Wright

*966 Opinion

In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768 [ 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 33 , 872 P.2d 574 ] (Christian S.), we reaffirmed that an actual, though unreasonable, belief in the need to defend oneself from an imminent threat of death or great bodily injury negates the malice element of murder, reducing the offense to manslaughter. (See also People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 674 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 84 , 603 P.2d 1 ].) We granted review in this case to consider whether to extend this “doctrine of imperfect self-defense” (Christian S., at p. 771) to a case in which the defendant’s actual, though unreasonable, belief in the need to defend himself was based on delusions and/or hallucinations resulting from mental illness or voluntary intoxication, without any objective circumstances suggestive of a threat. After studying the record, we conclude that we do not need to reach that issue here, because defendant was able to claim imperfect self-defense, the jury heard evidence supporting that defense, and the trial court’s exclusion of additional evidence supporting that defense was not prejudicial to defendant. Accordingly, because defendant was not prejudiced by the exclusion of this…

Concurring.—A series of flawed decisions and patchwork legislative solutions has left the law governing homicide in California confusing and in some cases anomalous. For the reasons stated in my majority opinion, ante, we cannot decide the issue we had intended to decide in this case, but considering the impenetrable labyrinth that California’s homicide law has become, perhaps the Legislature is better situated to provide the answer than we are. I write this concurrence to describe how we got ourselves into this labyrinth and to suggest the way out.

Much of the confusion is traceable to our efforts to define malice aforethought. “California statutes have long separated criminal homicide into two classes, the greater offense of murder and the lesser included offense of manslaughter. The distinguishing feature is that murder includes, but manslaughter lacks, the element of malice.” (People v. Rios (2000) 23 Cal.4th 450, 460 [ 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 512 , 2 P.3d 1066 ] (Rios).) But what exactly is malice in this context? The plain text of Penal Code section 188 1 seems to suggest that intent unlawfully to kill by itself establishes malice: Malice “is express when there is manifested a…

In In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768 , 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 33 , 872 P.2d 574 ( Christian S. ), we reaffirmed that an actual, though unreasonable, belief in the need to defend oneself from an imminent threat of death or great bodily injury negates the malice element of murder, reducing the offense to manslaughter. (See also People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 674 , 160 Cal.Rptr. 84 , 603 P.2d 1 .) We granted review in this case to consider whether to extend this "doctrine of imperfect self-defense" ( Christian S., at p. 771, 30 Cal. Rptr.2d 33 , 872 P.2d 574 ) to a case in which the defendant's actual, though unreasonable, belief in the need to defend himself was based on delusions and/or hallucinations resulting from mental illness or voluntary intoxication, without any objective circumstances suggestive of a threat. After studying the record, we conclude that we do not need to reach that issue here, because defendant was able to claim imperfect self-defense, the jury heard evidence supporting that defense, and the trial court's exclusion of additional evidence supporting that defense was not prejudicial to defendant. Accordingly, because defendant was not…