Before us is a petition to review a decision of the Tax Court of the United States holding that the sum of $400.00 paid by petitioners to The Society For Christian Instruction, Of Ripon, California in 1958 was not deductible as a charitable contribution under § 170 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 ( 26 U.S.C. § 170 ). The findings of fact and opinion of the Tax Court are reported at 36 T.C. 896 .

Petitioners, husband and wife, residents of Ripon, California, filed a joint income tax return for the calendar year 1958 in which a charitable deduction in the sum of $1,075.00 was claimed for payment made by them to The Society For Christian Instruction, Of Ripon, California. The respondent decreased the deduction claimed by the sum of $400.00 on the ground that said amount of the claimed deduction of $1,075.00 did not constitute a charitable contribution under the above mentioned section. The Tax Court sustained the respondent’s determination.

The stipulation of facts and the additional facts found by the Tax Court are not in dispute and may be summarized as follows:

The Society For Christian Instruction, Of Ripon, California (hereinafter referred to as the Society), is a non-profit corporation organized under the laws of the State of California, a corporation organized and operated exclusively for educational purposes, and exempt from federal income taxes under § 501(c) (3) of the 1954 Code, 26 U.S.C. § 501 (c) (3).

The Articles of Incorporation of the Society provide, in part, as follows:

The Society owned and operated a. grammar school and a high school at Ripon, California during 1958 and for some years prior thereto. These schools are full-time schools, accredited by the University of California, and instruction is given in Christian religion and doctrines as a part of their regular curriculum. Both petitioners had been, members of The Christian Reformed Church for many years and attended the-schools operated by the Society at Ripon, California. Petitioner Harold DeJong-had been a member of the Society for-many years and had served as a member and officer of the Board of Trustees of the Society for a number of years.

The Society charges no tuition but raises its funds from parents of enrolled' students, supporting churches, non-student parent members and other persons. interested in the schools. Funds from parents of students are secured in the following manner:

During 1958, the taxpayers’ two children, Robert and William DeJong, were full-time students of the grammar school operated by the Society. The taxpayers paid $1,075 in 1958 to the Society and deducted this amount as a contribution on their 1958 income tax return.

It was stipulated that the sum of $400.00 was “the approximate cost to The Society For Christian Instruction, Of Ripon, California of educating petitioners’ two children during the calendar year 1958.”

The sole question presented to us is whether the Tax Court erred in holding that the $400.00 paid by petitioners to the Society was in the nature of a tuition fee paid for the education which the Society was expected to furnish the petitioners’ children, and therefore not deductible as a charitable contribution.

The pertinent parts of § 170 with which we are primarily concerned provide:

Internal Revenue Code of 1954:

(26 U.S.C. 1958 ed., Sec. 170.)

Attention should also be noted of certain provisions of § 262 of the same Code:

(26 U.S.C. 1958 ed., Sec. 262.)

Included in the findings of fact of the Tax Court is the finding that “at least $400 of the amount paid by petitioners to the society in 1958 was intended as payment in the nature of tuition for petitioners’ children, a personal expense, and did not constitute a charitable contribution.” In the course of its opinion, the Tax Court stated:

The law is well settled that tuition paid for the education of the children of a taxpayer is a family expense, not a charitable contribution to the educating institution. Channing v. United States, 4 F.Supp. 33 (D.Mass.), aff’d., 67 F.2d 986 (1st Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 291 U.S. 686 , 54 S.Ct. 563 , 78 L.Ed. 1072 ; Cooper v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 264 F.2d 889 (4th Cir. 1959).

Before considering whether the Tax Court’s finding of fact above quoted is clearly erroneous, we will first consider whether the Tax Court erred in its construction of § 170(c) (2) (B) as applied to the facts of this case.

The section allows as a deduction any charitable contribution (as defined), payment of which is made within the taxable year. As defined in Subsection (c), the term “charitable contribution” means a contribution or gift to or for the use of certain types of organizations organized and operated for certain specified purposes and having certain specified characteristics. The Society is admittedly one such organization and its tax-exempt status is not an issue. The section, however, does not further define the terms “contribution” and “gift”. The Tax Court stated that as used in the section, the terms are synonymous. See also Channing v. United States, supra. We have found nothing which indicates otherwise. In Bok v. McCaughn, Collector of Internal Revenue, 42 F.2d 616 (3rd Cir. 1930), one of the issues to be decided was whether the fund or foundation there involved was “organized * * * exclusively for * * * charitable or educational * * * purposes, * * In the course of its opinion, the court stated: .

See also Dubois v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 31 B.T.A. 239 (1934); Gimbel v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 54 F.2d 780 (3rd Cir. 1931); Ould v. Washington Hospital For Foundlings, 95 U.S. 303 , 24 L.Ed. 450 (1887).

We have found no other helpful decisions construing the meaning of the terms “charitable contribution” or “charitable gift” as used in § 170. However, the term “gift” as used in other sections of the Internal Revenue Code, but not necessarily of a charitable connotation, has been construed in many decisions. Among them are many decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States concerned with the provision of the Internal Revenue Code which excludes from gross income of a taxpayer “the value of property acquired by Gift.” One of the latest is Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 , 80 S.Ct. 1190 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1218 (1960). In the course of the opinion is it stated:

In the above case the Supreme Court refused to promulate a new “test” to serve as a standard to be applied by the lower court and the Tax Court in dealing with the problems arising in the exclusion from gross income of the value of property acquired by gift. Instead it stated, 363 U.S. at p. 289 , 80 S.Ct. at p. 1198 :

The value of a gift may be excluded from gross income only if the gift proceeds from a “detached and distinterested generosity” or “out of affection, admiration, charity or like impulses” and must be included if the claimed gift proceeds primarily from “the constraining force of any moral or legal duty” or from “the incentive of anticipated benefit of an economic nature.” We must conclude that such criteria are clearly applicable to a charitable deduction under § 170.

In our view the Tax Court did not err in its construction of § 170(e) (2) (B) as applied to the facts of the instant case.

Finally, we consider whether the Tax Court erred in finding that “at least $400.00 of the amount paid by petitioners to the Society in 1958 was intended as payment in the nature of tuition for petitioners’ children, a personal expense, and did not constitute a charitable deduction.”

We must bear in mind that the schools operated by the Society were located in a community of small population in which the financial status of parents enrolling students in the schools was well known to the members of the Board of Trustees and members of the finance and enrollment committees of the Society. When asked whether any attempt was made to secure from parents a pledge for the total estimated cost per student (times the number of children who were enrolling), the treasurer of the Society testified:

Although the Society set no tuition fee, the record clearly shows that parents who could so afford were expected to contribute to the Society at least to the extent of the cost to the Society of providing their children with an education.

Under the circumstances disclosed by the record, the finding of the Tax Court that at least $400.00 of the amount paid by petitioners to the Society was in the nature of tuition fees for the education which the Society was expected to furnish to'petitioners’ children is not clearly erroneouus. The payment of such sum is not a charitable gift.

We have considered the decisions in Marshall v. Welch, 197 F.Supp. 874 (S.D. of Ohio, W.D., 1961) and, Estate of O. J. Wardwell, Deceased v. Commissioner, 301 F.2d 632 (8th Cir. 1962), urged upon us by the petitioners, but find them inap-posite.

The decision of the Tax Court is affirmed.

. The 1960 Census reports the population of Ripon at 1,894.