Bernard

In this case we determine whether close personal friends of a dependent elder who at the end of her life provided her with personal care, including health care, are “care custodians” for the purposes of statutory provisions that presumptively disqualify care custodians as beneficiaries of testamentary transfers from dependent adults to whom they provide such services. (Prob. Code, §§ 21350, 21351, subd. (d) (hereafter section 21351(d)); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.17, subd. (y).)

We conclude that when an unrelated person renders substantial, ongoing health services to a dependent adult, that person may be a care custodian for purposes of the statutory scheme at issue, notwithstanding that the service relationship between the individuals arose out of a preexisting personal friendship rather than a professional or occupational connection. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

*798 Background

On August 28, 1991, decedent Carmel L. Bosco executed the Carmel L. Bosco Revocable Living Trust (Trust). Over the years, decedent amended the Trust seven times. Plaintiffs, relatives of decedent, brought this action seeking to invalidate the seventh, and…

I wholly agree that Welfare and Institutions Code, section 15610.17 does not include a professional or occupational limitation on, or a preexisting personal friendship exception to, the definition of “care custodian” provided by the statute. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 808-809.) That section and the statutory scheme inclusive of Probate Code sections 21350, subdivision (a)(6) and 21351, subdivision (d), presumptively disqualifying care custodians as beneficiaries of testamentary transfers, do not contain or imply “an exception for preexisting personal friends of a dependent adult to whom they provide health care services.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 810.)

I also observe that the circumstances of the present case illustrate the Legislature’s well-founded concern—reflected in its adoption of statutory language sufficiently broad to encompass uncompensated caregivers—that individuals acting as unpaid care custodians of a dependent adult and not related to that adult potentially may exercise undue influence over their charge as readily as professional or occupational care custodians.

At the same time, it appears to me that in other, fairly common factual circumstances involving…

Superior Court, Los Angeles County; Robert H. O'Brien [*] , Judge.

Robert M. Neubauer for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Mark T. Eagan and Donna Bader, Laguna Beach, for Defendant and Respondent.

WERDEGAR, J.

In this case we determine whether close personal friends of a dependent elder who at the end of her life provided her with personal care, including health care, are "care custodians" for the purposes of statutory provisions that presumptively disqualify care custodians as beneficiaries of testamentary transfers from dependent adults to whom they provide such services. (Prob.Code, §§ 21350, 21351, subd. (d) (hereafter section 21351(d)); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.17, subd. (y).) [1]

We conclude that when an unrelated person renders substantial, ongoing health services to a dependent adult, that person may be a care custodian for purposes of the statutory scheme at issue, notwithstanding that the service relationship between the individuals arose out of a preexisting personal friendship rather than a professional or occupational connection. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

On August 28, 1991, decedent Carmel L. Bosco executed the Carmel L. Bosco…

I respectfully dissent. If the Legislature wanted Welfare and Institutions Code section 15610.17 1 to apply to anyone who provided care to elderly or dependent adults, whether professionally or otherwise, they simply would have said so. The impact and the import of the repeated use of such terms as “agency,” “office,” “facility,” “school,” “center,” “department,” etc., convey an intention to describe people who provide care or assistance through some formal relationship, rather than on a private friendship or familial basis. The use of the term “person” twice in the course of this lengthy provision demonstrates an intent to set out the broadest scope of those who offer care through the operation of an agency, office, facility, etc. The Legislature included, for example, support and maintenance staff, teachers, advocates, lawyers, ombudsmen, and firefighters. If it had intended to include “everybody who treated an elderly person with kindness,” it certainly would have been easy to do so. It painstakingly articulated a large *822 group, but one that is more circumscribed than “everyone.” Read in connection with the preceding subdivisions, section 15610.17, subdivision (y) is fairly…