Bland

We granted review to resolve issues involving transferred intent and proximate causation.

In its classic form, the doctrine of transferred intent applies when the defendant intends to kill one person but mistakenly kills another. The intent to kill the intended target is deemed to transfer to the unintended victim so that the defendant is guilty of murder. (See generally People v. Scott (1996) 14 Cal.4th 544 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 178 , 927 P.2d 288 ] (Scott)) Whatever its theoretical underpinnings, this result is universally accepted. But conceptual difficulties arise when applying the doctrine to other facts. Here, defendant shot at three persons, killing one and injuring, but not killing, the other two. A jury convicted him of one first degree murder and two premeditated attempted murders. We must decide whether defendant’s intent to kill the murder victim transfers to an alleged attempted murder victim.

We conclude that transferred intent applies even when the person kills the intended target. Intent to kill is not limited to the specific target but extends to everyone actually killed. We also conclude, however, that the doctrine does not apply to an inchoate crime like…

Unlike the majority, I am of the view that the trial court’s failure to properly instruct the jury on the scope of the transferred intent doctrine prejudiced defendant. Nor do I agree that the trial court’s failure to define the term “proximate cause” in connection with the sentence enhancement for “proximately” causing great bodily injury or death was harmless error.

I

Skylar Morgan and Leon Simon, neither of whom was a gang member, testified that on the night of March 6, 1999, they were in Long Beach in a car driven by Kenneth “Kebo” Wilson, a member of the Rolling 20’s Crips street gang. Wilson stopped the car to talk to defendant and another man, both members of the Insane Crips, a rival gang. When defendant asked Wilson if he was “Kebo,” Wilson replied he was, adding that his passengers were not gang members. He said he would drop off his passengers and return. Saying, “So you Kebo from 20’s,” defendant opened fire. As Wilson started to drive away, defendant and his companion fired at the car. Wilson was killed; his passengers, Morgan and Simon, were wounded.

According to Morgan and Simon, it was defendant who started shooting. In a tape-recorded statement to the police…

We granted review to resolve issues involving transferred intent and proximate causation.

In its classic form, the doctrine of transferred intent applies when the defendant intends to kill one person but mistakenly kills another. The intent to kill the intended target is deemed to transfer to the unintended victim so that the defendant is guilty of murder. (See generally People v. Scott (1996) 14 Cal.4th 544 , 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 178 , 927 P.2d 288 ( Scott ).) Whatever its theoretical underpinnings, this result is universally accepted. But conceptual difficulties arise when applying the doctrine to other facts. Here, defendant shot at three persons, killing one and injuring, but not killing, the other two. A jury convicted him of one first degree murder and two premeditated attempted murders. We must decide whether defendant's intent to kill the murder victim transfers to an alleged attempted murder victim.

We conclude that transferred intent applies even when the person kills the intended target. Intent to kill is not limited to the specific target but extends to everyone actually killed. We also conclude, however, that the doctrine does not apply to an inchoate crime like…