Myers

In 1995, the California Legislature found that “[tjobaccorelated disease places a tremendous financial burden upon the persons with the disease, their families, the health care delivery system, and society as a whole,” and that “California spends five billion six hundred million dollars ($5,600,000,000) a year in direct and indirect costs on smoking-related illnesses.” (Health & Saf. Code, § 104350, subd. (a)(7).) To obtain compensation for the physical and mental suffering and staggering expenses inflicted by tobacco-related illness, users of tobacco products and their families have sought relief in our courts through product liability lawsuits against manufacturers and sellers of tobacco products. In dealing with those lawsuits, courts have not been free to apply ordinary principles of tort law because, as we shall explain, the Legislature has enacted statutes that directly control the extent to which our courts may award damages against tobacco companies in product liability actions.

The statutes at issue are two successive versions of section 1714.45 of California’s Civil Code. 1 The first version, which we here sometimes refer to as the Immunity Statute, granted…

I respectfully dissent.

I agree with the majority that “to have the Repeal Statute govern product liability suits against tobacco companies . . . would indeed be a retroactive application of that statute . . . .” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 840.) Unlike the majority, however, I believe both the statutory language and the legislative history of Civil Code section 1714.45 1 evince a clear legislative intent to apply the statute retroactively. I further conclude that such retroactive application would not raise serious questions of constitutionality. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 845.)

Statutes are presumed to operate prospectively. (Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1208 [ 246 Cal.Rptr. 629 , 753 P.2d 585 ] *849 (Evangelatos); § 3.) “Of course, when the Legislature clearly intends a statute to operate retrospectively, we are obliged to carry out that intent unless due process considerations prevent us. [Citation.]” (Western Security Bank v. Superior Court (1997) 15 Cal.4th 232, 243 [ 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 243 , 933 P.2d 507 ].) Whether the Legislature intended retroactive application of a statute requires an exercise in statutory interpretation to ascertain if, by “ ‘express…

In 1995, the California Legislature found that "[t]obacco-related disease places a tremendous financial burden upon the persons with the disease, their families, the health care delivery system, and society as a whole," and that "California spends five billion six hundred million dollars ($5,600,000,000) a year in direct and indirect costs on smoking-related illnesses." (Health & Saf.Code, § 104350, subd. (a)(7).) To obtain compensation for the physical and mental suffering and staggering expenses inflicted by tobacco-related illness, users of tobacco products and their families have sought relief in our courts through product liability lawsuits against manufacturers and sellers of tobacco products. In dealing with those lawsuits, courts have not been free to apply ordinary principles of tort law because, as we shall explain, the Legislature has enacted statutes that directly control the extent to which our courts may award damages against tobacco companies in product liability actions.

The statutes at issue are two successive versions of section 1714.45 of California's Civil Code. [1] The first version, which we here sometimes refer to as the Immunity Statute,…