Before us is a petition of the National Labor Relations Board (hereinafter called “the Board”), pursuant to Section 10 (e) of the National Labor Relations Act as amended ( 61 Stat. 136 , as amended by 73 Stat. 519 , 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq.), for enforcement of its order issued on October 13, 1961 against U. S. Divers Company (hereinafter referred to as “U. S. Divers” or “the Company”). The Board’s decision and order are reported at 133 NLRB No. 88 . This court has jurisdiction as the alleged unfair labor practices occurred at the U. S. Divers plant in Santa Ana, California, where the Company is engaged in the manufacture and sale of diving equipment.

The Board, in agreement with the Trial Examiner, found that the Company violated Section 8(a) (1) of the National Labor Relations Act by interrogating its employees in respect to their membership, activity, or interest in the General Truck Drivers, Warehousemen & Helpers Union Local 235 (hereinafter called “Teamsters Union”), by inducing its employees to favor and to propagandize the United Rubber, Cork; Linoleum and Plastic Workers of America, AFL-CIO (hereinafter called “Rubber Workers Union”) in preference to the Teamsters Union, and by urging upon its employees a Company-supported representation plan for collective bargaining despite the pend-ency of a Teamsters Union representation petition before the Board. The Board also found that the Company violated Section 8(a) (3) and (1) of the Act by discharging employee James Sutton because of his activities on behalf of the Teamsters Union.

The facts upon which the Board’s findings are based appear in petitioner’s brief. This statement of facts presents the resolution of conflicting evidence made by the Trial Examiner and adopted by the Board. Such statement of facts to which the Company takes no serious issue is as follows:

The Company’s specification of errors is presented in its brief under four points.

Under the first point, the Company contends that it was denied a fair and impartial trial because of certain rulings made by the Trial Examiner during the course of the trial which were sustained by the Board upon consideration of the exceptions filed to the intermediate report of the Trial Examiner. The principal objections to the conduct of the hearing relate to two rulings.

The first ruling arose on cross-examination of the Board’s witness James Sutton. He testified at some length concerning the meeting held on April 20, 1960, to which reference has previously been made. On direct examination, he testified that the meeting was held in a private home and that there were present three organizers from the Teamsters Union from one of whom he received the Union’s authorization cards. Upon cross-examination, counsel for the Company was permitted to elicit from the witness the name of the employee at whose home the meeting was held, the names of the three Union organizers, the name of the Union’s organizer who gave to the witness 40 or 50 of the Union’s authorization cards, and the statement that the witness signed one of the authorization cards at the meeting. Upon interrogation as to the names of the other persons present at the meeting, the Board’s counsel objected on the ground that disclosure of such names might lead to reprisals from which such persons should be protected. The Trial Examiner sustained the objection on the ground that the question asked was not within the scope of direct examination since the witness had not testified that there were others present at the meeting other than the three Union organizers and the witness. Counsel’s stated purpose in seeking the name of others present at the meeting was that if given the names of such other persons, he might be able to produce them as witnesses and such persons might testify that Sutton did not get any of the Union’s authorization cards at the meeting, and thus impeach the testimony of the witness Sutton. In the course of his ruling, the Trial Examiner stated that he felt warranted in confining the issues to the witness’ direct examination. Following such ruling, the Company’s counsel moved to strike the testimony on the ground that his cross-examination had been unduly restricted. The Trial Examiner stated:

The Company’s counsel made no further effort to elicit such information. He did not call as witnesses on the Company’s case any one of the three Union organizers whose names he secured nor Sutton, nor employee Lollis at whose home the meeting was held and who was present at the meeting. On cross-examination of the Board’s witness Lollis, the Company’s counsel asked no questions concerning the details of the meeting other than to establish that Lollis was present.

