This is an appeal from an injunction granted by the United States District Court against defendant-appellants Shippers Co-operative, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as “Coop”) and against Pier-son-Corn, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as “Pierson-Corn”). The action was started by the filing of a complaint in which the plaintiff-appellee Interstate Commerce Commission (hereinafter referred to as “Commission”), under Part II of' the Interstate Commerce Act (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”), alleged that Coop had been and was transporting property for compensation in interstate commerce as a common or contract carrier without having been issued a certificate or permit by the Commission authorizing Coop to engage in such operations or business, and consequently, that defendant-Coop was in violation of § 206(a) or § 209(a) of the Act ( 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 306 (a) and 309(a), respectively). Pierson-Corn was made a party defendant under 49 U.S.C.A. § 52 ; the Commission having alleged that Pierson-Corn had participated in the acts charged in the complaint and would be directly affected by any judgment entered by the court.

The case was tried to the court. The court found (1) that Coop had been and was transporting property by motor vehicle over public highways and in interstate commerce for compensation as a contract carrier in violation of § 209(a) of the Act; and (2) that Pierson-Corn had been and was participating in the violation. The court entered a judgment enjoining both Coop and Pierson-Corn. Execution of the judgment was stayed pending this appeal.

The district court had jurisdiction under § 222(b) of the Act ( 49 U.S.C.A. § 322 (b)). A timely notice of appeal was filed. This court, therefore, has jurisdiction to review the judgment entered below under the provisions of § 1291 of Title 28 United States Code.

The question presented in this appeal is whether the district court erred in holding Coop to be a contract carrier rather than a private carrier.

Although the parties agree that the facts are not in dispute, each prefers to state them in its own words. We summarize them as follows:

Coop is a California nonprofit corporation whose stockholder-members are manufacturers, and the distributors and the processors of the manufacturers. Coop is, according to the stipulated facts, “an association of such members organized on a non-profit basis, for the purpose of securing the benefits of an expeditious movement of each member’s merchandise in truck-load, or less than truck-loads, for each said member.” Manufacturer-members with their principal place of business in Georgia, South Carolina, or Tennessee have distributors and processors in California; vis-a-vis, manufacturer-members with their principal place of business in California have distributors and processors in the states east of the Mississippi River.

To perform this transportation service for its members, Coop has leased eighteen tractors and trailers which are operated under Coop’s management and expense. Coop hired, supervised, and paid all its drivers; it maintained terminals in Los Angeles, California, and in Dalton, Georgia ; the transporting between terminals is done in the vehicles managed by Coop. Coop does not own the merchandise it transports, and it requires the consignor to execute a bill of lading or receipt when it accepts merchandise to be transported and it requires a receipt from the consignee when the merchandise is delivered. Coop has published a schedule of rates and charges, and each shipper-member is assessed and pays for each of its shipments according to the published schedule. Coop provides public liability and property damage insurance, and it insures all the merchandise it transports. Coop pays all its expenses, and receives and accounts for all revenues in its corporate name.

Coop’s books of account, its records of merchandise it has transported, and all of its office work are prepared and maintained by Pierson-Corn under a written contract the terms of which call for Coop to pay Pierson-Corn thirty cents for each one-hundred pounds of merchandise which Coop transports for its shipper-members.

Neither Coop nor Pierson-Corn held a certificate, permit, or any other authority from the Commission to transport property in interstate commerce.

The Commission alleged that Coop’s transportation activities have been and are those of a contract carrier by motor within the meaning of § 203(a) (15) of the Act; and that since Pierson-Corn is participating in Coop’s violations, the Commission is entitled to an injunction against both Coop and Pierson-Corn. The district court agreed, and it entered a judgment granting the injunctions sought by the Commission. Coop and Pierson-Corn then brought this timely appeal.

Appellants’ single specification of error is that the district court erred, “both in respect to the law and the evidence, in ruling that appellants were ‘contract carriers’ requiring authorization from the Interstate Commerce Commission.”

Appellants contend that Coop is a private carrier within the meaning of § 203 (a) (17) of the Act; and that the district court, in holding otherwise, erred in both fact and law. We believe the district court was correct in both respects and we affirm.

Appellants’ contention is that the Act, read as a whole, shows that Congress did not intend to include a group or association of shippers acting on a nonprofit basis. Appellants rely primarily upon § 402(c) of the Act and upon Pacific Coast Wholesalers Ass’n v. United States, S.D.Calif.1949, 81 F.Supp. 991 , affirmed 338 U.S. 689 , 70 S.Ct. 411 , 94 L.Ed. 474 .

Chapter 13 of the Interstate Commerce Act may be cited as Part IY of the Act ( 49 U.S.C.A. § 1001 ). Section 402 (c) of the Act ( 49 U.S.C.A. § 1002 (c) (1)) reads:

From the above language, appellants contend:

We cannot agree. That appellants’ contention is without merit is shown by the specific language in § 402(a) (5) and 402(c).

Section 402(a) (5) says that a “freight forwarder”,

Thus, to be a freight forwarder — the subject of Chapter 13 — one cannot be a carrier subject to Chapter 8 (Part II of the Act; “Motor Carriers”) and to be a freight forwarder within Chapter 13 one must utilize the services of carriers subject to Chapter 8.

Furthermore, § 402(c), supra, specifically exempts from Chapter 13 only an “association of shippers * * * consolidating or distributing freight for * * * members * * * on a nonprofit basis, for the purpose of securing the benefits of * * * volume rates * * Thus the exemption is restricted to an association of freight forwarders ; it does not extend to an association of carriers.

