This “appeal” presents more than the usual number of complications present when a layman attempts to appeal and act as his own attorney.

Appellant filed a complaint on December 15, 1961, alleging that appellee Rhay had deprived him, Robert Draper, a state prisoner serving two consecutive terms for robbery, of his civil rights, “by forcing petitioner to work,” causing “slavery and peonage.” $250,000 in American money is demanded, apparently as damages.

The day previously, the same plaintiff in another matter (No. 1656) had filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which had been denied, upon the ground (a) plaintiff was not then being held in confinement under the judgment and sentence plaintiff was then attacking; (b) he had not exhausted his state remedies. Treating the document filed as a petition for a writ of coram nobis, the petition was denied because not directed to the court which actually sentenced plaintiff. At that hearing plaintiff was present, and acted by choice as his own attorney. A transcript of this proceeding is before us.

On December 15, 1961, plaintiff in addition to this complaint alleging peonage and a motion for a restraining order filed in the district court, also filed in the district court (a) a motion addressed to the Supreme Court of the United States for a restraining order; and (b) civil complaints addressed to the Supreme Court of the United States, based on alleged peonage.

Upon hearing of a motion to dismiss, filed by the Attorney General of the State of Washington, a hearing was had and plaintiff was present in court on January 2, 1962. The motion to dismiss was granted on said date.

A letter was written the court by the plaintiff and was treated as a proposed amended complaint. It was received on January 11, 1962, and on January 25, 1962, the court directed the filing of this letter as an amended complaint and required a responsive pleading to be filed by the Attorney General of the State of Washington. On February 12, 1962, an answer was filed by the State.

Meanwhile, on November 29, 1961, plaintiff had filed with this court a petition for a writ of mandamus, Miscellaneous Number 1341, asking us to require the district court to act on plaintiff’s complaint. This was denied as moot on January 31, 1962. A purported amendment to the petition for a writ of mandamus was filed with this court on January 26, 1962. On January 31, 1962, this court made the following order in Miscellaneous Number 1387:

Again meanwhile, and on February 8, 1962, plaintiff filed (a) a motion for the issuance of a certificate of probable cause, and (b) a notice of appeal to this court.

On February 16, 1962, plaintiff’s “Reply to Respondent’s Answer” was filed.

The record before us does not disclose what document was filed by the plaintiff with the Supreme Court of the United States in the matter presently pending therein. However, we note that in No. 817, Miscellaneous (Supreme Court’s 1961- 1962 Term Calendar), Draper v. Washington, 370 U.S. 935 , 82 S.Ct. 1589 , 8 L.Ed.2d 806 , plaintiff’s “Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis” and the “Petition for a Writ of Certiorari” were granted. The case was transferred to the Appellate Docket and placed on the Summary Calendar for argument, immediately following No. 476 (Douglas v. California, 370 U.S. 930 , 82 S.Ct. 1579 , 8 L.Ed.2d 804 ). Number 817, Miscellaneous, on the 1961-1962 Calendar became No. 201 on the Appellate Docket, 1962- 1963 Term Calendar.

Plaintiff thereafter during the next month made various motions and filed at least four new complaints. On March 20, 1962, the district court heard seven various motions, and on March 28, 1962, ruled on them. The district court also on March 20, 1962, with plaintiff present in court, considered the plaintiff’s oral motions (a) to strike the notice of appeal, and (b) to withdraw notice of appeal. The latter motion was granted by order dated March 27, 1962. We have read the transcript of that proceeding.

The court then ordered plaintiff’s oral motion granted, allowing him to file an amended complaint, combining in one amended complaint “all claims for relief that the plaintiff now has filed in this cause under seven different complaints.” This was filed on March 29, 1962; an answer was filed April 9, 1962.

Plaintiff thereafter made several motions, all denied. He then filed a “Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States.” Plaintiff's “reply” to respondent’s answer was then filed, and various other motions made and denied.

There thus is now pending no appeal filed with or to this court. Technically, nothing is before us. If we assume, however, that the Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States is an attempted appeal to this court, we can and will proceed to hear the matter, considering as the Notice of Appeal the document entitled “Motion for Docketing of Appeal” and “Notice of Appearance” attached to the “Opening Appeal Brief and Argument,” filed September 21, 1962 in this ease.

We note first that appellant complains of matters not before the district court at the time it made its ruling; of matters not before this court at this time— “of all 16 adverse rulings” on various motions made below. Appellant then lists his “Questions Presented”; thirty-four in number, as follows:

“SPECIAL QUESTIONS FOR THIS COURT

No answer we could give to these questions would, we are certain, satisfy the appellant.

Fundamental to appellant’s appeal are his three positions: (1) That he cannot be forced to perform any labor in the penitentiary because his appeal from his final judgment of conviction has not been heard in the Supreme Court of the State of Washington; (2) that he is being denied his right to contact the courts or correspond with attorneys; (3) appellant is continually being placed in the “hole” because he will not work.

The voluminous record before us proves there is no merit in the second point. To support his first and third points, appellant cites numerous cases, many of which represent sound law on the facts there involved, but have no application to the facts disclosed by the record now before us. For example, appellant relies heavily on the case of Bailleaux v. Holmes, 1959 , D.C., 177 F.Supp. 361 . He fails to realize or recognize that that case was reversed by this court in Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 1961, 290 F.2d 632 .

Because a defendant appeals a conviction, or questions it by a collateral attack, he is not entitled, pending a final determination, to his freedom; nor to enunciate to the warden the rules by which he is to be governed during his confinement.

There is no federally protected right of a state prisoner not to work while imprisoned after conviction, even though that conviction is being appealed.

Prison rules may require appellant to work but this is not the sort of involuntary servitude which violates Thirteenth Amendment rights. Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 332 , 36 S.Ct. 258, 259 , 60 L.Ed. 672 , where it was said:

Where a person is duly tried, convicted, sentenced and imprisoned for crime in accordance with law, no issue of peonage or involuntary servitude arises. Lindsey v. Leavy, 9 Cir., 149 F.2d 899 . The Thirteenth Amendment has no application where a person is held to answer for a violation of a penal statute. Blass v. Weigel, D.C., 85 F.Supp. 775, 781 .

It follows, therefore, that whether appellant is being held in the state penitentiary or the county jail, he may be required to work in accordance with institution rules.

Appellant asserts, however, that he is being improperly held in the state penitentiary, and that in accordance with state law he should be in the county jail. Due process questions do not arise merely because appellant has been treated at variance with state law. Hughes v. Heinze, 9 Cir., 1959, 268 F.2d 864, 869 . No denial of equal protection is shown unless there is shown intentional or purposeful discrimination between persons or classes. Hoffman v. Halden, 9 Cir., 1959, 268 F.2d 280, 290 .

The sum of appellant’s position is that the district court’s actions were “so arbitrary and capreciuos (sic) as to deny him” constitutional rights and due process of law.

Appellant raised many points on appeal that relate to unappealable orders.

We have read the transcript of proceedings had on December 14,1961, on March 20, 1962 and on April 19, 1962. We find no arbitrary or capricious action on the part of the trial judge.

We also note that there is no final judgment of the court below. There being none, there is nothing before us upon which an appeal can be based.

The appeal is, therefore, herewith dismissed.

From the Minutes of the Supreme Court of the United States of June 25, 1962, we take this to have been an appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court of the State of Washington. State v. Long, 58 Wash.2d 830 , 365 P.2d 31 . . Cited by appellant under various names, such, as “Ballixuea v. Holmes,-F.D2” (p. 9, Plaintiff’s Reply to Defendant’s Answer), filed July 9, 1962.