Dominguez

I concur in the majority’s affirming in part and reversing in part the Court of Appeal’s judgment. In particular, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that substantial evidence supports defendant’s conviction for aggravated kidnapping. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1153.) I think it unnecessary to go further and discuss the asportation standard for simple kidnapping in 1997. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1154-1155.)

As the majority notes, defendant asserts “the evidence of asportation was insufficient because it showed the victim was moved less than 90 feet. He maintains that, at the time of his crime, simple kidnapping required a movement of more than 90 feet, and because simple kidnapping was a lesser included offense of aggravated kidnapping, kidnapping for rape must have required a movement of more than 90 feet.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1154.) The response to this argument is that here, defendant was convicted of aggravated, not simple kidnapping. At the time of his crime, we had recently reaffirmed that for aggravated kidnapping “there is no minimum number of feet a defendant must move a victim.” (People v. Rayford (1994) 9 Cal.4th 1, 12 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 317 , 884 P.2d 1369 ]; see…

We address in this case three separate claims of error. First, we consider whether the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury, sua sponte, that a reasonable yet mistaken belief the victim consented to have sexual intercourse was a defense to a charge of rape. (People v. Mayberry (1975) 15 Cal.3d 143 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 745 , 542 P.2d 1337 ].) Because defendant did not request such an instruction, rely on that defense, or present substantial evidence to support the defense, no duty to instruct arose and the Court of Appeal correctly so ruled.

*1145 Second, we revisit an area of criminal law in which recent Court of Appeal opinions suggest consistency has eluded the appellate courts: When is the forced movement, or asportation, of a victim sufficient to permit conviction of aggravated kidnapping? Contrary to the Court of Appeal, we conclude defendant’s forced movement of the victim here was sufficient to satisfy the asportation requirement.

Finally, we once again address the circumstances in which a person who commits a serious felony can be liable for murder under the felony-murder rule when a coparticipant in the felony is the actual killer. (See People v.…

We address in this case three separate claims of error. First, we consider whether the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury, sua sponte, that a reasonable yet mistaken belief the victim consented to have sexual intercourse was a defense to a charge of rape. ( People v. Mayberry (1975) 15 Cal.3d 143 , 125 Cal. Rptr. 745 , 542 P.2d 1337 .) Because defendant did not request such an instruction, rely on that defense, or present substantial evidence to support the defense, no duty to instruct arose and the Court of Appeal correctly so ruled.

Second, we revisit an area of criminal law in which recent Court of Appeal opinions suggest consistency has eluded the appellate courts: When is the forced movement, or asportation, of a victim sufficient to permit conviction of aggravated kidnapping? Contrary to the Court of Appeal, we conclude defendant's forced movement of the victim here was sufficient to satisfy the asportation requirement.

Finally, we once again address the circumstances in which a person who commits a serious felony can be liable for murder under the felony-murder rule when a coparticipant in the felony is the actual killer. (See People v.…