Jose A. Ramos v. Matson Navigation Company, a Corporation

Good Law
316 F.2d 128
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitMay 22, 196317942_1California5,991 words

Opinion

Lead Opinion

Duniway, J.

This is a libel in admiralty, with a cause of action under the Jones Act ( 46 U.S.C. § 688 ), for damages and maintenance and cure arising from a claim that Ramos was injured aboard appellee’s vessel. There are three causes of action. The first charges that the vessel was unseaworthy in that the stowage of laundry was unsafe, and accordingly, Ramos was not provided with a safe area in which to work. The second charges negligence, under the Jones Act, based upon the same facts. The third is for maintenance and cure. Judgment went against Ramos, who appeals.

The material parts of the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law are as follows:

Appellant attacks findings III and IV and conclusions II, III and IV as inadequate, and as not supported by the evidence. He does not claim that the basic findings are insufficient in form. Thus, he states in his closing brief, as to finding III, “This is a direct finding of fact, and sufficient in form.” “A finding of seaworthiness is usually a finding of fact.” (Stone, C. J., in Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 1944, 321 U.S. 96, 98 , 64 S.Ct. 455, 457 , 88 L.Ed. 561 ) We think the same can be said of finding IV, as to negligence,…

Concurring Opinion

Chambers, J.

(concurring).

I concur in the foregoing opinion. In my judgment the trial judge who saw him found all of the testimony of Ramos untrustworthy. Maybe the trial judge was wrong in doing so, but we are in no position to so find. I desire to say at this time I have come to question our first case of Irish v. United States, 225 F.2d 3 . I think we should have affirmed the case on the first hearing. But there judge number one thought it should be reversed, judge number two thought it should be sent back for more findings. (My concurrence with judge number two at the time indicates I could find no one to agree with me.) But in the end the result was reached which I thought should be reached. 243 F.2d 874 .

Dissenting Opinion

Hamley, J.

(dissenting).

The claimed unseaworthiness was in so storing laundry bags that one fell upon appellant while he was in a passageway intended for use by crewmen. The trial court made no finding as to whether the bag was stored in a rack along the passageway ; if so, whether the bag fell from the rack; and, if so, whether the bag struck appellant when it fell. Consequently, we do not know, from the conclusional finding of seaworthiness, whether the trial court thought appellant had not been struck by a bag stored in the rack, or whether it thought that, even so, this would not establish that the vessel was unseaworthy.

I think we are entitled to findings of fact which are at least sufficiently explicit so that we will know whether we are dealing with a question as to the sufficiency of the evidence as to how the accident occurred, or with a question of law as to whether insecurely stored bags could render a vessel unseaworthy. All that the majority states concerning the right of the trial court to disbelieve witnesses is beside the point if that was not the basis of the court’s conclusional finding.

There was, to be sure, a finding of fact (if such an observation may be so…

Opinion

316 F.2d 128 Jose A. RAMOS, Appellant, v. MATSON NAVIGATION COMPANY, a corporation, Appellee. No. 17942. United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit. March 22, 1963. Rehearing Denied May 22, 1963. L. Charles Gay, San Francisco, Cal., for appellant. Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, and Donald D. Connors, Jr., San Francisco, Cal., for appellee. Before CHAMBERS, HAMLEY and DUNIWAY, Circuit Judges. DUNIWAY, Circuit Judge. 1 This is a libel in admiralty, with a cause of action under the Jones Act ( 46 U.S.C. § 688 ), for damages and maintenance and cure arising from a claim that Ramos was injured aboard appellee's vessel. There are three causes of action. The first charges that the vessel was unseaworthy in that the stowage of laundry was unsafe, and accordingly, Ramos was not provided with a safe area in which to work. The second charges negligence, under the Jones Act, based upon the same facts. The third is for maintenance and cure. Judgment went against Ramos, who appeals. 2 The material parts of the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law are as follows: 3 "FINDINGS OF FACT 4 * * * * * * 5 "II. 6 On or about July 9, 1959, libelant terminated his employment aboard SS…

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