People v. Johnson

Both the United States and the California Constitutions prohibit the exercise of peremptory challenges solely because of group bias. (Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 [ 90 L.Ed.2d 69 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 ] (Batson); People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 890 , 583 P.2d 748 ].) In this case, defendant objected at trial that the prosecutor had challenged three African-American prospective jurors on the basis of their race. The trial court found that defendant had not established a prima facie case of group bias and overruled the objection. Following his conviction of second degree murder and assault resulting in the death of a child under the age of eight, defendant argued on appeal that the court erred in not finding a prima facie case of group bias. The Court of Appeal agreed and reversed the judgment. We granted review.

On review, we held that, in order to establish a prima facie case of group bias, “the objector must show that it is more likely than not the other party’s peremptory challenges, if unexplained, were based on impermissible group bias.” (People v. Johnson (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1302, 1306 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 71 P.3d 270 ].) Applying this…

In People v. Johnson (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1302 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 71 P.3d 270 ], a majority of this court held that to make a prima facie showing that a prosecutor was unconstitutionally using peremptory challenges for a discriminatory purpose, a defendant must show “that it is more likely than not [that the prosecutor’s] peremptory challenges, if unexplained, were based on impermissible group bias.” (Id. at p. 1306.) I dissented, joined by Justice Werdegar, pointing out that the majority’s holding was inconsistent with the views of federal courts and the courts of other states, most of which permitted the defendant to establish a prima facie case by raising a reasonable inference of discrimination. (Id. at p. 1335 (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.); see id. at pp. 1328-1329 (dis. opn. of Werdegar, J.).) The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that a defendant need only produce evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference of group bias, rather than prove discrimination was more likely than not. (Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162 [ 162 L.Ed.2d 129 , 125 S.Ct. 2410, 2416-2417 ].)

The high court returned the case to this court for further…

I concur in the majority’s decision to remand this case for further proceedings. I do so with the understanding that the error in this case was a federal, not a state, constitutional error (see maj. opn., ante, at p. 1100). As the majority explains, the high court in Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 [ 90 L.Ed.2d 69 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 ], having found a violation of the federal equal protection clause, ordered that case remanded for a new hearing. The lower federal courts, following Batson, have similarly ordered remand as a remedy for Batson violations. 1 People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 890 , 583 P.2d 748 ], however, has a different origin. As we explained in that pre-Batson case, “the use of peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors on the sole ground of group bias violates the right to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community under article I, section 16, of the California Constitution.” (Wheeler, at pp. 276-277.) Because Wheeler was based on state law, nothing we decide today implicates the rule of automatic reversal this court has applied for state constitutional Wheeler error. 2 Although some appellate courts…

Both the United States and the California Constitutions prohibit the exercise of peremptory challenges solely because of group bias. ( Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 ( Batson ); People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890 , 583 P.2d 748 .) In this case, defendant objected at trial that the prosecutor had challenged three African-American prospective jurors on the basis of their race. The trial court found that defendant had not established a prima facie case of group bias and overruled the objection. Following his conviction of second degree murder and assault resulting in the death of a child under the age of eight, defendant argued on appeal that the court erred in not finding a prima facie case of group bias. The Court of Appeal agreed and reversed the judgment. We granted review.

On review, we held that, in order to establish a prima facie case of group bias, "the objector must show that it is more likely than not the other party's peremptory challenges, if unexplained, were based on impermissible group bias." ( People v. Johnson (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1302, 1306 , 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 71 P.3d 270 .) Applying this…