecting the public peace and order and are immune from suit.” Defendants cite Billington v. Smith, 292 F.3d 1177, 1188-1189 (9th Cir.2002), a case involving deadly force under Section 1983, that “even though the officers might have had ‘less intrusive means available to them,’ and perhaps under departmental guidelines should have ‘developed a tactical plan’ instead of attempting an immediate seizure, police officers ‘need not avail themselves of the least intrusive means of responding’ and need only act ‘within that range of conduct we identify as reasonable.’ ” Defendants cite Knapps v. City of Oakland, 647 F.Supp.2d 1129, 1166 (N.D.Cal.2009):

Defendants assert that they are entitled to immunity pursuant to California Government Code § 821.6, which provides that a public employee is immune from liability for injuries caused by instituting or prosecuting any judicial or administrative proceedings, even if the employee acts maliciously and without probable cause.

Whether Defendants were acting reasonably and with lawful privilege is a question of fact which cannot be resolved in a motion to dismiss. In addition, California denies immunity to police officers who use excessive force in arresting a suspect. Robinson v. Solano County, 278 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir.2002), citing Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, 54 Cal.3d 202, 215 , 285 Cal.Rptr. 99 , 814 P.2d 1341 (1991). Public employees are not entitled to immunity in suits for false arrest or false imprisonment. Id., citing California Government Code § 820.4. Because the Defendant Officers may not be entitled to immunity, the City of Sonora is not entitled to immunity. Id., citing California Government Code § 815.2. Defendants reference to Section 821.6 makes no sense in the context of this action because the FAC does not allege that Defendants instituted or prosecuted any judicial or administrative proceedings.

Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Second Cause of Action for false imprisonment is DENIED.

5. Third Came of Action for Battery.

Defendants move to dismiss the Third Cause of Action for battery for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

As explained in Brown v. Ransweiler, 171 Cal.App.4th 516, 526-527 , 89 Cal.Rptr.3d 801 (2009):

Defendants reiterate that the officers, in good faith, acted in an objectively reasonable manner and, therefore, the Third Cause of Action should be dismissed. Defendants refer to the allegations that the City of Sonora has a written handcuff policy, which is a discretionary procedure and that the officers only arrived at the school based on information from school officials, including a specialist, that Plaintiff was out of control. Defendants argue:

For the reasons already stated, Defendants’ contentions raise factual issues, especially given the allegation that the Chief of Police stated that he was handcuffing Plaintiff because of protocol and not because of any concern for safety or flight.

Defendants rely on California Government Code § 820.2 in arguing that Defendants are entitled to immunity. Section 820.2 provides:

Defendants, relying on Section 820.2, move to dismiss the Third Cause of Action on the ground that government officials are not personally liable for their discretionary acts within the scope of their authority, even where it is alleged that their conduct was malicious.

In Caldwell v. Montoya, 10 Cal.4th 972 , 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 842 , 897 P.2d 1320 (1995), the California Supreme Court, citing Johnson v. State, 69 Cal.2d 782 , 73 Cal.Rptr. 240 , 447 P.2d 352 (1968), ruled:

10 Cal.4th at 981-982 , 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 842 , 897 P.2d 1320 .

Here, the decision to handcuff Plaintiff cannot be viewed as a basic policy decision, but rather it must be viewed as a ministerial decision implementing a basic policy already formulated.

Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Third Cause of Action for battery is DENIED.

6. Fourth Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.

Defendants move to dismiss the Fourth Cause of Action for intentional infliction of emotional distress for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

After incorporating all preceding allegations, the Fourth Cause of Action alleges:

Under California law, the elements of a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiffs suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct. Hergenroeder v. Travelers Property Cas. Ins. Co., 249 F.R.D. 595, 620 (E.D.Cal.2008). Conduct to be outrageous must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community. Id.

Defendants argue that the FAC does not allege extreme or outrageous conduct:

Defendants further argue that the FAC does not allege severe emotional distress. “Severe emotional distress means “ ‘emotional distress of such substantial quality or enduring quality that no reasonable [person] in civilized society should be expected to endure it.’ ” ” Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal.4th 965, 1004 , 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 550 , 863 P.2d 795 (1993). Defendants argue:

As discussed above, it is questionable that Defendants handcuffed Plaintiff for his own safety. The allegations of the FAC are that Plaintiff was handcuffed at the direction of the Chief of Police pursuant to a protocol, which is not supported by the alleged written Handcuffing Policy. Further, the allegations are that Defendants ignored Plaintiffs IEP after they were advised of it and instead of contacting family members to come to the school, removed Plaintiff from the school in a police vehicle. Whether this conduct is “outrageous” and caused “severe emotional distress” is a question of fact. The Fourth Cause of Action sufficiently alleges a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Defendants also move to dismiss the Fourth Cause of Action on the ground that the officers are immune from liability pursuant to California Government Code §§ 821.6 and 820.2. Defendants cite Kemmerer v. County of Fresno, 200 Cal.App.3d 1426 , 246 Cal.Rptr. 609 (1988). In Kem merer, a civil service employee brought suit against the county and individual county officials based on disciplinary proceedings instituted against him and his discharge arising out of those proceedings. One of the causes of action was for intentional infliction of emotional distress. In finding immunity under Section 820.2, the Kemmerer Court held:

Kemmerer, 200 Cal.App.3d at 1437 , 246 Cal.Rptr. 609 .

