This action was instituted against C. B. Day and Carroll S. Bucher for alleged misapplication of money of the State Compensation Insurance Fund, (hereinafter referred to as the fund), and Massachusetts Bonding and Insurance Company, a corporation, as surety on a bond which is conditioned upon any designated act of wrongful abstraction, or willful misapplication, etc. of the funds of the fund. A second cause of action is based upon an alleged conspiracy founded upon the facts alleged in the first cause of action. Judgment was entered for the plaintiffs.

Defendant Day and the bonding company have not appealed, but a chronological statement of the acts of both Day and Bucher—those of the former commencing in 1936, and those of the latter not until a few days subsequent to January 27, 1937—is necessary to understand the participation of Bucher. Such a recital is also necessary to a statement and understanding of the position taken by the respective parties on the appeal. The findings are lengthy but they succinctly narrate the necessary facts as to Day and Bucher. There is evidence to support the findings against Day. If the trial court disbelieved Bucher, then there is substantial evidence against him. If credence should be given to his sworn statements, then the sufficiency of the evidence is, to say the least, problematical. Certain findings sustained by the evidence will be quoted, and excerpts of evidence given verbatim or in substance to indicate that the court’s findings and judgment, insofar as they apply to Bucher, are substantially upheld by the evidence.

The pertinent findings applicable to the appeal by Bucher which are supported by evidence which may be declared substantial, appear as follows: “1. Plaintiff State Compensation Insurance Fund is, and at all times herein mentioned was, a fund created by law and an agency of the State of California.

The findings continue upon practically the same facts as previously stated and set forth that a conspiracy was formed about February 6, 1936, with “other persons unknown” to do the alleged wrongful acts and to refrain from performing certain official duties. Bucher’s connection with the alleged conspiracy is fixed as of the date he became counsel for the State Compensation Insurance Fund in the latter part of the month of January, 1937.

The findings further provide: “47. It was the purpose and object of said C. B. Day and said Carroll S. Bucher at that stage of the conspiracy to obtain the commutation for said Clinton H. Resau in order to put said Clinton H. Resau in possession of money that he would then loan or give or turn over to said C. B. Day or said Carroll S. Bucher for the purpose of financing said Tru-Sheen Corporation, a corporation, of which corporation said C. B. Day and said Carroll S. Bucher were then officers. ’ ’ There is also evidence that a day or two following the payment of the commuted award Day requested Bucher to meet him at a bank in San Francisco. It there developed that Resau was loaning part of the award to the Tru-Sheen company in which Day and one Hamilton owned stock, and Bucher, the attorney and secretary-treasurer, had been paid in shares of stock for legal services rendered. The money advanced by Resau was not deposited with a bank but was placed in a safe deposit box, which could only be opened by any two of the three parties mentioned.

In the narrative statement of the evidence, certified by the trial judge as a “full and correct narrative statement of the testimony taken, and the evidence adduced, at the trial” appears, as part of the testimony of appellant, Bucher, the following: “I next heard of Mr. Resau a few days after the commutation. That was in connection with the safe deposit box transaction. Mr. Day telephoned me to come down to the Anglo Bank at the corner of McAllister and Market Streets. I went down there and met Mr. Day and also Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Day told me that they had borrowed some money from Mr. Resau and he then, for the first time, called my attention to the fact that Mr. Resau was the man for whom a commutation had been made, that the Tru-Sheen Corporation had borrowed this money from Mr. Resau and that they desired to put it in the safe deposit box in the Bank. I asked him why they were putting it in the safe deposit box and he said there was a man who was the manager of the Company who would be inclined to pay the money out more rapidly than it should be. The safe deposit box was opened in the names of all three of us, with any two to have access to it.

According to Day, when Resau received the check Mrs. Resau was physically ill and Resau determined that he would not go east—though eventually they journeyed to Resau’s brother’s home in the city of Baltimore. According to Day, Resau wanted to invest part of the money in securities that would return an income.

