Hill

Conviction of kidnapping and carjacking generally requires proof that the perpetrator committed the criminal acts against the will of the victim, i.e., without the victim’s consent. This requirement presents special problems when the victim is an infant too young to give or withhold consent. In People v. Oliver (1961) 55 Cal.2d 761, 768 [ 12 Cal.Rptr. 865 , 361 P.2d 593 ] (Oliver), we found the against-the-will requirement satisfied as to a person unable to give legal consent if the criminal act “is done for an illegal purpose or with an illegal intent.” We believe an analogous rule is appropriate for carjacking. Applying the rule to this case, we conclude that substantial evidence supports defendant’s convictions for kidnapping and carjacking as to both an infant and the infant’s mother.

I. The Facts and Procedural History

Because defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the convictions, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment below. (People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 34 [ 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 84 , 931 P.2d 262 ].) So viewed, and as relevant to the issues here, the evidence shows that in the evening of April 19, 1996,…

As January R. was removing her seven-month-old daughter Marissa from her car, defendant and his codefendant *862 accosted her and forced her back into the car with Marissa. Defendant drove the car away with all four of them inside. Defendant stopped the car; his codefendant threatened to shoot Marissa and raped her mother January. January then got out of the car and grabbed Marissa from the car. Defendant drove off with his codefendant. A jury convicted defendant of numerous crimes, including two counts of kidnapping and two counts of carjacking. He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions for kidnapping Marissa and for carjacking Marissa.

I agree with the majority that defendant was properly convicted under Penal Code section 207 of kidnapping the infant Marissa. In People v. Oliver (1961) 55 Cal.2d 761, 765, 768 [ 12 Cal.Rptr. 865 , 361 P.2d 593 ], we held that kidnapping an infant or other person unable to give legal consent required both that the kidnapper forcibly take the victim away and that the kidnapper take the victim for an illegal purpose or with an illegal intent. Here, there was evidence both that defendant and his codefendant applied…

Conviction of kidnapping and carjacking generally requires proof that the perpetrator committed the criminal acts against the will of the victim, i.e., without the victim's consent. This requirement presents special problems when the victim is an infant too young to give or withhold consent. In People v. Oliver (1961) 55 Cal.2d 761, 768 ( Oliver ), we found the against-the-will requirement satisfied as to a person unable to give legal consent if the criminal act "is done for an illegal purpose or with an illegal intent." We believe an analogous rule is appropriate for carjacking. Applying the rule to this case, we conclude that substantial evidence supports defendant's convictions for kidnapping and carjacking as to both an infant and the infant's mother.

Because defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the convictions, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment below. ( People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 34 , 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 84 , 931 P.2d 262 .) So viewed, and as relevant to the issues here, the evidence shows that in the evening of April 19, 1996, January R. drove to her Spring Valley home with her seven-month-old…