Buttram

We address a conflict in the Courts of Appeal about the proper application of Penal Code section 1237.5 and rule 31(d) of the California Rules of Court. 1 These provisions allow an appeal from a judgment entered on a guilty plea only if (1) the defendant obtains a certificate of probable cause from the trial court or (2) the appeal falls within the two categories of grounds that do not require a certificate. One “noncertificate” category involves postplea claims, including sentencing issues, that do not attack the validity of the plea.

In People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 851 , 913 P.2d 1061 ] (Panizzon), we held that one who agreed to a specific sentence in return for his plea must obtain a certificate of probable cause in order to claim on appeal that the agreed sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. We explained that while such an appeal may appear to involve a sentencing issue arising after the plea, in substance it challenges the very bargain on which the plea was rendered, and thus the validity of the plea itself. Addressing an analogous principle, we confirmed in People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290 [ 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 641 , 992…

I agree, of course, with the reasoning and result of the majority opinion, which I authored. Under existing law and practice, and on the facts of this case, the majority’s holding is correct. I do believe, however, that the current “certificate of probable cause” system for discouraging baseless appeals from negotiated pleas (Pen. Code, § 1237.5; 1 Cal. Rules of Court, rule 31(d) (rule 31(d)) is not working well. The result is a substantial burden on the time and resources of our already overextended court system. This should always be a cause for concern, but it is especially serious now, when the state faces unprecedented fiscal difficulties. I write separately to offer some suggestions for improvement.

At the outset, and most fundamentally, the parties to a plea agreement should, if possible, expressly negotiate and resolve the issue of appealability. A prime reason why we conclude here that defendant Buttram may take his appeal without a certificate, and that the Court of Appeal must address it on the merits, is that Buttram’s plea is silent on the appealability of the trial court’s sentencing choice.

Yet it is well settled that a plea bargain may include a waiver of the…

I respectfully dissent.

Decades ago, this court misguidedly entered “into the business of crafting exceptions” to the certificate of probable cause requirement found in Penal Code section 1237.5. (People v. Lloyd (1998) 17 Cal.4th 658, 667 [ 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 224 , 951 P.2d 1191 ] (dis. opn. of Brown, J.).) In doing so, this court ignored the broad language of the statute and forgot the purpose of the *796 requirement—“ ‘to promote judicial economy “by screening out wholly frivolous guilty [and nolo contendere] plea appeals before time and money is spent preparing the record and the briefs for consideration by the reviewing court.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 668, quoting People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 75-76 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 851 , 913 P.2d 1061 ].) Five years ago, I warned my colleagues that our continued expansion of these exceptions further eviscerates the purpose behind the requirement and creates “a prescription for unnecessary litigation.” (Lloyd, at p. 668.) But, like the prophecies of Cassandra, my warnings were ignored.

We now have another opportunity to “halt th[is] process.” (People v. Lloyd, supra, 17 Cal.4th 658, 668 (dis. opn. of Brown, J.).) But once again my colleagues…

We address a conflict in the Courts of Appeal about the proper application of Penal Code section 1237.5 and rule 31(d) of the California Rules of Court. [1] These provisions allow an appeal from a judgment entered on a guilty plea only if (1) the defendant obtains a certificate of probable cause from the trial court or (2) the appeal falls within the two categories of grounds that do not require a certificate. One "noncertificate" category involves postplea claims, including sentencing issues, that do not attack the validity of the plea.

In People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68 , 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 851 , 913 P.2d 1061 ( Panizzon ), we held that one who agreed to a specific sentence in return for his plea must obtain a certificate of probable cause in order to claim on appeal that the agreed sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. We explained that while such an appeal may appear to involve a sentencing issue arising after the plea, in substance it challenges the very bargain on which the plea was rendered, and thus the validity of the plea itself. Addressing an analogous principle, we confirmed in People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290 , 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 641 ,…