People v. Clark

Defendant Douglas Daniel Clark appeals from a judgment of death under the 1978 death penalty law. A jury found him guilty of six counts of first degree murder. (Pen. Code, § 187.) 1 Multiple murder special circumstances and enhancements for personal use of a firearm were found true as to each of the murder charges. (§§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3), 12022.5.) The jury further found defendant guilty of one count of mutilation of human remains, as to one of the murder victims (Health & Saf. Code, § 7052), and of attempted murder and mayhem as to a different victim. (§§ 187/664, 203.) Allegations that defendant had personally used a deadly weapon were found true as to the attempted murder and mayhem counts. (§ 12022, subd. (b).) An enhancement allegation for intentional infliction of great bodily injury was found true as to the attempted murder count. (§ 12022.7.)

The jury set the punishment at death. This appeal is automatic. (§ 1239, subd. (b).) We conclude that the attempted murder and mayhem convictions must be reversed, and all but one of the multiple-murder special-circumstance findings must be set aside. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment.

I. Guilt Phase…

This death penalty trial was a judge’s nightmare: an extremely complex multiple-murder case in which an obstreperous, manipulative defendant insisted on exercising his constitutional right to represent himself. Obviously frustrated with defendant’s course of conduct, the trial court, confronted with defendant’s decision to stand mute, incorrectly deemed that decision to be a waiver of defendant’s right to represent himself, and appointed counsel to represent him.

*175 Much as I sympathize with the trial court’s desire to terminate defendant’s pro se status under the circumstances of this case, defendant had a right to remain silent in the face of the prosecution’s allegations. By preventing him from doing so, the court violated defendant’s constitutional right to act as his own attorney and to present his case in his own way. I cannot accept the majority’s conclusion that by being silent defendant obstructed the proceedings against him, thus warranting revocation of his right to self-representation. I therefore dissent.

Background

On October 13, 1982, the trial court granted defendant’s request, made in the midst of trial, to represent himself. (See Faretta v. California (1975)…

I dissent. Justice was not served by the trial court proceedings.

This case illustrates the futility of self-representation in a death penalty case. It was unfortunate that Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [ 45 L.Ed.2d 562 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 ]—a noncapital case—in recognizing a general right of self-representation did not distinguish between mere traffic infractions and the heightened requirement of cases in which the issue is life or death. In the latter, both the state and the defendant have the responsibility of presenting all available evidence, for and against the death penalty or life without possibility of parole. Defendant may not frustrate that duty by silence as in this case, by gamesmanship as in People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1234 [ 259 Cal.Rptr. 669, 774 P.2d 698 ] (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.), or by prohibiting counsel to present evidence as in People v. Deere (1985) 41 Cal.3d 353, 361 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 13 , 710 P.2d 925 ].

I must repeat the admonition given to trial courts and counsel in Deere : when the people of California are being asked to take a human life, every aspect of the case must be presented to and considered by the jury in a genuine adversary…

Defendant Douglas Daniel Clark appeals from a judgment of death under the 1978 death penalty law. A jury found him guilty of six counts of first degree murder. (Pen. Code, § 187.) [1] Multiple murder special circumstances and enhancements for personal use of a firearm were found true as to each of the murder charges. (§§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3), 12022.5.) The jury further found defendant guilty of one count of mutilation of human remains, as to one of the murder victims (Health & Saf. Code, § 7052), and of attempted murder and mayhem as to a different victim. (§§ 187/664, 203.) Allegations that defendant had personally used a deadly weapon were found true as to the attempted murder and mayhem counts. (§ 12022, subd. (b).) An enhancement allegation for intentional infliction of great bodily injury was found true as to the attempted murder count. (§ 12022.7.)

The jury set the punishment at death. This appeal is automatic. (§ 1239, subd. (b).) We conclude that the attempted murder and mayhem convictions must be reversed, and all but one of the multiple-murder special-circumstance findings must be set aside. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment.

This case…