There is evidence that Bucher had never met Resau personally at any time during the various transactions, or knew anything about the industrial accident claim. Bucher was directed by Day within a short time after his appointment as counsel for the fund to prepare a commutation of award. The directions were followed and Bucher, as attorney for the fund, signed the stipulation. Where an application for commutation is presented by stipulation its passage or approval by the Industrial Accident Commission is automatic if the referee of the Industrial Accident Commission is satisfied after an examination of the file that it complies with Labor Code section 5100. In this case the referee of the Industrial Accident Commission not only approved the commutation but had the statisticians fix the amount, whereupon the referee prepared the order, which was duly approved by the commission.

There is some evidence that Day told officials and employees of the fund that Resau was his friend. Bucher did not deny that this information was given him, but stated in that regard that he could not remember. Whether the preparation of the stipulation of commutation by Bucher was an act that should have put Bucher on guard against a misapplication of funds is a question of fact. Bucher had 25 or more years of experience in the practice of industrial cases. There is evidence that the usual practice was to refer all commutations exceeding $500 to a committee to examine, and make recommendations to the manager of the fund, and that life pension cases were few in number. There is also evidence that the “committee” was not in existence, and other evidence that various officials and employees of the fund did not remember whether it existed at the time of the Resau commutation transaction.

The rules necessary to establish the quantum of proof of fraud or a conspiracy are stated in Campbell v. Birch, 19 Cal.2d 778, 789 [ 122 P.2d 902 ], as follows: “The trial court is the exclusive judge of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. It is its province to give to the evidence that weight to which, in its judgment, it is entitled, and to draw all reasonable inferences therefrom, and if, in its judgment, the evidence is entitled to no weight it may disregard such evidence altogether. (24 Cal.Jur. 886, sec. 135.) The eases have frequently taken notice of the fact that it is next to impossible to secure direct evidence of a conspiracy,' unless one of the participants has confessed, and that the proof must usually be inferential and circumstantial.” In People v. Yant, 26 Cal.App.2d 725, 737 [ 80 P.2d 506 ], the court said: “It is not often that the direct fact of an unlawful agreement which is the essence of a conspiracy can be proved otherwise than by the establishment of independent facts bearing upon the common design; and the question as to the existence of the conspiracy being one of fact, it is sufficient if the circumstances proved satisfy the jury, leaving the weight and sufficiency of the evidence to the triers of the questions of fact. (People v. Sampsell, 104 Cal.App. 431, 439 [ 286 P. 434 ].)” (See, also, Johnstone v. Morris, 210 Cal. 580 [ 292 P. 970 ] ; Revert v. Hesse, 184 Cal. 295 [ 193 P. 943 ] ; People v. Kauffman, 152 Cal. 331 [ 92 P. 861 ] ; Beeman v. Richardson, 185 Cal. 280 [ 196 P. 774 ].) The trial court heard all of the evidence covering the securing of the commutation and the loan to a company in which Bucher held stock. Appellant contends that there is insufficient evidence to establish any wrongdoing on his part. The trial court evidently disbelieved his testimony. “In determining the disputed questions of fact presented at the trial of the case it was the province of the jury to disbelieve any testimony which appeared to them to lack verity. They were the exclusive judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony*. They could reject positive testimony and accept circumstantial evidence as proof of the facts, as it is elementary that direct evidence may be disbelieved and contrary circumstantial evidence relied upon to support a verdict or finding.” (Gray v. Southern Pacific Co., 23 Cal.2d 632, 640-641 [ 145 P.2d 561 ].) Unless mandatory presumptions are prescribed by statute, and in the absence of a question of law, it is the duty of the court or jury (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2101, 2061) as the ease may be, to deduce an inference from a fact legally proved (Code Civ. Proc., § 1958), or on a reasonable deduction based on such fact in conformity with the ordinary propensities or passions of men generally or of the particular person involved. The deduction may also be founded on the course of business or of nature. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1960.) “Prom the secrecy with which unlawful undertakings are adopted it would be generally impossible to make such proof by direct testimony. Evidence is indirect as well as direct,—consisting of inferences and presumptions,—and it is code law that upon the trial of a ease evidence may be given-of any facts from which the facts in issue are presumed or are logically inferable. ’ ’ (People v. Donnolly, 143 Cal. 394, 398 [ 77 P. 177 ].) Inferences which reasonably may be drawn from the evidence and which are legally admissible notwithstanding that a contrary inference might be drawn by an appellate court, must be accepted on appeal as evidence in favor of the prevailing party. The inference drawn by the trial court may not be the inference which the individual members of this court might draw. 1 ‘ The fact that some inference other than that which has been drawn by a jury may appear to an appellate tribunal to be the more reasonable, affords no sufficient reason for disturbing the inference in question. (10 Cal.Jur., p. 735, et seq.) It also appears to be well-established law that notwithstanding the fact that the evidence upon which the inference is founded is undisputed or without conflict, an appellate court has not the power to draw an inference different from that which the jury has deduced.” (Juchert v. California Water Service Co., 16 Cal.2d 500, 508 [ 106 P.2d 886 ].) (See, also, Mah See v. Northern American Acc. Ins. Co., 190 Cal. 421 [ 213 P. 42 , 26 A.L.R. 123] ; Webster v. Board of Dental Examiners, 17 Cal.2d 534 [ 110 P.2d 992 ] ; Hamilton v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 12 Cal.2d 598 [ 86 P.2d 829 ] ; Barham v. Widing, 210 Cal. 206 [291 P. 173] ; Arques v. National Superior Co., 67 Cal.App.2d 763 [ 155 P.2d 643 ] ; Palmer v. Palmer, 49 Cal.App.2d 331 [ 121 P.2d 822 ].)

