From a judgment predicated upon the sustaining of a demurrer to plaintiff’s first amended complaint without leave to amend in an action to enjoin the enforcement of an ordinance (No. 56,600, sec. 81) of defendant city, exacting a license tax of one-half cent per barrel on oil produced within the limits of the city of Los Angeles, plaintiff appeals.

The essential allegations of the amended complaint are that:

Plaintiff relies for reversal of the judgment on these propositions:

The first proposition is tenable. The law is settled in California that an injunction will be granted to restrain the enforcement of an unconstitutional license ordinance containing penal provisions, where irreparable damage to property rights will result if the ordinance is enforced. (Bueneman v. City of Santa Barbara, 8 Cal. (2d) 405, 407 [ 65 Pac. (2d) 884 ].) The case just cited extends injunctive relief to a class of cases in which it had formerly been denied. See, for example, Sullivan v. San Francisco Gas etc. Co., (1905) 148 Cal. 368 [ 83 Pac. 156 , 17 Ann. Cas. 574, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 401].

The second proposition is untenable and is governed by these established principles of law:

Applying the foregoing rules to the undisputed facts in the instant case, the ordinance here questioned is valid as levying an occupational license tax upon oil which tax is not discriminatory and applies to all persons or corporations engaged in the same business in proportion to the amount of business transacted by each.

For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Crail, P. J., and Wood, J., concurred.

A petition by appellant to have the cause heard in the Supreme Court, after judgment in the District Court of Appeal, was denied by the Supreme Court on June 19, 1939.