Neal

It long has been settled under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution that an involuntary statement obtained by a law enforcement officer from a criminal suspect by coercion is inadmissible in a criminal proceeding. (See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi (1936) 297 U.S. 278, 285-286 [ 80 L.Ed. 682 , 56 S.Ct. 461 ].) In Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 ] (Miranda), recognizing that any statement obtained by an officer from a suspect during custodial interrogation may be potentially involuntary because such questioning may be coercive, the United States Supreme Court held that such a statement may be admitted in evidence only if the officer advises the suspect of both his or her right to remain silent and the right to have counsel present at questioning, and the suspect waives those rights and agrees to speak to the officer. The court further held in Miranda that if the suspect indicates that he or she does not wish to speak to the officer or wants to have counsel present at questioning, the officer must end the interrogation. In Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477 [ 68 L.Ed.2d 378 , 101 S.Ct.…

According to the majority, the trial court should have suppressed defendant Kenneth Ray Neal’s confessions to the murder of Don Collins for two closely related reasons: (1) the confessions themselves were involuntary (see Malloy v. Hogan (1964) 378 U.S. 1 [ 12 L.Ed.2d 653 , 84 S.Ct. 1489 ]); and (2) the confessions were obtained in violation of Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477 [ 68 L.Ed.2d 378 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 ] (Edwards) because defendant did not voluntarily initiate the conversations at which he confessed. I agree. I write separately to note that the confessions also appear to be inadmissible for another and, in my view, more compelling reason, namely, the lack of a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel before the confessions. That was a point addressed in Edwards , but one that the majority here does not discuss.

In Edwards , the police took the defendant into custody and advised him of his Miranda rights. (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 ].) When he said he wanted to speak to an attorney, the police stopped questioning him. The next day, two other officers readvised him of his rights. This time the defendant…

There are few less pleasant judicial duties than to reverse a conviction because a police officer, though charged with enforcing the law, obtained important evidence by deliberately improper means. Yet I must join the majority in condemning the tactics used by Detective Mario Martin of the Tulare County Sheriff’s Department.

In superficial deference to Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 ] (Miranda), Martin told defendant, a suspect in custody, that he had the “right” to the presence and assistance of counsel before any questioning. But then, contrary to Miranda , Martin ignored defendant’s repeated efforts to invoke that “right.” Martin badgered defendant, made coercive threats and promises, and finally relegated defendant to overnight confinement with no food, water, or toilet access. These ploys had their intended effect. Placed in this situation, defendant—18 years old, unsophisticated, and ill-versed in the criminal justice system—could easily *90 assume that his right to counsel was illusory, that he would receive no legal help, and that he had no choice but to cooperate. It is no surprise that the next morning, chastened by his…

It long has been settled under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution that an involuntary statement obtained by a law enforcement officer from a criminal suspect by coercion is inadmissible in a criminal proceeding. (See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi (1936) 297 U.S. 278, 285-286 , 56 S.Ct. 461 , 80 L.Ed. 682 .) In Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 ( Miranda ), recognizing that any statement obtained by an officer from a suspect during custodial interrogation may be potentially involuntary because such questioning may be coercive, the United States Supreme Court held that such a statement may be admitted in evidence only if the officer advises the suspect of both his or her right to remain silent and right to have counsel present at questioning, and the suspect waives those rights and agrees to speak to the officer. The court further held in Miranda that if the suspect indicates that he or she does not wish to speak to the officer or wants to have counsel present at questioning, the officer must end the interrogation. In Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68…