Musser

Two questions are presented by this case. The first question is whether considerations of public policy require the adoption of a blanket rule barring concurrent counsel or cocounsel from suing one another for indemnification of legal malpractice damages. We conclude public policy does not require the adoption of such a blanket rule. The second question is whether insurers of attorneys sued for legal malpractice may be subrogated to the attorneys’ indemnity claims against concurrent counsel or cocounsel. While legal malpractice claims are not ordinarily assignable, we conclude the policy considerations against assignment are not applicable here.

*277 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which had reversed the judgment of the trial court granting a nonsuit.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Sandra G. Musser is an attorney who practices family law. She represented Pam Scott in divorce proceedings in 1992. Musser filed a petition for spousal and child support set to be heard on July 17, 1992. At that hearing, Scott’s husband declared that he had filed for bankruptcy and the support hearing was continued. Musser arranged for []…

I agree with these two holdings by the majority: (1) There is no legal barrier precluding concurrent counsel or cocounsel from suing one another for indemnification of damages incurred in a legal malpractice action, and (2) the insurer of the attorney sued for legal malpractice may be subrogated to the attorney’s indemnity claims against concurrent counsel or cocounsel.

I express no view, however, on the scope of indemnity between predecessor and successor counsel (see maj. opn., ante, at pp. 280-281) because that is not an issue in this case. Nor do I express a view on whether a client suing one of the client’s attorneys but not the other has waived the attorney-client privilege as to both attorneys or only as to the attorney being sued. (Id. at pp. 283-284.) This issue too is not presented here. I would leave resolution *288 of these difficult questions for another day when, having been properly raised, they require resolution.

Baxter, J., concurred.

I agree, of course, that the considerations of public policy that have led a majority of the Courts of Appeal to bar indemnification claims in the predecessor/successor cases—avoiding conflicts of interest between attorney and client and protecting the confidentiality of attorney-client communications—do not require the adoption of a blanket rule barring indemnification claims in cocounsel cases. However, out of a concern for judicial economy, I would have preferred to have adopted such a blanket rule.

The case-by-case approach, which we adopt in the majority opinion, may result in more justice for lawyers, but less for the general public, because we will continue to squander scarce judicial resources, at both the trial and appellate level, on these cases. The exorbitant number of published Court of Appeal opinions devoted to them was tallied in a puckish footnote by Justice Miriam A. Vogel. “This opinion, our fourth, means we now have the lead for the number of published opinions on this issue. Division One of the Fourth District is second with three published opinions. Division Three of the Fourth District is third with two published opinions. Divisions Two, Four and Seven of…

Murphy, Pearson, Bradley & Feeney, James A. Murphy, Harlan B. Watkins, San Francisco, and Alexander J. Berline for Cross-complainant and Appellant.

Stephan, Oringher, Richman & Theodora, Harry W. R Chamberlain II, Robert M. Dato and Brian P. Barrow for California Society of Certified Public Accountants as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Cross-complainant and Appellant.

Lanahan & Reilley, Christopher R Miller, Cheryl P. Martinsen and Noreen M. Evans, Santa Rosa, for Cross-defendants and Respondents.

BROWN, J.

Two questions are presented by this case. The first question is whether considerations of public policy require the adoption of a blanket rule barring concurrent counsel or cocounsel from suing one another for indemnification of legal malpractice damages. We conclude public policy does not require the adoption of such a blanket rule. The second question is whether insurers of attorneys sued for legal malpractice may be subrogated to the attorneys' indemnity claims against concurrent counsel or cocounsel. While legal malpractice claims are not ordinarily assignable, we conclude the policy considerations against assignment are not applicable here.

For the reasons stated, we…