On March 30,1956, after judgment for plaintiffs below was entered, the trial judge fixed $2,000,000 as the amount of supersedeas bond on appeal. “It is further ordered that said bond may be by approved corporate sureties, or by deposit of Government bonds as provided in 6 U.S.Code § 15.” (Tr. p. 389.)

Defendant and appellant Sunkist has shown the cost of a $2,000,000 supersede-as bond would have been $40,000. We assume this refers to the annual premium. Appellants borrowed money, purchased $2,000,000 in Government bonds, and deposited them as security. The bonds were originally purchased at a $30,000 discount from face value. Appellants paid the prime interest rate then obtaining in the Los Angeles area, on the money borrowed, renewing said notes representing the amount borrowed each ninety days. This rate began at 3%% went to 4%, to 4%%, to 4%, to 31/2%, to 4%, to 41/2%, to 5%, and to 4y2%between April 20th, 1956 and July 27th, 1962. The income received from the bonds, $391,811.57, was set off against the expense, $542,587.75, leaving a net expense of $150,776.18.

Six annual yearly premiums, had they been paid, would have cost $240,000. The time here involved is six years and three months, roughly. Appellees have not questioned any of the above figures in their motion.

“The allowance or disallowance of items of cost is determined by statute, rule, order, usage, and practice of the instant court.” Kemart Corp. v. Printing Arts Research Lab., 9 Cir. 1956, 232 F.2d 897, 899 .

Local Rule 15(b) of the Southern District of California provides:

This court has in the past allowed more than the bare premium, i. e., has allowed the “expenses incurred in arranging with bankers * * * to furnish the indemnity which the bonding company exacted. * * * [Pjayment of the premium is not the only burden which necessity imposes. * * * In this case the expense of providing indemnity was as necessary as payment of the premium.” The Europe (1911) 9 Cir., 190 F. 475, 481 .

Appellees do not dispute the facts here involved, nor the general rule that the trial court has discretion to tax costs, but (a) refer to a previous order of this court which “required each party to bear its own costs, except that the costs of the reporter’s transcript and printing the transcript on appeal are to be equally borne by the parties,” and (b) that the $150,776.18 item obviously is not within Rule 15(a).

We think it is, but that in any event we are bound by the mandate of the Supreme Court to this court which ordered reversal of the judgment “with costs.”

The motion to tax costs in the sum of $160,979.62 is granted.