This is an appeal from an order of the United States District Court, Southern District of California, denying appellant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The appeal is made pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2253 .

Appellant was convicted of narcotics violations and sentenced to imprisonment, and is confined within the jurisdiction of the same court. Hence that court is the proper forum for either a motion under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 , or for a petition for writ of habeas corpus.

After appealing his conviction to this Court, and being denied certiorari by the Supreme Court of the United States, appellant filed in the court which imposed the sentence, a motion under § 2255 to annul, vacate and set aside the judgment of conviction. That motion was finally denied March 15,1961, and no appeal was taken from that order.

On June 20, 1961, the instant habeas corpus action was filed and was dismissed by the District Court for lack of jurisdiction. The portions of § 2255 pertinent to this appeal are:

In the enactment of § 2255, “ * * * the sole purpose was to minimize the difficulties encountered in habeas corpus hearings by affording the same rights in another and more convenient forum.” (Emphasis supplied) United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 , 72 S.Ct. 263 , 96 L.Ed. 232 .

This viewpoint is even more clearly expressed in Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424 , 82 S.Ct. 468 , 7 L.Ed.2d 417 , wherein the Supreme Court said:

Petitioner contends that the provision of § 2255 which seeks to limit the use of habeas corpus is violative of Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States. This court has considered that question numerous times, and is still of the opinion expressed in Jones v. Squier, 195 F.2d 179 (9th Cir. 1952):

Petitioner, having failed to appeal from the denial of his motion under § 2255, may not now question either the ruling on that motion, or the validity of his sentence, by use of habeas corpus.

Petitioner fares no better if his application for writ of habeas corpus is treated as a second motion under § 2255. That statute provides that the sentencing Court shall not be required to entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner. Appellant insists in his brief that the third, fourth, fifth and sixth grounds of the habeas corpus application include new questions not advanced in his first § 2255 motion. An examination of these claims shows that they are all based upon the fact that decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States subsequent to the original motion under § 2255 had raised possible new constructions of some statutes applicable to petitioner’s problems. Such matters would not be considered under a writ of habeas corpus prior to the enactment of § 2255, and consequently would not be applicable as new grounds under a second motion under § 2255. This is clearly established in Hill v. United States, supra, where the court said:

“In Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174 , [ 67 S.Ct. 1588 , 91 L.Ed. 1982 ], the Court held that the remedy of habeas corpus was unavailable in circumstances far more compelling than are presented here. There the petitioners at their criminal trial had been denied an opportunity to present a defense which subsequent decisions of this Court had held should clearly have been available to them. What was said in that is apposite here:

Even if these may be considered as new grounds, the application fails to set forth the reason why petitioner was previously unable to assert the new grounds, and does not allege that he had previously been unaware of the significance of the relevant facts which is a standard established for consideration of successive motions under § 2255. Sanders v. United States, 297 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1961).

It appearing from the foregoing that the application for habeas corpus was defective on its face and contrary to the provisions of § 2255, the District Court was correct in holding that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the same, and in ordering that the petition be denied.

This makes it unnecessary to consider the contention of appellant that the court should have permitted him to be personally present at the hearing on the petition, inasmuch as the issue before the court was purely one of law, and did not require the presence of petitioner. Such presence is warranted only where there is required to be determined by the court a question of fact wherein petitioner’s own knowledge is involved. Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 , 61 S.Ct. 574 , 85 L.Ed. 830 ; United States v. Hayman, supra.

For reasons appearing above, the petitioner’s request that this court treat this appeal as an original petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied.