Stoll

We decide whether a criminal defendant charged with committing lewd and lascivious acts upon a child may introduce a psychologist’s opinion testimony, based upon an interview and professional interpretation of standardized written personality tests, that defendant displays no signs of “deviance” or “abnormality.” Under existing law and the facts of this case, the evidence bears on a defense claim that the charged acts did not occur.; Professional testimony regarding the absence of sexual deviance also is authorized under statutory rules permitting a criminal defendant to introduce ¡evidence of his “good character.”

Of course, such evidence must satisfy traditional limits governing the admission of expert testimony—a qualified witness, testifying on an appropriate “subject,” and relying upon professionally reasonable “matter.” We conclude that a qualified psychologist’s diagnosis does not offend such standards solely because it is grounded upon interviews and standardized tests. To the extent the proffered testimony in a particular case is cumulative or unduly prejudicial, the trial court has broad discretion to limit or exclude it.

However, we see no reason to subject…

I respectfully dissent. As will appear, the standardized “personality function” tests at issue here, if used in the manner proposed by the two defendants in this case, are in all essential respects indistinguishable from polygraph, voiceprint or other scientific tests aimed at proving, or disproving, guilt. For that reason, these standardized tests must meet the usual Kelly/Frye standard for admissibility.

I readily acknowledge the admissibility of opinion evidence tending to show that the defendant’s character or trait of character makes it unlikely that he or she committed a charged offense. (See Evid. Code, § 1102, subd. (a); People v. Jones (1954) 42 Cal.2d 219, 222 [ 266 P.2d 38 ] [defendant lacked usual characteristics of sex deviants].) I also recognize that such evidence may be presented in the form of expert testimony (see Evid. Code, § 801), which ordinarily is not subject to the Kelly/Frye admissibility standards (see People v. McDonald (1984) 37 Cal.3d 351, 372-373 [ 208 Cal.Rptr. 236 , 690 P.2d 709 , 46 A.L.R.4th 1011 ]).

But the present case involves more than a simple expert opinion to the effect that defendant Grafton was a “normal” heterosexual whose character…

We decide whether a criminal defendant charged with committing lewd and lascivious acts upon a child may introduce a psychologist's opinion testimony, based upon an interview and professional interpretation of standardized written personality tests, that defendant displays no signs of "deviance" or "abnormality." Under existing law and the facts of this case, the evidence bears on a defense claim that the charged acts did not occur. Professional testimony regarding the absence of sexual deviance also is authorized under statutory rules permitting a criminal defendant to introduce evidence of his "good character."

Of course, such evidence must satisfy traditional limits governing the admission of expert testimony — a qualified witness, testifying on an appropriate "subject," and relying upon professionally reasonable "matter." We conclude that a qualified psychologist's diagnosis does not offend such standards solely because it is grounded upon interviews and standardized tests. To the extent the proffered testimony in a particular case is cumulative or unduly prejudicial, the trial court has broad discretion to limit or exclude it.

However, we see no…