Montoya

California law prohibits convicting a defendant of two offenses arising from a single criminal act when one is a lesser offense necessarily included in the other. Here, the Court of Appeal held that unlawful taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851) is not a lesser included offense of carjacking (Pen. Code, § 215) 1 and affirmed defendant’s convictions of both offenses. We agree.

I

Responding to a newspaper advertisement, defendant came to Amanda Locke’s home in Kern County to see a car she was selling, a 1994 Jeep. After inspecting the car, defendant asked Locke to take him for a ride. About one-half mile from Locke’s house, defendant asked her to pull over so he could drive. Locke complied. Defendant got in the driver’s seat, but as Locke was entering the passenger side, defendant pulled a gun, ordered her out of the car, and drove off. Locke telephoned police from a nearby house. Bakersfield police officers pursued defendant in a high-speed chase into Los Angeles County, where they arrested him.

A jury convicted defendant of carjacking (§ 215), unlawful taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851), and reckless flight from pursuing peace officers *1034 (Veh. Code, §…

I agree with the majority’s conclusion and with its analysis as far as it goes. I write separately to address what the majority declines to address: defendant’s potentially dispositive argument based on People v. Tufunga (1999) 21 Cal.4th 935 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 143 , 987 P.2d 168 ] (Tufunga), made in support of his claim that an unlawful taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851) is a lesser included offense of carjacking (Pen. Code, § 215).

In Tufunga , we held that under Penal Code section 211 (the robbery statute), a claim of right continues, as at common law, to constitute a defense *1037 to robbery. (Tufunga, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 950 .) In reaching that conclusion, we observed that, at common law, a claim of right was recognized as a defense to both larceny and robbery: to larceny because a claim of right was deemed to negate the felonious-intent-to-steal element of the offense, and to robbery because that offense was viewed as simply an aggravated form of larceny. (Id. at p. 945.) Construing the plain language of the theft and robbery statutes, we concluded that “by adopting the identical phrase ‘felonious taking’ as used in the common law with regard to both offenses, the…

I agree with the majority that we need not decide whether the so-called accusatory pleading test applies here, because even that *1039 test does not aid defendant. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1035-1036.) I write separately only to emphasize the force of the argument against applying the accusatory pleading test in deciding whether conviction of two charged offenses is proper.

The accusatory pleading test has been used to determine whether a defendant received notice of the charges so as to permit conviction of an uncharged lesser offense. (E.g., People v. Lopez (1998) 19 Cal.4th 282, 288-289, 293 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 195 , 965 P.2d 713 ], and cases cited.) We have questioned, without deciding, whether the accusatory pleading test should apply “in other situations.” (People v. Pearson (1986) 42 Cal.3d 351, 356, fn. 2 [ 228 Cal.Rptr. 509 , 721 P.2d 595 ].) Courts of Appeal have refused to apply that test in deciding whether multiple conviction of charged offenses is appropriate. (People v. Miranda (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1464, 1467 [ 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 610 ]; People v. Watterson (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 942, 947, fn. 15 [ 286 Cal.Rptr. 13 ]; People v. Scheidt (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 162, 165-171 […

California law prohibits convicting a defendant of two offenses arising from a single criminal act when one is a lesser offense necessarily included in the other. Here, the Court of Appeal held that unlawful taking of a vehicle (Veh.Code, § 10851) is not a lesser included offense of carjacking (Pen.Code, § 215) [1] and affirmed defendant's convictions of both offenses. We agree.

Responding to a newspaper advertisement, defendant came to Amanda Locke's home in Kern County to see a car she was selling, a 1994 Jeep. After inspecting the car, defendant asked Locke to take him for a ride. About one-half mile from Locke's house, defendant asked her to pull over so he could drive. Locke complied. Defendant got in the driver's seat, but as Locke was entering the passenger side, defendant pulled a gun, ordered her out of the car, and drove off. Locke telephoned police from a nearby house. Bakersfield police officers pursued defendant in a high-speed chase into Los Angeles County, where they arrested him.

A jury convicted defendant of carjacking (§ 215), unlawful taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851), and reckless flight from pursuing peace officers (Veh.Code, § 2800.2),…