The trial court, with the above rules in mind, could consider the long standing friendship between Day and Bucher; the fact that Bucher was selected by Day from three names submitted by the personnel board for appointment as chief counsel for the fund; Bucher’s long experience with the particular class of work; the fact that he might have made an independent investigation; the preparation of the stipulation of the commutation of the award; the fact that Bucher signed the stipulation as the legal representative of the compensation fund; the assent finally given to the deposit of the Besau money in a safe deposit box instead of with a bank; Bucher’s actions and demeanor as a witness, to determine his credibility and participation in the scheme of Day.

Appellant cites Ryder v. Bamberger, 172 Cal. 791 [ 158 P. 753 ], and other cases to the same effect that it is the duty of the trial court to find in favor of fair dealing if there be two inferences that are equally susceptible of being adopted from all the facts and circumstances. The rule is set forth in Ryder v. Bamberger, swpra, as follows (pp. 799-800) : “For, if there be two inferences equally reasonable and equally susceptible of being drawn from the proved facts, the one favoring fair dealing and the other favoring corrupt practice, it is the express duty of court or jury to draw the inference favorable to fair dealing. ’ ’ The rule is applicable when the evidence is equally susceptible of two conflicting inferences. The opinion in the case of Ryder v. Bamberger, supra, page 800, seems to be that there was no substantial evidence of fraud. In the other cases cited the same principle is involved. In the present case, the testimony of Bucher was considered, but disbelieved. Added to that circumstance is the evident attitude of the trial court showing that he disbelieved any testimony of Day favorable to Bucher. This was the trial court’s right. (Campbell v. Birch, supra.) This court as a matter of law is unable to say that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the findings and judgment.

The trial court decided this case on the theory of intentional wrong on the part of Day and Bucher, and a conspiracy between them to defraud the state; and that an agent of the state is jointly responsible with his coconspirator for damages suffered. (Civ. Code, § 2343, subd. 3 ; Stirnus v. Adams, 50 Cal.App. 730 [ 195 P. 955 ].) “In an action for damages resulting from acts of conspirators, the major significance of the conspiracy lies in the fact that it renders each participant in the wrongful act responsible as a joint tort-feasor for all damages ensuing from the wrong, irrespective of whether or not he was a direct actor qnd regardless of the degree of his activity. And so, a plaintiff is entitled to a joint recovery of damages against such defendants as he can show have united or cooperated in inflicting a wrong upon him. A person is liable for his participation in a conspiracy, having for its object the commission of a wrongful act, even though he acts only as an agent for another and is unacquainted with the details of the scheme, and although he expected no benefit from the wrongful act and in fact received none.’.’ (5 Cal.Jur. § 30, p. 530 ; Mox, Incorporated v. Woods, 202 Cal. 675 [ 262 P. 302 ] ; Revert v. Hesse, supra ; Mary Pickford Co. v. Bayly Bros., Inc., 12 Cal.2d 501 [ 86 P.2d 102 ].) Bucher, found to be a

conspirator, and found to have been a participant in a wrongful act, is, in the eyes of the law, equally liable with Day for the wrong perpetrated, though he may not have known the details of the scheme from its inception. They were joint tort feasors and liable equally for the full amount of damages. Day did not appeal from the judgment and it has become final as to him. Respondents have not appealed from the judgment and, therefore, are not in a position to urge the point that as joint tort feasors Bucher’s liability should be the same as Day’s. The amount assessed against Bucher, in the absence of an appeal by the respondents, must stand.

