Flatley
Flatley v. Mauro
Opinion
Lead Opinion
Moreno, J.
*305 Opinion
Plaintiff Michael Flatley, a well-known entertainer, sued defendant D. Dean Mauro, an attorney, for civil extortion, intentional infliction of emotional distress and wrongful interference with economic advantage. Flatley’s action was based on a demand letter Mauro sent to Flatley on behalf of Tyna Marie Robertson, a woman who claimed that Flatley had raped her, and on subsequent telephone calls Mauro made to Flatley’s attorneys, demanding a seven-figure payment to settle Robertson’s claims. Mauro filed a motion to strike Flatley’s complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute. 1 (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16.) He argued that the letter was a prelitigation settlement offer and therefore Flatley’s complaint arose from Mauro’s exercise of his constitutionally protected right of petition. The trial court denied the motion. The Court of Appeal held that, because Mauro’s letter and subsequent telephone calls constituted criminal extortion as a matter of law, and extortionate speech is not constitutionally protected, the anti-SLAPP statute did not apply. Therefore, it affirmed denial of Mauro’s motion to strike. We granted Mauro’s petition for review.
We conclude that, consistent…
Concurring Opinion
Werdegar, J.
I agree with the majority that defendant does not enjoy the protection of the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16.) 1 I therefore concur in the judgment affirming the Court of Appeal. In moving to strike this action, it was defendant’s initial burden to demonstrate the anti-SLAPP statute’s applicability by showing the lawsuit arises from protected speech or petitioning. (Id., subds. (b)(1), (e); Zamos v. Stroud (2004) 32 Cal.4th 958, 965 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 54 , 87 P.3d 802 ].) This he failed to do. Insofar as the gravamen of plaintiff s claim is that defendant attempted to extort money from him by threatening, through “various kinds of opprobrium” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 332), to ruin plaintiff’s reputation and encourage prosecutorial authorities to pursue plaintiff (see especially id. at pp. 309-311, 329-332), the action does not arise from protected speech and petitioning.
The majority details plaintiffs evidentiary submissions opposing defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 306-311.) These describe what the operative second amended complaint alleges: a “vicious and criminal scheme” by defendant and…
Opinion
Plaintiff Michael Flatley, a well-known entertainer, sued defendant D. Dean Mauro, an attorney, for civil extortion, intentional infliction of emotional distress and wrongful interference with economic advantage. Flatley's action was based on a demand letter Mauro sent to Flatley on behalf of Tyna Marie Robertson, a woman who claimed that Flatley had raped her, and on subsequent telephone calls Mauro made to Flatley's attorneys, demanding a seven-figure payment to settle Robertson's claims. Mauro filed a motion to strike Flatley's complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute. [1] (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16.) He argued that the letter was a prelitigation settlement offer and therefore Flatley's complaint arose from Mauro's exercise of his constitutionally protected right of petition. The trial court denied the motion. The Court of Appeal held that, because Mauro's letter and subsequent telephone calls constituted criminal extortion as a matter of law, and extortionate speech is not constitutionally protected, the anti-SLAPP statute did not apply. Therefore, it affirmed denial of Mauro's motion to strike. We granted Mauro's petition for review.