Giordano

The majority holds that in a criminal proceeding the sentencing court may order a defendant who has been convicted of a homicide crime to pay the deceased victim’s surviving spouse, as restitution, a portion of the estimated income that the deceased victim would likely have earned. In the tragic circumstances of this case, that holding is certainly appealing. But the Legislature has established other methods by which a surviving spouse may obtain restitution for loss of economic support resulting from a homicide victim’s death—the surviving spouse may bring a civil wrongful death action (Code Civ. Proc., § 377.60) against the defendant or apply to the state Restitution Fund established for crime victims (Gov. Code, § 13950 et seq.). A close review of the pertinent legislative scheme reveals several reasons to doubt that the Legislature has, in addition to these two clearly established methods for obtaining restitution for lost support, also authorized sentencing courts to include this category of loss in a direct restitution order. It seems more likely that the Legislature reasonably decided that the criminal sentencing process is ill suited to making the often exceptionally…

Defendant was convicted of vehicular manslaughter and sentenced to a prison term of four years. He was ordered to pay direct victim restitution to the wife of the deceased victim in the amount of $167,711.65, the value of five years of the deceased victim’s average annual earnings. We here consider whether Penal Code section 1202.4, governing direct victim restitution, authorizes a court to require a convicted defendant to compensate the spouse of a deceased victim for his or her future economic losses attributable to the deceased victim’s death. We hold that a court may include this loss of economic support in a direct restitution order.

We also consider how a trial court should measure a surviving victim’s economic loss. We articulate several factors that a trial court may consider when calculating how much restitution is owed to a surviving victim. *650 Because defendant has not shown that the amount of restitution ordered was an abuse of the trial court’s discretion, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On or about December 1, 2003, defendant Charles Giordano was driving under the influence of alcohol when he hit and…

Defendant was convicted of vehicular manslaughter and sentenced to a prison term of four years. He was ordered to pay direct victim restitution to the wife of the deceased victim in the amount of $167,711.65, the value of five years of the deceased victim's average annual earnings. We here consider whether Penal Code section 1202.4, governing direct victim restitution, authorizes a court to require a convicted defendant to compensate the spouse of a deceased victim for his or her future economic losses attributable to the deceased victim's death. We hold that a court may include this loss of economic support in a direct restitution order.

We also consider how a trial court should measure a surviving victim's economic loss. We articulate several factors that a trial court may consider when calculating how much restitution is owed to a surviving victim. Because defendant has not shown that the amount of restitution ordered was an abuse of the trial court's discretion, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

On or about December 1, 2003, defendant Charles Giordano was driving under the influence of alcohol when he hit and killed Kenneth Armstrong, who was riding…