Stanistreet

*501 Opinion

Penal Code 1 section 148.6 makes it a misdemeanor to file an allegation of misconduct against a peace officer knowing the allegation to be false. We must decide whether that section violates constitutional free speech rights. Relying primarily on R.A.V. v. St. Paul (1992) 505 U.S. 377 [ 112 S.Ct. 2538 , 120 L.Ed.2d 305 ] (R.A.V.), defendants argue, and the Court of Appeal found, that section 148.6 is unconstitutional because it proscribes knowingly false accusations of misconduct against peace officers only and not against others. “By protecting only peace officers,” the Court of Appeal said, “section 148.6 selectively prohibits expression because of its content. It therefore violates the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.” We conclude that section 148.6 is constitutional on its face.

Section 148.6 proscribes only constitutionally unprotected speech—knowingly false statements of fact. Moreover, it does not apply to all accusations of misconduct against peace officers but only to complaints filed with a law enforcement agency in a way that legally obligates the agency to investigate the complaint. The circumstance that it covers only those…

I agree with the majority that Penal Code section 148.6 (section 148.6) is constitutional because it criminalizes only knowingly false complaints against peace officers, and any content discrimination it embodies by not covering complaints against other public officials is, in light of the substantial secondary effects of a complaint against a peace officer, justifiable under R. A. V. v. St. Paul (1992) 505 U.S. 377 [ 112 S.Ct. 2538 , 120 L.Ed.2d 305 ] (R.A.V.) “ ‘without reference to the content of the . . . speech’ ” (id. at p. 389 [ 112 S.Ct. at p. 2546 ]). (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 508-509 [noting cost to public of mandatory investigation of police misconduct complaints].) Accordingly, I concur in the judgment of reversal and in this aspect of the majority’s reasoning. I disagree, however, that section 148.6 also falls within R.A. V. ’s “special force” exception for content discrimination based on “the very reason the entire class of speech at issue is proscribable” (R.A.V., supra, at p. 388 [ 112 S.Ct. at p. 2545 ]) or its catchall exception, applicable where “there is no realistic possibility that official suppression of ideas is afoot” (id. at p. 390 [ 112 S.Ct. at p.…

Superior Court, Ventura County; John J. Hunter [*] , Judge.

Andrew Wolf, Ventura, for Defendant and Appellant Shaun Stanistreet.

Steven Warner, Ventura, for Defendant and Appellant Barbara Joyce Atkinson.

ACLU Foundation of Southern California, Daniel P. Tokaji, Mark D. Rosenbaum, Los Angeles; ACLU Foundation of Northern California and Alan L. Schlosser, for Defendants and Appellants.

Douglas E. Mirell and Karen R. Thorland, Century City, for National Association for Citizen Oversight of Law Enforcement and Professor Samuel Walker as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.

Michael D. Bradbury, District Attorney, Michael D. Schwartz and Douglas H. Ridley, Deputy District Attorneys, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Lewis, D'Amato, Brisbois & Bisgaard, Joseph Arias and Christopher D. Lockwood, San Bernardino, for City of San Bernardino as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.

Rains, Lucia & Wilkinson and Alison Berry Wilkinson for Peace Officers' Research Association of California Legal Defense Fund as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.

Jones & Mayer, Martin J. Mayer, Long Beach, and Michael R. Capizzi, Santa Ana, for California…