However, as discussed above, the California Supreme Court’s decision in Caldwell v. Montoya appears to apply a different standard than that applied in Kemmerer . Defendants’ decision to handcuff Plaintiff and take him to his uncle in a police car cannot be viewed as a basic policy decision, but rather it must be viewed as a ministerial decision implementing a basic policy already formulated. Defendants reference to Section 821.6 makes no sense in the context of this action because the FAC does not allege that Defendants instituted or prosecuted any judicial or administrative proceedings.

Defendants motion to dismiss the Fourth Cause of Action is DENIED.

7. Punitive Damages.

The FAC prays for exemplary damages against the City of Sonora on each of the causes of action alleged against the City. Although not asserted by Defendants as a ground for dismissal of the FAC, a municipality entity is immune from punitive damages under Section 1983. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 , 101 S.Ct. 2748 , 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981). California Government Code § 818 provides:

Because Defendants did not move for dismissal of the prayers for punitive damages against the City, the Court does not dismiss these allegations sua sponte. However, Plaintiff is advised to revise the requested relief in his scheduling and pretrial statements.

C. Motion for More Definite Statement.

1. Governing Standards.

“Under the liberal pleading standards, ‘pleadings in federal courts are only required to fairly notify the opposing party of the nature of the claim.’ ” City of South Pasadena v. Slater, 56 F.Supp.2d 1095, 1105 (C.D.Cal.1999). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e) provides:

A Rule 12(e) motion for a more definite statement must be considered in light of Rule 8’s liberal pleading standards in federal court. See, e.g., Bureerong v. Uvawas, 922 F.Supp. 1450, 1461 (C.D.Cal.1996).

A Rule 12(e) motion is proper only if the complaint is so indefinite that the defendant cannot ascertain the nature of the claim being asserted, ie., so vague that the defendant cannot begin to frame a response. See Famolare, Inc. v. Edison Bros. Stores, Inc., 525 F.Supp. 940, 949 (E.D.Cal.1981). The Court must deny the motion if the complaint is specific enough to notify defendant of the substance of the claim being asserted. See Bureerong, 922 F.Supp. at 1461 ; see also San Bernardino Pub. Employees Ass’n v. Stout, 946 F.Supp. 790, 804 (C.D.Cal.1996) (“A motion for a more definite statement is used to attack unintelligibility, not mere lack of detail, and a complaint is sufficient if it is specific enough to apprise the defendant of the substance of the claim asserted against him or her.”).

The Court may also deny the motion if the detail sought by a motion for more definite statement is obtainable through discovery. See Davison v. Santa Barbara High Sch. Dist., 48 F.Supp.2d 1225, 1227 (C.D.Cal.1998). “Thus, the class of pleadings that are appropriate subjects for a motion under Rule 12(e) is quite small— the pleading must be sufficiently intelligible for the court to be able to make out one or more potentially viable legal theories on which the claimant might proceed, but it must not be so vague or ambiguous that the opposing party cannot respond, even with a simple denial, in good faith or without prejudice to himself.” Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure (2d ed.) § 1376.

Whether to grant a Rule 12(e) motion for a more definite statement lies within the wide discretion of the district court. See id. § 1377. However, “[m]otions for more definite statement are viewed with disfavor, and are rarely granted.” William W. Schwarzer, A. Wallace Tashima, and James M. Wagstaffe, Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial § 9:351 (2000).

2. Merits of Motion.

Defendants move for a more definite statement, asserting that the FAC alleges that Defendants were malicious, oppressive, fraudulent and acted in bad faith, but sets forth no specific facts to support these allegations, thereby necessitating a more definite statement. Defendants rely on Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 , 118 S.Ct. 1584 , 140 L.Ed.2d 759 (1998).

In Crawford-El , the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff bringing a constitutional action against government officials for damages, for which an official’s improper motive is a necessary element, need not adduce clear and convincing evidence of improper motive in order to defeat an official’s motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court then stated:

523 U.S. at 597-598 , 118 S.Ct. 1584 .

Plaintiff responds that the standard for the alleged Fourth Amendment violations is one of objective reasonableness. See discussion supra. Therefore, a more definite statement is not required.

Given the standards set forth above, Defendants’ motion for more definite statement is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint and for more definite statement is DENIED;

2. Plaintiffs counsel shall prepare and lodge a form of order consistent with this Memorandum Decision within five (5) court days following service of this Memorandum Decision.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

. Plaintiff and Defendants Sonora School District and Karen Sinclair have settled this action.