People v. Palmer

We granted review to decide whether the so-called rule of consistency—that the acquittal of all alleged coconspirators but one requires acquittal of the remaining alleged conspirator—requires the reversal of a conspiracy conviction in this case, and whether similar principles require the reversal of a finding as to one but not both codefendants that an attempted murder was premeditated. We conclude that the rule of consistency is a vestige of the past with no continuing validity. Many reasons may explain apparently inconsistent verdicts: lenience, compromise, differing evidence as to different defendants, or, possibly, that two juries simply viewed similar evidence differently. If substantial evidence supports a jury verdict as to one defendant, that verdict may stand despite an apparently inconsistent verdict as to another defendant.

In this case, substantial evidence supports the conspiracy conviction and the premeditation finding. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which affirmed this conviction and this finding.

I. Factual and Procedural History

On December 11, 1996, codefendants 15-year-old Floyd Maurice Palmer and 29-year-old Donald…

I concur in the result.

This is an easy case that makes good law. If we are careful.

The first of two general scenarios for inconsistent verdicts is this: A single jury returns inconsistent verdicts either against a single defendant on multiple crimes (e.g., the jury finds the defendant not guilty of selling narcotics, but also finds him guilty of using a telephone to sell narcotics) or against multiple defendants for a single crime (e.g., the jury finds the first of two defendants not guilty of conspiring with the second, but also finds the second guilty of conspiring with the first).

Such inconsistency of verdicts necessarily entails error, albeit apparently not of federal constitutional dimension, on the part of the jury in question, according to decisions including United States v. Powell (1984) 469 U.S. 57 [ 105 S.Ct. 471 , 83 L.Ed.2d 461 ], and Dunn v. United States (1932) 284 U.S. 390 [ 52 S.Ct. 189 , 76 L.Ed. 356 , 80 A.L.R. 161 ], It is “ ‘error,’ in the sense that the jury has not followed the court’s instructions” and its own oath. (United States v. Powell, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 65 [105 S.Ct. at pp. 477]; see Dunn v. United States, supra, 284 U.S. at p. 393 [52 S.C.…

We granted review to decide whether the so-called rule of consistency— that the acquittal of all alleged coconspirators but one requires acquittal of the remaining alleged conspirator—requires the reversal of a conspiracy conviction in this case, and whether similar principles require the reversal of a finding as to one but not both codefendants that an attempted murder was premeditated. We conclude that the rule of consistency is a vestige of the past with no continuing validity. Many reasons may explain apparently inconsistent verdicts: lenience, compromise, differing evidence as to different defendants, or, possibly, that two juries simply viewed similar evidence differently. If substantial evidence supports a jury verdict as to one defendant, that verdict may stand despite an apparently inconsistent verdict as to another defendant.

In this case, substantial evidence supports the conspiracy conviction and the premeditation finding. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which affirmed this conviction and this finding.

On December 11, 1996, codefendants 15 year old Floyd Maurice Palmer and 29 year old Donald Edmond Price engaged in a crime spree,…