In Re Seaton

Petitioner Ronald Harold Seaton was sentenced to death after his conviction of murder (Pen. Code, § 187) 1 with burglary-murder and robbery-murder special circumstances (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A) & (G)). On his automatic appeal, we affirmed the judgment. (People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598 [ 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 441 , 28 P.3d 175 ].)

The petition for writ of habeas corpus challenges his capital murder conviction on numerous grounds. Four of those pertain to matters that petitioner could not have raised on appeal because of his failure to raise them in the trial court by a pretrial motion. 2 We issued an order to show cause to determine whether this failure also precludes consideration of those issues in a postconviction habeas corpus proceeding. We conclude it does, unless the *197 claim depends substantially upon facts that the petitioner did not know, and could not reasonably have known, at the time of trial.

I

On January 25, 1998, petitioner filed this habeas corpus petition.

In claim U.A., petitioner contends that his murder conviction, the jury’s special circumstance findings, and his sentence of death should be vacated because the prosecutor’s decision to seek…

I have previously expressed my view that “creating a Byzantine system of procedural hurdles, each riddled with exceptions and fact-intensive qualifications, only undermines ... the goals they purport to serve: integrity of judgments, finality, and comity.” (In re Gallego (1998) 18 Cal.4th 825, 842 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 132 , 959 P.2d 290 ] (conc. & dis. opn. of Brown, J.); see also In re Sanders (1999) 21 Cal.4th 697, 730 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 899 , 981 P.2d 1038 ] (conc. & dis. opn. of Brown, J.).) Since, at least in the capital context, the court’s internal practice generally ensures full merit review irrespective of procedural bars (see Gallego, at p. 852 (conc. & dis. opn. of Brown, J.)), consideration of possible defaults can only delay finality and invite disregard in the federal courts given the difficulty in determining whether we invoke them with sufficient regularity. (See id. at pp. 843-845 (conc. & dis. opn. of Brown, J.).)

In this instance, the majority goes one better, formulating a quintessential form-over-substance rule. As the majority perforce acknowledges, any failure to preserve an appealable issue by appropriate objection at trial can—and will—be raised on habeas…

I concur in the judgment. I see no need, however, to announce today that the newly created procedural bar will apply even to “claims of constitutional error that are ‘clear and fundamental, and strike[] at the heart of the trial process.’ ” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 199, quoting In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 834 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373 , 855 P.2d 391 ].) The majority does not assert that any of petitioner’s claims meets that high standard. Indeed, as the majority explains, each of petitioner’s claims ultimately lacks merit, either because he has failed to state a claim or because he has failed to show prejudice. Accordingly, I would postpone consideration of exceptions until presented with a conviction in which the new rule’s application threatens a miscarriage of justice. (Cf. Harris, supra, at pp. 825-826, 831, 833-834 .) To announce that a new rule will have no exceptions is far too easy when the facts of the case at hand do not offer a serious test of the rule’s fairness and wisdom.

Petitioner Ronald Harold Seaton was sentenced to death after his conviction of murder (Pen.Code, § 187) [1] with burglary-murder and robbery-murder special circumstances (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A) & (G)). On his automatic appeal, we affirmed the judgment. ( People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598 , 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 441 , 28 P.3d 175 .)

The petition for writ of habeas corpus challenges his capital murder conviction on numerous grounds. Four of those pertain to matters that petitioner could not have raised on appeal because of his failure to raise them in the trial court by a pretrial motion. [2] We issued an order to show cause to determine whether this failure also precludes consideration of those issues in a postconviction habeas corpus proceeding. We conclude it does, unless the claim depends substantially upon facts that the petitioner did not know, and could not reasonably have known, at the time of trial.

On January 25, 1998, petitioner filed this habeas corpus petition.

In claim II.A., petitioner contends that his murder conviction, the jury's special circumstance findings, and his sentence of death should be vacated because the prosecutor's decision to seek…