Manduley

Proposition 21, titled the Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention Act of 1998 and approved by the voters at the March 7, *545 2000, Primary Election (Proposition 21), made a number of changes to laws applicable to minors accused of committing criminal offenses. As relevant here, the initiative measure broadened the circumstances in which prosecutors are authorized to file charges against minors 14 years of age and older in the criminal division of the superior court, rather than in the juvenile division of that court. Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (d) (section 707(d)), 1 confers upon prosecutors the discretion to bring specified charges against certain minors directly in criminal court, without a prior adjudication by the juvenile court that the minor is unfit for a disposition under the juvenile court law.

Petitioners are eight minors accused of committing various felony offenses. 2 As authorized by section 707(d), the People filed charges against petitioners directly in criminal court. Petitioners demurred to the complaint, contending that section 707(d) is unconstitutional on several grounds. The superior court overruled the demurrers,…

I concur in parts I through V of the majority opinion and concur in the result. But as explained below, I take issue with much of the majority’s analysis of the single-subject rule and with the way this court has defined the single-subject rule in prior case law.

I.

On the March 7, 2000 ballot on which Proposition 21 appeared, there were 17 initiatives and one referendum, including complex and important matters involving election reform, limits on same-sex marriages, voting requirements for school bonds, and approval of Indian gaming compacts. The texts of the proposed laws took 56 double-columned pages of small (9 point) type. The ballot summaries and arguments were 78 pages long. It is doubtful that the average judge or lawyer, let alone the average layperson, comprehended all the material within these pages.

Although many of the reforms suggested to reduce the volume and complexity of the legislative choices faced by voters are beyond the scope of this court’s power to implement, there is one measure already available to us: the rigorous enforcement of the single-subject rule. It is unlikely that the drafters of the rule in 1948, when there were only eight propositions on…

Historically, in California the decision whether to grant a district attorney’s request that a minor be prosecuted in adult court instead of juvenile court has been a function of the judiciary, a neutral body. In 2000, however, the voters of this state enacted Proposition 21, an initiative measure that among other matters grants a prosecutor arbitrary and virtually unlimited discretion to decide whether a minor should be tried in juvenile or adult court. There is no hearing, and no right to counsel. No standards guide the exercise of discretion. There is no judicial review. This last omission is fatal, for by depriving the judiciary of any role in making or reviewing the decision, this portion of Proposition 21 eliminates an essential check to arbitrary executive power, and thus offends the principle of separation of powers embodied in the California Constitution.

I

The California Constitution expressly provides for the separation of governmental powers among the three branches of state government. (Cal. Const., art III, § 3.) “Although this particular provision dates only from 1972, our state Constitution ‘[fjrom its inception . . . has contained an explicit provision embodying…

I concur in the judgment and, in all but one respect, in the majority opinion’s reasoning. I write separately to explain my reasons for agreeing that Proposition 21 does not violate the single-subject limitation imposed on initiative measures by article II, section 8, subdivision (d) of the California Constitution.

As the majority explains (maj. opn., ante, at p. 576), the problems of violent gang crime and juvenile crime are so closely interrelated that they can reasonably be considered the common subject Proposition 21 seeks to address. The difficulty, in terms of the single-subject rule, comes with those provisions changing the “Three Strikes” law’s “lock-in” date (Pen. Code, §§ 667.1, 1170.125) 1 and amending the statutory lists of serious (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)) and violent (§ 667.5, subd. (c)) felonies that, among their other roles in sentencing, define the prior convictions that qualify recidivists for sentencing under the Three Strikes law. I would analyze this aspect of the issue somewhat differently than the majority.

By Proposition 21, the voters added to the lists in sections 1192.7 and 667.5 certain offenses clearly related to gangs and/or juvenile crime. Newly…

Howard, Rice, Nemerovski, Canady, Falk & Rabin, Steven L. Mayer, Kimberly A. Proctor, San Francisco, Erick M. Silber; Robert Kim, Margaret C. Crosby; Mark D. Rosenbaum, Los Angeles; Jordan C. Budd for American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California, America Civil Liberties Union of Southern California, American Civil Liberties Union of San Diego and Imperial Counties, League of Women Voters of California, California Teachers Association, Children's Advocacy Institute, Coleman Advocates for Children and Youth and Pacific Juvenile Defender Center as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioners.

John T. Philipsborn, San Francisco, for California Attorneys for Criminal Justice as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioners.

James F. Sweeney, Sacramento, for California Catholic Conference as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioners.

Munger, Tolles & Olson, Jeffrey L. Bleich, San Francisco, Deborah N. Pearlstein; Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights of the San Francisco Bay Area, Robert Rubin and Rebekah B. Evenson for The Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice, The National Center for Youth Law, Legal Services for Children, The National Association of Counsel for Children, The American…