On July 22, 1954, the Great Northern Railway Company, a Minnesota corporation, leased to the Ryan Mercantile Company, a Montana corporation, certain real property located in Great Falls, Montana. The lease was to run for a term of twenty years, and the property leased is described in the written instrument as follows:

The lease also contains provisions requiring Ryan, under certain circumstances, to indemnify Great Northern against claims for damages and to appear and defend any suits brought against Great Northern on account of any such damage claims. These provisions read as follows:

On December 31,1958, Evelyn Burditt, the wife of an employee of Ryan, was injured while riding in a car being driven by her husband when the car was struck by a boxcar being pushed by a switch engine owned and operated by Great Northern. The accident occurred on the right of way described in paragraph 2 (A) (2) of the agreement. Mrs. Burditt brought suit against Great Northern alleging that it was negligent in that no bells, warning lights, whistles, gongs, or other warning devices were given, all in violation of Section 72-219 of the Revised Codes of Montana, 1 and that there *632 was no watchman or flagman at the crossing to warn of the approaching switch train. Great Northern tendered the defense of the action to Ryan, but Ryan declined to accept the defense and instituted this action for a declaratory judgment to determine the rights of the parties under the lease agreement.

The trial judge ruled that “under and pursuant to the indemnity provision of said Lease, Ryan Mercantile Company -» * * js obligated to defend, at its expense, the action arising out of said accident * * * and to pay any judgment entered therein and save the Great Northern Railway Company harmless in said action or alleged cause of action.” 2 It is from this judgment that Ryan brings this appeal. Jurisdiction in the district court was based on diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 , and this court has jurisdiction of the appeal under the provisions of 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1291 and 1294.

Ryan concedes that the district judge correctly outlined the questions of law involved when he stated:

We shall consider these questions in the order that they are set forth above.

The right of way is given to-Ryan in paragraph 2(A) (2) of the lease under the general heading “(A) Premises”, and the use granted is described, as “equivalent in use to the rights enjoyed by the public in the use of public highways, for ingress to and egress from Ryan Tract.” Ryan and those having-business with Ryan are permitted to use the right of way in order that Ryan may occupy and use the land and buildings-described in paragraph 2(A) (1) of the lease. The right of way is a necessary and integral part of the agreement of the parties and is described in the agreement under the heading “Premises”. We think that there is no merit in appellant’s contention that it is not part of the “leased' premises,” for it appears from the instrument that the intention of the parties was to include the right of way within, the term “leased premises”.

Neither can we say that it was; the intention of the parties that Ryan’s indemnity agreement should not extend to claims for injuries occurring on the premises which Great Northern uses in common with Ryan. At the time the-lease was entered into Great Northern must have realized that the conduct of' business by Ryan would increase the risk of injury, irrespective of the cause of the injury. To us the agreement is clearly an attempt by Great Northern to insulate itself, as far as possible, from any liability occasioned by the increased risk of injury. The terms of the agreement support this theory, and an analysis of the probable business considerations gives reason to the terms as they are set. forth in the document.

Mrs. Burditt drove to the Ryan plant to bring her husband home from his work at Ryan, and her husband was driving the car away from the Ryan *633 plant at the time of the accident. Certainly the Burditts’ use of the right of way at this time grew “out of business conducted by Ryan on the leased premises” and out of “the use and occupancy thereof by Ryan.” It specifically grew out of the use “by other persons at Ryan’s instance or with Ryan’s consent and knowledge.” The lease contains no express provisions limiting Ryan’s liability to those portions of the property over which Ryan had exclusive control, and we find no implied provisions of the agreement so limiting appellant’s indemnity.

Ryan next contends that it was not the intention of the parties that it should indemnify Great Northern for accidents caused by the sole negligence of Great Northern employees at a place where Great Northern had the duty to provide safeguards. 3 Appellee conceded in its brief that in order to uphold an indemnification agreement for damages •caused by negligent acts of the indemnitee there must be clear and unequivocal terms, but contends that in this case "the terms of the indemnity agreement are clear and unequivocal. We agree. An •examination of the indemnity agreement discloses no ambiguity. The phrases used—“any and all personal injuries”, “of every name and nature which may in any manner arise”, “whether due or not due to the negligence of Great Northern” —demonstrate that Ryan’s indemnity would cover any claim made against Great Northern for damages, no matter where on the premises mentioned in the lease such claim arose, and shows that the parties had in mind that the negligence of Great Northern would be no bar to Ryan’s indemnity obligation. In addition, paragraph 2(J) (2) of the lease requires Ryan to keep in force public liability and property damage insurance protecting Great Northern against loss by the happening of any of the contingencies mentioned in paragraph 2(J) (1).

This court had occasion to consider the terms of an indemnity agreement in Bedal v. Hallack & Howard Lumber Co., 9 Cir., 1955, 226 F.2d 526 , 4 where it held that the provisions of the indemnity agreement were sufficient to provide a recovery by the indemnitee (Railroad) against the indemnitor (Lumber Company) in a case where it had been determined that the railroad indemnitee was negligent and liable in damages to a third person. This court in speaking of the indemnity agreement in that case said, “It would be hard to find more all-inclusive language.” 5 We believe that the language in the agreement now before this court is even more specific and that there can be no question but that it is designed to impose liability upon Ryan.