While it is apparent to us that the question asked by the Company’s counsel was within the proper scope of cross-examination, the ruling of the Trial Examiner did not constitute prejudicial error under the circumstances shown. The Trial Examiner made it clear that his ruling was based on the ground of restricting cross-examination to matters testified on direct examination. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the ruling would have been the same if the Company’s counsel had sought to elicit such information on the Company’s case by calling as witnesses one or more of the Union’s organizers, employee Sutton, and employee Lollis. The Company, therefore, was not denied the opportunity to offer witnesses who might contradict Sutton’s testimony that he secured the Union’s authorization cards at the meeting. The record does not support the Company’s contention that the ruling of the Trial Examiner excluded relevant and material evidence.

The second ruling likewise arose on cross-examination of Sutton. On direct examination, Sutton testified that on April 21, 1960, at the Company’s plant, he obtained the signatures of 8 or 9 employees on the Union’s authorization cards. On cross-examination, the Company’s counsel sought to elicit the names of such employees. The Board’s counsel objected to such disclosure. The Trial Examiner sustained the objection. The Company’s counsel’s stated purpose in seeking the names of the employees who had signed the cards was two-fold: First, to show that the treatment given by the Company to persons active in the Union as compared to the treatment given employees not active in the Union, was not discriminatory; and, second, to corroborate the Company’s contention that Sutton was discharged on that day because he was, and had been, an unsatisfactory employee inattentive to his duties, and on that day was not attending to his duties but was spending his time in endeavoring to secure employee signatures on the Union’s authorization cards. The record discloses that the Trial Examiner sustained the objection of the Board’s counsel because it did not then appear to the Trial Examiner that the question was relevant to the issue of the circumstances surrounding Sutton’s discharge, as established on his direct examination, but indicated that he would re-consider the materiality of such question should it reappear in the presentation of the Company’s case. The Company’s counsel stated: <

The witness was not called on the Company’s case and the Company’s counsel made no further effort to elicit identities of employees who had signed the Union’s authorization cards. Under such circumstances, it cannot be said that the ruling of the Trial Examiner constituted prejudicial error.

We have considered other claimed errors of the Trial Examiner in the admission of evidence and find them without substance.

Under points two and three, the Company contends that the Board’s findings that the Company violated Section 8(a) (1) and (3) of the Act by discharging employee James Sutton and that the Company violated Section 8(a) (1) of the Act, are not supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole.

We have carefully examined the entire record on this case. We find, as in most cases of this type, the evidence to be in sharp conflict on material matters in numerous instances. The Company’s main contention appears to be that such conflicts should be resolved in favor of the Company’s contentions in that the testimony of its witnesses was entitled to more credence than opposing testimony.

Under Section 8(e) of the Act, the findings of the Board with respect to questions of fact if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole, shall be conclusive. As stated by this court, in National Labor Relations Board v. Stanislaus Implement and Hardware Company, Ltd., 9 Cir., 226 F.2d 377 (1955), at page 381:

We see no purpose to be served by summarizing the conflicting evidence offered by the Company. The statement of facts appearing earlier in this opinion, together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, fully supports the Board’s findings that the Company violated Section 8(a) (3) and (1) of the Act by discharging employee James Sutton because of his Union activities, and that the Company violated Section 8(a) (1) of the Act by interrogating and polling its employees, and by attempting to interfere with their choice of a collective bargaining representative.

Under point four, the Company complains that the Board’s order is too broad in scope because (a) it directs the Company to cease and desist from discouraging membership “in any other labor organization”; (b) that that portion of the Board’s order with respect to directing, requesting or inducing employees to engage in any activity on behalf of, or against, any labor organization, is violative of the rights granted to employers under Section 8(c) of the Act; and (c) that the phrase “in any other like or related manner” is too broad.

In National Labor Relations Board v. International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union, Local 10, et al., 283 F.2d 558 (9th Cir., 1960), this court stated, at page 568:

We believe that under the record in this case the order of the Board should be modified by striking therefrom the words “in any other labor organization” and by adding to that portion of the order directing, requesting or inducing any of its employees to engage in any activity on behalf of or against any labor organization, the clause “except as provided in Section 8(c) of the Act.”

The petition for enforcement of the order as herein modified is granted.