Rodriguez

Juan Carlos Rodriguez (Rodriguez) appeals from a judgment sentencing him to two years’ imprisonment following his conviction for burglary (Pen. Code, § 459) and subsequent revocation of probation for that offense. The trial court revoked Rodriguez’s probation after finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Rodriguez had violated a condition of his probation by committing theft. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the facts in a probation revocation hearing must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. We are of the opinion that the facts supporting revocation of probation may be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

I.

Facts and Proceedings Below

In 1985, Rodriguez was convicted of second degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459) and placed on three years’ probation. The terms and conditions of his probation included a requirement that he obey all laws and not associate with known criminals.

*440 On February 24, 1988, Rodriguez’s probation officer filed a petition to revoke Rodriguez’s probation, alleging violations of Penal Code sections 666 (petty theft with prior conviction) and 484…

I concur in the result reached by the majority. I write separately, however, to suggest additional grounds for our holding. It is manifest that the Legislature, in providing that probation may be revoked when the court has “reason to believe” revocation is warranted (Pen. Code, § 1203.2, subd. (a)), intended the standard of proof to be no greater than a preponderance of evidence. 1 Given this fact, the primary issue *448 before us in this case is whether constitutional principles require a higher standard of proof.

The majority correctly holds that they do not, noting that no decision has ever required grounds for revocation to be proved beyond reasonable doubt (see maj. opn., ante, at pp. 441-442), and concluding that proof by preponderance of evidence is sufficient because revocation deprives the probationer only of “conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special [ ] restrictions.” (Id. at p. 442.) We should also explain why the loss of conditional liberty entailed in revocation of probation does not warrant proof by an intermediate standard. Use of such a standard would not be altogether unprecedented; the United States Supreme Court has held, for example,…

I agree with the majority’s conclusion

that the applicable language of Penal Code section 1203.2, subdivision (a)— a “court may revoke . . . probation if. . . the court, in its judgment, has reason to believe . . . that the [probationer] has violated any of the conditions of. . . probation ... or has subsequently committed other offenses ...” (italics added)—authorizes the revocation of probation on the basis of a “preponderance of the evidence” standard of proof. I do not agree, however, with the majority’s suggestion that, as a matter of policy, a “preponderance of the evidence” standard is superior to a “clear and convincing evidence” standard. (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 445.)

If this court were free to decide the question of the applicable standard of proof at a probation revocation proceeding on the basis of our own policy determination, I would conclude, for the reasons expressed by the drafters of the American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice (ABA Standards), that a probationer should have “the right to require the government to establish [a probation] violation by clear and convincing evidence, unless the probationer admits the violation . . . .” (3 ABA…

Juan Carlos Rodriguez (Rodriguez) appeals from a judgment sentencing him to two years' imprisonment following his conviction for burglary (Pen. Code, § 459) and subsequent revocation of probation for that offense. The trial court revoked Rodriguez's probation after finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Rodriguez had violated a condition of his probation by committing theft. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the facts in a probation revocation hearing must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. We are of the opinion that the facts supporting revocation of probation may be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

In 1985, Rodriguez was convicted of second degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459) and placed on three years' probation. The terms and conditions of his probation included a requirement that he obey all laws and not associate with known criminals.

On February 24, 1988, Rodriguez's probation officer filed a petition to revoke Rodriguez's probation, alleging violations of Penal Code sections 666 (petty theft with prior conviction) and 484 (theft). At a probation…