Collins

In this case we must determine the validity of a criminal defendant’s waiver of a jury trial, when the trial court, in advising the defendant before accepting the waiver, informed him that he would receive “some benefit” if he waived his right to a jury trial, although the court could not specify what the benefit would be. The Court of Appeal, in a divided decision, determined that the jury waiver obtained under these circumstances was valid. We conclude that the waiver of a jury trial obtained by a trial court’s assurance of an unspecified benefit is not a valid waiver, and that this error compels reversal of defendant’s conviction. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed.

I

On January 29, 1997, an information was filed against defendant Damani Collins, alleging that he had committed five forcible acts of lewd or lascivious conduct on a child under the age of 14 years (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. *301 (b)), or five acts of lewd or lascivious conduct on a child under that age without the use of force (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)), based upon the same five acts. The information alleged that four of the acts in violation of Penal Code section 288,…

I agree with the majority that defendant’s waiver of his right to a jury trial cannot be deemed knowing and intelligent in light of the trial court’s offer of some unspecified benefit in exchange for that waiver. I would, however, expressly evaluate the validity of that waiver under the well-established totality of the circumstances test.

Here, unlike the situation in People v. Ernst (1994) 8 Cal.4th 441, 443 [ 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 238 , 881 P.2d 298 ], in which there was no express jury trial waiver, we have an express waiver, and the only question is its validity. The offer of an undefined benefit was an error in the admonitions preceding the jury trial waiver that was not cured by other statements during the proceeding (an examination of the totality of the circumstances). It is difficult to imagine how else we would determine the waiver’s validity other than by examining the circumstances under which it was made. Indeed, the majority alludes to such an approach in parts of its analysis. (See, e.g., maj. opn., ante, at p. 301 [“[w]e set forth in some detail the trial court’s communication with defendant on the subject of his waiver of a jury trial, in order to provide an adequate…

In this case we must determine the validity of a criminal defendant's waiver of a jury trial, when the trial court, in advising the defendant before accepting the waiver, informed him that he would receive "some benefit" if he waived his right to a jury trial, although the court could not specify what the benefit would be. The Court of Appeal, in a divided decision, determined that the jury waiver obtained under these circumstances was valid. We conclude that the waiver of a jury trial obtained by a trial court's assurance of an unspecified benefit is not a valid waiver, and that this error compels reversal of defendant's conviction. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed.

On January 29, 1997, an information was filed against defendant Damani Collins, alleging that he had committed five forcible acts of lewd or lascivious conduct on a child under the age of 14 years (Pen.Code, § 288, subd. (b)), or five acts of lewd or lascivious conduct on a child under that age without the use of force (Pen.Code, § 288, subd. (a)), based upon the same five acts. The information alleged that four of the acts in violation of Penal Code section 288, subdivision…