Jefferson

In this case, we consider whether a compromise and release executed in a workers’ compensation proceeding, that expressly releases “all claims and causes of action” relating to an injury and that includes an attachment establishing the parties’ intent to include civil claims within the scope of the release, bars a civil action under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.) for damages relating to the same events that resulted in the injury. We conclude the express terms of the release evidence the parties’ intent to settle the FEHA action. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

The California Department of Youth Authority (the Youth Authority) employed Mary J. Jefferson from September 1992 to February 1994 to work part time as a teacher’s assistant in the high school classroom of Larry Berg. *302 Jefferson claims that, while working in Berg’s classroom, Berg and his students regularly used derogatory language when referring to women. The language offended Jefferson, who complained to Berg and his supervisors. Nevertheless, the sexually offensive conduct…

I concur in the majority opinion. I write separately to clarify what I believe to be the scope of and rationale for our holding.

As the majority correctly states: “[T]he Court of Appeal decisions that have considered the issue have been consistent in their view that the preprinted language in a workers’ compensation compromise and release form should be narrowly construed to apply only to workers’ compensation claims.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 309.) The majority makes clear that it neither approves or disapproves of two of these decisions (Lopez v. Sikkema (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 31 [ 280 Cal.Rptr. 7 ]; Delaney v. Superior Fast Freight (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 590 [ 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 33 ]), and it approves of a third, Asare v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 856 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 452 ], on the grounds that extrinsic evidence was introduced that the release was not intended to apply to civil claims. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 309.)

Whatever the validity of the above-stated general rule that workers’ compensation releases apply only to workers’ compensation claims, the present case recognizes an exception to that rule. The majority distinguishes this case from Lopez and Delaney in…

I agree with the majority that the release plaintiff executed pertained not only to her claims in the workers’ compensation proceeding but also to any civil claims she may have had against her employer. There is one point, however, on which I wish to comment.

According to the majority, standardized language in the release stating that the employee is giving up “ ‘all claims and causes of action’ relating to the injury” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 305) is sufficient to put any employee on notice that the release covers not only workers’ compensation claims but also any potential claims the employee could assert against the employer in a civil lawsuit. To conclude otherwise, the majority says, would unduly burden employers because they “would have to struggle to enumerate all claims the employee might plan to allege.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 306.) I do not share that view.

Although here the preprinted release form’s language, considered together with the evidence presented, shows there was no misunderstanding on plaintiffs part that she was giving up all of her workers’ compensation claims and also those she could have brought in a civil action under the Fair Employment and Housing…

In this case, we consider whether a compromise and release executed in a workers' compensation proceeding, that expressly releases "all claims and causes of action" relating to an injury and that includes an attachment establishing the parties' intent to include civil claims within the scope of the release, bars a civil action under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov.Code, § 12900 et seq.) for damages relating to the same events that resulted in the injury. We conclude the express terms of the release evidence the parties' intent to settle the FEHA action. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

The California Department of Youth Authority (the Youth Authority) employed Mary J. Jefferson from September 1992 to February 1994 to work part time as a teacher's assistant in the high school classroom of Larry Berg. Jefferson claims that, while working in Berg's classroom, Berg and his students regularly used derogatory language when referring to women. The language offended Jefferson, who complained to Berg and his supervisors. Nevertheless, the sexually offensive conduct continued.

Eventually, the Youth Authority reassigned…