Cage

In Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 [ 158 L.Ed.2d 177 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 ] (Crawford), the United States Supreme Court announced a new standard for determining when the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment prohibits the use of hearsay evidence—i.e., an out-of-court statement offered for its truth—against a criminal defendant. Crawford held that this clause protects an accused against hearsay uttered by one who spoke as a “ ‘witness[]’ ” “ ‘bearing] testimony’ ” ( 541 U.S. at p. 51 ) if the declarant neither takes the stand at trial nor was otherwise available for cross-examination by the accused.

Crawford declined to provide a comprehensive assessment of what kinds of hearsay fall within “this core class of ‘testimonial’ statements.” ( Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. 36, 51 .) However, the court concluded that, even under “a narrow standard,” testimonial statements include those made, during a formal police interrogation, by one who was herself a suspect in the crime under investigation. (Id. at p. 52.)

*970 State and federal courts have struggled to apply the Crawford concept of testimonial hearsay. The issue has particular impact in domestic abuse cases, where…

I join the majority in upholding the trial court’s admission of a statement that the alleged victim, a minor, made to an emergency room physician treating his injuries. I also agree that the trial court violated defendant’s rights under the confrontation clause of the federal Constitution by admitting two statements that the minor made to a sheriff’s deputy, describing the cause of the minor’s injuries. I do not agree, however, that the erroneous admission of these two statements was harmless.

I

While investigating a domestic disturbance at defendant’s home, Riverside County Deputy Sheriff Perry Mullin saw a bloody towel and drops of blood outside the home; inside the home, he saw the top of a glass coffee table was missing and defendant was picking up broken glass. After talking to defendant and other family members, Deputy Mullin left. An hour later he was dispatched to an intersection a mile from defendant’s home, where he found defendant’s 15-year-old son, John R, who had not been present at the home during Muffin’s earlier visit. John had a large cut running from his ear to his neck. Muffin saw to it that John was taken to a hospital.

Later, Deputy Mullin talked to John in…

In Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S.Ct 1354 , 158 L.Ed.2d 177 ( Crawford) , the United States Supreme Court announced a new standard for determining when the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment prohibits the use of hearsay evidence—i.e., an out-of-court statement offered for its truth—against a criminal defendant. Crawford held that this clause protects an accused against hearsay uttered by one who spoke as a "`witness[ ]'" "`bear[ing] testimony'" ( id. at p. 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354 ) if the declarant neither takes the stand at trial nor was otherwise available for cross-examination by the accused.

Crawford declined to provide a comprehensive assessment of what kinds of hearsay fall within "this core class of `testimonial' statements." ( Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. 36, 51 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 .) However, the court concluded that, even under "a narrow standard," testimonial statements include those made, during a formal police interrogation, by one who was herself a suspect in the crime under investigation. ( Id. at p. 52, 124 S.Ct. 1354 .)

State and federal courts have struggled to apply the Crawford concept of testimonial hearsay. The issue has…