Chambers

Here we consider whether derivative information, developed by independent investigation after Pitchess 1 disclosure in an earlier case, is subject to a protective order under Evidence Code 2 section 1045, 3 *677 subdivision (e) (section 1045(e)). We hold that derivative information is not generally subject to the statutorily required protective order when a subsequent defendant files his or her own Pitchess motion and receives the name of the same complainant to which the derivative information pertains. We therefore affirm the Court of Appeal’s judgment.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Defendant Tariq Chambers was charged with one count of resisting, delaying, or obstructing a peace officer. (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1).) According to the police report, on July 29, 2004, Officer E. and his partner responded to a report of domestic violence at Chambers’s residence. Chambers became belligerent and rushed toward Officer E. three times. Officer E. used pepper spray to protect himself.

In January 2005, Chambers filed a Pitchess motion, seeking information in Officer E.’s personnel file regarding “excessive force, aggressive conduct, unnecessary violence,…

I concur in the majority’s narrow holding that “[wjhen complainant information has been ordered disclosed to counsel who, when later representing a different defendant, succeeds under Pitchess [v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 522 P.2d 305 ]] in discovering the same complainant information relating to the same officer, *683 counsel may then refer to the derivative information uncovered as part of the earlier followup investigation.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 681, italics added.) After counsel has won a second Pitchess disclosure, involving the same officer and the same complainant information, no purpose of the statutes and protective orders that safeguard confidential police officer personnel records is served by requiring counsel to perform a meaningless duplicate investigation before using, at trial, derivative information counsel already possesses.

However, I do not interpret the majority’s opinion, or its judgment, to imply that counsel may employ information learned as a direct result of the first Pitchess disclosure to support a later request for Pitchess disclosure in a different case. The statutory scheme, and the protective orders issued…

I fully concur with the majority’s holding that derivative information developed through investigation after Pitchess disclosure (Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 522 P.2d 305 ] (Pitchess)) in an earlier case is not generally subject to a protective order under Evidence Code, section 1045, subdivision (e), 1 when a subsequent defendant files a Pitchess motion and receives the name of the same complainant to which the derivative information pertains. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 676-677.) I write separately to express my continuing disagreement with the notion that section 1045, subdivision (e), restricts “ ‘use of the disclosed information to the proceeding in which it was sought.’ ” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 680, citing Alford v. Superior Court (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1033, 1042 [ 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 672 , 63 P.3d 228 ] (Alford))

As I explained in my concurring and dissenting opinion in Alford, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pages 1057-1063, such a conclusion is neither prescribed by the plain language of section 1045, subdivision (e), nor is it supported by the legislative history. Both support the conclusion that Pitchess disclosure “may be used in any court…

Michael J. Aguirre, City Attorney, and David M. Stotland, Deputy City Attorney, for Real Party in Interest.

Dennis Barlow, City Attorney (Burbank) and Juli C. Scott, Chief Assistant City Attorney, for League of California Cities as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.

CORRIGAN, J.

Here we consider whether derivative information, developed by independent investigation after Pitchess [1] disclosure in an earlier case, is subject to a protective order under Evidence Code [2] section 1045, [3] subdivision (e) (section 1045(e)). We hold that derivative information is not generally subject to the statutorily required protective order when a subsequent defendant files his or her own Pitchess motion and receives the name of the same complainant to which the derivative information pertains. We therefore affirm the Court of Appeal's judgment.

Defendant Tariq Chambers was charged with one count of resisting, delaying, or obstructing a peace officer. (Pen.Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1).) According to the police report, on July 29, 2004, Officer E. and his partner responded to a report of domestic violence at Chambers's residence. Chambers became belligerent and rushed toward…