Stroud

Here we consider issues concerning the application of Penal Code section 861. This statute requires dismissal of a criminal complaint if the preliminary examination is not completed in “one session . . . , unless the magistrate, for good cause shown by affidavit, postpones it.” {Ibid., italics added.)

During a preliminary examination of capital defendants in custody, the parties stipulated to minor interruptions for their convenience and waived, on the record, the continuous conduct of the examination during those particular periods. Then, on the fourth day of the examination, which by then had already continued well past an original time estimate, the magistrate announced that on the Friday four days thence, he would be attending a one-day Judicial Council task force meeting in a distant location. No defendant objected until a day and a half before the meeting was to occur.

*957 The magistrate attended his Friday meeting, and no proceedings in the preliminary examination were held on that day. The examination resumed on the following Monday and was completed around noon of the immediately following Wednesday. The defendants were bound over for trial. The superior…

The majority finds good cause to postpone a preliminary examination in the magistrate’s desire to attend a Judicial Council advisory committee meeting. I find no good cause, and therefore dissent.

Penal Code section 861 does not define good cause. It provides only that “[t]he preliminary examination shall be completed at one session or the complaint shall be dismissed, unless the magistrate, for good cause shown by affidavit, postpones it.” Lacking a definition, the statute unavoidably requires us to make a value judgment: Was it more important for the magistrate to stay in Los Angeles to finish the preliminary hearing in one session or to travel to San Francisco to discuss drug courts? In my view, the question is not close. The magistrate’s job—his reason for being a magistrate—is to hear and decide the cases assigned to him. We judges cannot allow this essential public responsibility to take second place to the internal affairs of the judicial branch.

Before today, it was understood that a judge’s desire to attend meetings, seminars, and conferences did not afford good cause to delay a trial. (See Lewis v. Superior Court (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 494, 496-499 [ 176 Cal.Rptr. 80 ];…

Gil Garcetti, District Attorney, Brent Riggs and William Woods, Deputy District Attorneys, for Real Party in Interest.

Here we consider issues concerning the application of Penal Code section 861. This statute requires dismissal of a criminal complaint if the preliminary examination is not completed in "one session ..., unless the magistrate, for good cause shown by affidavit, postpones it." ( Ibid., italics added.) [1]

During a preliminary examination of capital defendants in custody, the parties stipulated to minor interruptions for their convenience and waived, on the record, the continuous conduct of the examination during those particular periods. Then, on the fourth day of the examination, which by then had already continued well past an original time estimate, the magistrate announced that on the Friday four days thence, he would be attending a one-day Judicial Council task force meeting in a distant location. No defendant objected until a day and a half before the meeting was to occur.

The magistrate attended his Friday meeting, and no proceedings in the preliminary examination were held on that day. The examination resumed on the following Monday and was…