Slayton

People v. Slayton

Good Law
112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 561·2001 Cal. LEXIS 6768·2001 Daily Journal DAR 11129·26 Cal. 4th 1076·32 P.3d 1073
Supreme Court of CaliforniaOctober 18, 2001S086153California3,228 words

Opinion

Opinion

Chin, J.

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution (Sixth Amendment) provides in part that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.” This right to counsel attaches “ ‘at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings—whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.’ ” (United States v. Gouveia (1984) 467 U.S. 180, 188 [ 104 S.Ct. 2292, 2297 , 81 L.Ed.2d 146 ].) After it both attaches and is invoked, any incriminating statement the government deliberately elicits from a defendant in counsel’s absence is inadmissible at that defendant’s trial. (Massiah v. United States (1964) 377 U.S. 201, 205-206 [ 84 S.Ct. 1199, 1202-1203 , 12 L.Ed.2d 246 ]; In re Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 945, 950 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 269 , 838 P.2d 1222 ].)

In McNeil v. Wisconsin (1991) 501 U.S. 171, 175 [ 111 S.Ct. 2204, 2207 , 115 L.Ed.2d 158 ] (McNeil), the United States Supreme Court declared that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is “offense specific.” “That is to say, it attaches to offenses as to which adversary judicial criminal proceedings have been…

Sign in to read the full opinion

Create a free account to read the complete opinion text, citation history, and good-law status for this case.