Joseph

This is an automatic appeal from a judgment imposing a penalty of death. (See Pen. Code, § 1239, subd. (b).)

*939 I.

Appellant Mariney Joseph was convicted by a jury of the first degree murder of Oscar Dent. (§§ 187, 189.) The jury found that he used a firearm in the commission of the murder (§§ 12022.5, 1203.06, subd. (a)(1)), and that the murder was committed during the commission or attempted commission of a robbery. (§ 190.2, subds. (a)(17)(i) and (b).) Appellant was also convicted of the robbery of Lou Reynolds; allegations of firearm use (§ 12022.5) and great bodily injury (§ 12022.7) were found to be true. The Dent-Reynolds offenses arose out of a single incident in which appellant and one or possibly two other men went to a house to rob its residents of money. The jury also convicted appellant of six additional counts of robbery, each with firearm use. These offenses arose out of a separate incident which occurred at a shoeshine parlor approximately one month before the Dent-Reynolds offenses.

Neither party presented any evidence at the penalty phase. (§§ 190.3, 190.4.) The jury fixed the penalty at death.

II.

The only claim of error this court need address…

I concur.

In doing so, however, I must express some of the unease addressed by Justice Richardson in his separate opinion. The right declared in Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [ 45 L.Ed.2d 562 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 ], is not as absolute as the majority opinion implies. Under some circumstances there may be a limitation on the right of self-representation, particularly in a capital case.

Although it is axiomatic that ordinarily a defendant controls the substance of his defense, in People v. Chadd (1981) 28 Cal.3d 739 [ 170 Cal.Rptr. *949 798 , 621 P.2d 837 ], we refused to permit a capital defendant to plead guilty over the objection of his attorney (Pen. Code, § 1018). We declared (at p. 752): “Faretta does not grant a capital defendant the right to ‘defend’ himself by discharging his counsel and waiving his automatic appeal.” The state has an interest in the proceedings that cannot be extinguished.

We have consistently refused to permit a defendant in a capital case to waive his right to appeal after conviction. In Massie v. Sumner (9th Cir. 1980) 624 F.2d 72 , certiorari denied, 449 U.S. 1103 [ 66 L.Ed.2d 828 , 101 S.Ct. 899 ], a defendant under a California sentence of…

I concur in the judgment.

The trial court in this death penalty case took the understandable position that, because of the serious nature of the charges facing defendant, he should not be permitted to represent himself. Such a solicitous approach, however, evidently violated Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [ 45 L.Ed.2d 562 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 ], which limits the trial court’s inquiry to the issue whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel, and was “aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation . . . .” (P. 835 [ 45 L.Ed.2d at p. 582 ].) It is not, however, essential that defendant be competent to serve as counsel in a criminal case. (P. 836 [ 45 L.Ed.2d at p. 582 ].) It is enough that he intelligently waive his right to an attorney and that he understand the risks. This formulation may be dubious but it is the law, even in a capital case. (See ibid.; People v. Teron (1979) 23 Cal.3d 103, 113 [ 151 Cal.Rptr. 633 , 588 P.2d 773 ]; Ferrel v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 888, 891 [ 144 Cal.Rptr. 610 , 576 P.2d 93 ].) The record herein indicates that defendant was competent to waive his right to counsel and that he understood…

This is an automatic appeal from a judgment imposing a penalty of death. (See Pen. Code, § 1239, subd. (b).) [1]

Appellant Mariney Joseph was convicted by a jury of the first degree murder of Oscar Dent. (§§ 187, 189.) The jury found that he used a firearm in the commission of the murder (§§ 12022.5, 1203.06, subd. (a)(1)), and that the murder was committed during the commission or attempted commission of a robbery. (§ 190.2, subds. (a)(17)(i) and (b).) Appellant was also convicted of the robbery of Lou Reynolds; allegations of firearm use (§ 12022.5) and great bodily injury (§ 12022.7) were found to be true. The Dent-Reynolds offenses arose out of a single incident in which appellant and one or possibly two other men went to a house to rob its residents of money. The jury also convicted appellant of six additional counts of robbery, each with firearm use. These offenses arose out of a separate incident which occurred at a shoeshine parlor approximately one month before the Dent-Reynolds offenses.

Neither party presented any evidence at the penalty phase. (§§ 190.3, 190.4.) The jury fixed the penalty at death.

The only claim of error this court need address…