This is an appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Oregon, refusing to grant taxpayer an income tax refund for the year 1953. Jurisdiction below rested on 28 U.S.C. § 1346 . This court has jurisdiction on the appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 .

The sole issue before us is the amount of gain realized by appellant upon the sale of her residence on July 27, 1953, for the sum of $325,000. She entered into a written cost-plus contract to construct a new residence on April 1, 1954. The eighteen months period which is here of importance expired January 27, 1955. Appellant “used” her new residence prior to that date, but only $131,-099.31 worth of work was performed to and including that date, while $149,-742.46 was the cost of work performed after that date, out of the total cost of $280,841.77.

In appellant’s original 1953 income tax return, she had estimated the probable cost of her new house at $115,000, and paid the tax on a taxable gain of $209,-567.50. In her amended income tax return for 1953, she used the actual construction cost figure hereinabove mentioned, computed her taxable gain at $43,725.73, and sued for the alleged overpayment of taxes in the amount of $51,-829.86. The Commissioner allowed as her cost only the amount paid for work actually performed within the eighteen month period.

In filing her amended return, appellant maintained:

In ruling against appellant, the trial judge stated:

This court feels as did the trial judge, that this is an example of inequities that frequently exist in income tax laws and regulations when any line is drawn, before which an exemption exists and after which it does not. However, any change in the law must come through legislative and not judicial action. We cannot fall into the error of judicial legislation.

*31 The statute involved reads in pertinent part:

Internal Revenue Code of 1939, Section 112 (26 U.S.C.1952 ed., § 112):

Treasury Regulation 118, section 29, 112(n) 1(b) (5) provides:

The italicizing of the word “made” is because of the emphasis placed on that by the trial judge, amplified in his opinion that it was “the most important word used in the statute.”

It seems to us that at least one logical interpretation of the statute is to read the phrase following the word “made”— namely: “which are properly chargeable to capital account,” as modifying only the word “improvements,” and not modifying “acquisition, construction, [and] reconstruction.” “Improvements” might or might not be properly chargeable to capital account — dependent upon their *32 nature 1 — but the cost of acquisition and construction almost certainly would be properly chargeable to capital account. “Recontruction” might conceivably not be but in all probability would also be chargeable to capital account.

However logical we may think our interpretation to be, it was not the interpretation placed on the statute by the government in its Regulations, as we have seen above (Treas.Reg. 118 § 29, 112(n) 1(b) (5)), and this is entitled to weight in our consideration of the matter. Diamond v. Sturr, 2 Cir., 1955, 221 F.2d 264 . Nor did the respective Houses of Congress, and their joint committee, agree with us in considering the meaning of this legislation. As the trial judge points out:

The House of Representatives explains its understanding of the language as follows:

One Conference Committee Report states (H.Rep. 1179, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.):

Another Conference Committee report reads (H.Conf.Rep. 1213, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., p. 76 (1951-2 Cum.Bull. 622, 629)):

See also Summary of the Provisions of the Rev.Act of 1951 (H.Rep. 4473, October 1951, p. 29).

We can only conclude, as did the trial court, that the Congress intended to permit the taxpayer to obtain the benefit, taxwise, only of so much of the cost of construction of, or improvements to, a new house as the taxpayer had constructed and used within the eighteen month period herein applicable. We cannot in good conscience rewrite the statute as though it included the words “contractual liabilities incurred during the 18 months period.” The desire of the Congress to provide finality to the deferment provisions of Section 112 (n) must regretfully be respected. Any relief to taxpayers must lie with the legislative rather than the judicial branch of the government.

The judgment is affirmed.

. “An improvement under our land system does not mean a general enhancement of the value of the tract from the occupant’s operation. It has a more limited meaning * * Simpson v. Robinson, 37 Ark. 132, 137 .

“A valuable addition made to property * * * or an amelioration in its condition, amounting to more than mere repairs or replacement of waste, costing labor or capital, and intended to enhance its value, beauty, or utility * * Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 890.

“Improvements” is “a term used in leases, of doubtful meaning * * * when contained in any document, its meaning is generally explained by other words.” Black’s, supra at 891.