In Re John Z.

We granted this case to settle a conflict in Court of Appeal decisions as to whether the crime of forcible rape (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. *758 (a)(2)) is committed if the female victim consents to an initial penetration by her male companion, and then withdraws her consent during an act of intercourse, but the male continues against her will. (Compare People v. Vela (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 237 [ 218 Cal.Rptr. 161](Vela) [no rape committed] with People v. Roundtree (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 846 [ 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 921 ] (Roundtree) [rape committed].) We agree with Roundtree and the Court of Appeal in the present case that a withdrawal of consent effectively nullifies any earlier consent and subjects the male to forcible rape charges if he persists in what has become nonconsensual intercourse.

The juvenile court, after holding a contested jurisdictional hearing on a unitary petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 602, 777, subd. (a)) filed on behalf of John Z. (defendant), found that he committed forcible rape (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(2)) and that his previous juvenile court disposition had been ineffective. (Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.) He was…

A woman has an absolute right to say “no” to an act of sexual intercourse. After intercourse has commenced, she has the absolute right to call a halt and say “no more,” and if she is compelled to continue, a forcible rape is committed. Although California’s rape statutes are gender neutral, the criminalization of more subtle forms of sexual violence reflects a new view of women as “responsible, autonomous beings who possess the right to personal, sexual, and bodily self-determination.” (Berger et al., The Dimensions of Rape Reform Legislation (1988) 22 L. & Soc’y Rev. 329, 330.) Thus, both courts and legislatures have expanded the concept of rape to include spousal rape, lesser degrees of rape, and what has been characterized as postpenetration rape. (See, e.g., McGill v. State (Alaska Ct.App. 2001) 18 P.3d 77, 84 ; State v. Siering (1994) 35 Conn.App. 173 [ 644 A.2d 958, 962-963 ]; State v. Robinson (Me. 1985) 496 A.2d 1067, 1070-1071 ; State v. Crims (Minn.Ct.App. 1995) 540 N.W.2d 860, 865 .)

To the extent the majority holds the clear withdrawal of consent nullifies any earlier consent and forcible persistence in what then becomes nonconsensual intercourse is rape, not assault…

We granted this case to settle a conflict in Court of Appeal decisions as to whether the crime of forcible rape (Pen.Code, § 261, subd. (a)(2)) is committed if the female victim consents to an initial penetration by her male companion, and then withdraws her consent during an act of intercourse, but the male continues against her will. (Compare People v. Vela (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 237 , 218 Cal.Rptr. 161 ( Vela ) [no rape committed] with People v. Roundtree (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 846 , 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 921 ( Roundtree ) [rape committed].) We agree with Roundtree and the Court of Appeal in the present case that a withdrawal of consent effectively nullifies any earlier consent and subjects the male to forcible rape charges if he persists in what has become nonconsensual intercourse.

The juvenile court, after holding a contested jurisdictional hearing on a unitary petition (Welf. & Inst.Code, §§ 602, 777, subd.(a)) filed on behalf of John Z. (defendant), found that he committed forcible rape (Pen.Code, § 261, subd. (a)(2)) and that his previous juvenile court disposition had been ineffective. (Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.) He was committed…