*634 Appellant’s final contention is that the indemnity clauses of the lease are void as against public policy. The complaint in Mrs. Burditt’s negligence action against Great Northern alleged that at the time of the accident Great Northern did not blow a whistle or ring a bell as required by Section 72-219, R.C.M.1947. 6 Section 13-802, R.C.M. 1947, reads as follows:

There are no Montana cases in point construing the section quoted above. However, it is identical with Section 1668 of the Civil Code of California, and there have been some California cases discussing this section. Appellee relies on the construction found in Werner v. Knoll, 1945, 89 Cal.App.2d 474 , 201 P.2d 45 , while the appellant contends that the holding in Werner v. Knoll has in effect been overruled by Barkett v. Brucato, 1953, 122 Cal.App.2d 264 , 264 P.2d 978 , and Butt v. Bertola, 1952, 110 Cal.App.2d 128 , 242 P.2d 32 .

In Werner v. Knoll the action was brought to recover damages for the wrongful death of the plaintiff’s son who sustained fatal injuries while operating a tractor owned by the defendant upon farm land leased by the plaintiff from the defendant. The lease contained the following provision [ 89 Cal.App.2d 474 , 201 P.2d 46 ]:

The court there held that under Section 1668 the lease provision was not against public policy, saying:

In Butt v. Bertola the court was dealing with a general exemption clause which read as follows [ 110 Cal.App.2d 128 , 242 P.2d 39 ] :

The court held that the clause did not relieve the lessor from liability under the circumstances present in the case, but in doing so it emphasized the gravity of the misconduct:

The court referred to Werner v. Knoll, but felt that it did not control the clause under consideration in Butt:

In Barkett v. Brucato the court approved the statements contained in Butt v. Bertola, stating that a general waiver clause “will not be interpreted, in the absence of clear, positive and specific language, to include acts amounting to affirmative negligence.” 10 In his opinion in the case now before us the district judge pointed out that “[i]t should be noted, however, that in both of these California cases the court was construing a general exemption clause, and not one which expressly made the indemnitor liable for the indemnitee’s negligence.” 11 The contract between Ryan and Great Northern expressly provided for indemnity whether or not the damage was due to the negligence of Great Northern. We agree with the statement of the district judge that “the California cases upon which the plaintiff relies are not applicable in view of the express provision for indemnity ‘whether due or not due to the negligence of Great Northern’ ”. 12

The case of Pettit Grain & Potato Co. v. Northern Pacific Ry., 1948, 227 Minn. 225 , 35 N.W.2d 127 , is persuasive. In that case the lessee had agreed to indemnify the railroad for any loss, occasioned by fire or sparks, incident to the operation of the railroad’s trains, whether or not such loss was the result of the negligence of the railroad’s employees. The contention was made that this provision was invalid because the law required the railroad companies to equip locomotives with spark arresters and provided that a violation of such law would be a misdemeanor. The court held that the provision was not invalid, stating:

The agreement between the parties now before this court merely provides *636 that Ryan will hold Great Northern harmless from any judgment, and that to aid in carrying out this purpose Ryan will carry liability insurance. We see nothing in this arrangement that is contrary to public policy. The agreement does not provide that Ryan shall pay the fine if Great Northern is convicted of a criminal violation, nor does it prevent the railroad from being primarily liable to Mrs. Burditt if in fact her injury was the result of the negligence of the railroad’s employees. It is simply a private contract of insurance.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

. The pertinent provisions of 72-219, R.C.M.1947, read as follows: “If any railroad corporation * * * shall permit any locomotive to approach any highway, road, or railroad crossing, without causing the whistle to be sounded at a point between fifty and eighty rods from the crossing, and the bell to be rung from said point until tlie crossing is reached * * * shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor * [sic].

. The quotation is taken from the Declaratory Judgment dated September 19, 1960. The opinion of the district court is reported as Ryan Mercantile Co. v. Great Northern Ry., D.C.D.Mont.1960, 186 F.Supp. 660 .

. Mi'S. Burditt’s complaint alleged, inter alia, tliat at tlie time and place of the accident “no guards nor gates were kept or maintained at said crossing by defendant; that at said time and place there were no bells, warning lights, whistles, gongs, or •other warning devices kept or maintained at said crossing by said defendant * * * that there were no bells, warning lights, whistles, gongs, or other warning devices given to said plaintiff warning her of the approach of said train or switch engine and said cars, all of which is in violation of Section 72-219, Revised Codes of Montana, 1947; * * * [t]hat because of the fact that no notice of the condition of said crossing as herein alleged and of its being more than ordinary dangerous to persons crossing the same, as such persons had a legal right to do, was given to such persons; * * * that defondant * * * its agents, servants and employees knew or in the exercise of ordinary care and prudence should have known of such dangerous condition.”

. The indemnity agreement in Bedal contained the following language: “It is especially covenanted and agreed * * * that the Lessee shall hold harmless the Lessor and the leased premises from any and all liens, fines, damages, penalties, forfeitures or judgments in any manner accruing by reason of the use or occupation of said premises by the Lessee; and that the Lessee shall at all times protect the Lessor and the leased premises from all injury, damage or loss by reason of the occupation of the leased premises by the Lessee, or from any cause whatsoever growing out of said Lessee’s use thereof.”

. 226 F.2d at page 540 .

. See footnote 1.

. 201 P.2d at page 47 .

. 242 P.2d at page 39 .

. Id., at page 40.

. 264 P.2d at page 988 .

. 186 F.Supp. at page 667 .

. Ibid.

. 35 N.W.2d at page 133 .