Appellants would have this court believe that what is good for freight forwarders is good for motor carriers. This is not necessarily so. Freight forwarders and motor carriers are not the same. United States v. Chicago Heights Trucking Co., 1940, 310 U.S. 344 , 60 S.Ct. 931 , 84 L.Ed. 1243 ; Acme Fast Freight, Inc. v. United States, S.D.N.Y.1940, 30 F. Supp. 968 , affirmed, 309 U.S. 638 , 60 S.Ct. 810 , 84 L.Ed. 993 . A freight forwarder is one who hires independent common or contract carriers. Ibid.

Appellants rest their other foot on Pacific Coast Wholesalers Ass’n v. United States, supra. The case gives appellants no more support than does the statute. (1) Pacific Coast Wholesalers was brought under § 402(c) (1) of the Act; the case at bar was brought under §§ 206(a) and 209(a) of the Act. (2) In Pacific Coast Wholesalers the issue was whether the association was subject to Commission regulation as a freight forwarder or was exempt from Commission regulation under the exemption given in § 402(c) (1) ; in the case at bar the issue is whether Coop is subject to Commission regulations as a contract carrier by motor vehicle or is exempt from Commission regulation under the exemption given to a private carrier. (3) In Pacific Coast Wholesalers the association at no time transported property over the public highways; in the case at bar Coop did and does transport property over the public highways. We conclude Pacific Coast Wholesalers Ass’n v. United States, supra, is inapposite.

Having concluded that appellants’ contention cannot stand on the authorities they cite, was the district court correct in holding appellants guilty of a violation of § 209(a) of the Act? We hold the district court was correct.

Section 209(a) of the Act reads in pertinent part:

The evidence supports the findings that Coop falls within the term “any person” as defined by the Act. And if Coop is included within the term “contract carrier by motor vehicle,” it cannot be a “private carrier of property by motor vehicle.” This brings us to the crux of appellants’ argument.

Appellants contend that Coop is not a contract carrier because it does not perform its services “for compensation;” i. e., it is a nonprofit association and, therefore, is not compensated within the meaning of Part II of the Act. This contention is answered by the case of Schenley Distillers Corporation v. United States, D.C.Del.1945, 61 F.Supp. 981 , affirmed, 326 U.S. 432 , 66 S.Ct. 247 , 90 L.Ed. 181 , where Judge Maris, speaking for the court, said:

The district court here found that Coop was reimbursed for its services. What was said in Schenley is equally applicable here: Coop engaged in the transportation of property for compensation. The evidence in the case at bar supports the district court’s finding that Coop performed its transportation services “for compensation.”

Appellants would also have this court disregard Coop as a corporate entity. Under the circumstances, this cannot be done. The Supreme Court, in its per curiam affirmance in the Schenley case, said:

The Commission does not (nor does this decision) quarrel with a person’s right to transport his own merchandise. (E. g., I. C. C. v. Tank Car Oil Corp., 5 Cir. 1945, 151 F.2d 834 ; I. C. C. v. Clayton, 10 Cir. 1942, 127 F.2d 967 ; and Taylor v. I. C. C., 9 Cir. 1953, 209 F.2d 353 .) Nor does the Commission quarrel with this court’s decision in Pacific Coast Wholesalers Ass’n v. United States, supra. What the Commission does contend is that these cases are not in point and! that the facts of this case show that Coop is a contract carrier within the meaning of Part II of the Act. The district court agreed with the Commission. We agree with the district court.

Affirmed.

. The manufactured products are rugs, carpets, utility appliances, heating and refrigerating units, etc. . Specifically, 23 members reside in Georgia, 1 in South Carolina, 1 in Tennessee, 2 in Pennsylvania, and 22 in California. . The charges shown in the schedule are based on a study made by Pierson-Corn which estimated the cost of round-trip transportation between Coop’s two terminals. Coop’s shipper-members, shipping merchandise jointly pay a charge sufficient to cover the estimated expenses of the shipment. The money paid to Coop by its shipper-members is deposited in a “trust for members.” After a trip is completed, and its actual cost is known, the shipper-member’s account with Coop is credited or debited to meet the actual cost. . A California corporation with its principal place of business in Los Angeles, California. . 49 U.S.C.A. § 1002 (a) (5). . Chapter 1, “Railroad and Pipe Line Carriers”; Chapter 8. “Motor Carriers”; Chapter 12, “Water Carriers”; Chapter 13, “Freight Forwarders”. . “Any person” as used in Part II of the Act “means any individual, firm, co-partnership, corporation, company, association, or joint-stoclc association; and includes any trustee, receiver, assignee, or personal representative thereof.” (Emphasis added.) (§ 203(a) (1) of the Act; 49 U.S.C.A. § 303 (a) (1).) “The term ‘contract carrier by motor vehicle’ means any person which engages in transportation by motor vehicle of passengers or property in interstate or foreign commerce, for compensation * * *, under continuing contracts which one person or a limited number of persons either (a) for the furnishing of transportation services through the assignment of motor vehicles for a continuing period of time to the exclusive use of each person served or (b) for the furnishing of transportation services designed to meet the distinct need of each individual customer.” (Emphasis added.) (§ 203(a) (15) of the Act; 49 U.S.C.A. § 303 (a) (15).) And, “the term ‘private carrier of property by motor vehicle’ means any person not included in the terms ‘common carrier by motor vehicle’ or ‘contract carrier by motor vehicle’, who or which transports in interstate or foreign commerce by motor vehicle property of which such person is the owner, lessee, or bailee, when such transportation is for the purpose of sale, lease, rent, or bailment, or in furtherance of any commercial enterprise.” (Emphasis added.) (§ 203(a) (17) of the Act; 49 U.S.C.A. § 303 (a) (17).) . See footnote 9, infra- . This language shows that a person within the definition of a “contract carrier” cannot be a “private carrier.”