The judgment against Bucher represents compensation for a permanent disability of Resau of 100 per cent as found by the Industrial Accident Commission, entitling him to $5,335.20, to be paid at the rate of $22.23 a week for 240 weeks, and thereafter the sum of $1.3.68 a week for the remainder of his natural life. The prospective term of Resau’s natural life was of course uncertain. The chief of the compensation bureau of the commission testified in substance, as related in the narrative statement on appeal, that commutation is based primarily upon the amount of future payments, in turn based upon the normal expectancy of life; that the commission in making the permanent disability rating considered a well recognized mortality table, the history of the case, the condition of the ailment of the applicant, plus the experience of the commission in similar computations.

The trial court did not fix the amount of damages arbitrarily nor compute the various amounts mentioned during the trial of the case as a basis for damages, but followed the order of the Industrial Accident Commission which had previously fixed the amount, without appeal from that order by any of the parties interested. The order of the commission has long since become final.

Appellant contends (1) that respondents offered no evidence tending to show the amount for which the claim should have been commuted; (2) that, if the claim had not been commuted the fund would have been obliged to pay the death benefit, from which the accrued compensation should have been deducted. As to the first contention, since the conspiracy prevented a determination of the amount for which the claim should have been commuted, appellant cannot be heard to complain. “The most elementary conceptions of justice and public policy require that the wrongdoer shall bear the risk of the uncertainty which his own wrong has created. ’ ’ (Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc.,-U.S. - [ 66 S.Ct. 574, 580 , 90 L.Ed.-] ; see, also, Speegle v. Board of Fire Underwriters, 29 Cal.2d 34, 46 [ 172 P.2d 867 ].) On the second point, no citations are given and no argument presented in support of the bare statement. Under such circumstances the matter complained of will be deemed to be without prejudice to appellant’s rights. (People v. Hermes, 73 Cal.App.2d 947 [ 168 P.2d 44 ], and cases cited.)

The prayer of the complaint asks for judgment against Day, Bucher and the bonding company in the sum of $8,171.58 “together with interest thereon.” The figure $8,171.58 was evidently arrived at by adding to the $6,962.56, the amount of the commuted award, the sum $1,044.81, the previous indemnity payments made to Resau, and $164.21, paid for medical services and expenses. The judgment provides: “1. That plaintiffs have and recover from defendants C. B. Day, Carroll S. Bucher and Massachusetts Bonding and Insurance Company, a corporation, the total sum of Twelve Thousand Nine Hundred Forty-five and 36/100 Dollars ($12,945.36) being the principal sum of Eight Thousand One Hundred Seventy-one and 58/100 Dollars ($8,171.58) together with interest thereon at the rate of Seven per centum (7%) per annum, compounded annually from February 8, 1937, to and including November 25, 1943, in the sum of Four Thousand Seven Hundred Seventy-three and 78/100 Dollars ($4,773.78), except, however, as to the defendant Carroll S. Bucher only plaintiffs have and recover the sum of Eleven Thousand Thirty-one and 97/100 Dollars ($11,031.97), being the principal sum of Six Thousand Nine Hundred Sixty-two and 56/100 Dollars ($6,962.56) together with interest thereon at the rate of Seven per centum (7%) per annum, compounded annually from February 8, 1937, to and including November 25, 1943.

The judgment is dated April 1,9, 1944, and recorded April 20, 1944. The record, insofar as this court has been able to discover, does not disclose why November 25,1943, was selected as a stopping point in the payment of interest, nor why there should be assessed on the first amount compound interest from that date as if it were the date of judgment. It has been suggested that November 25,1943, is the date of the order for preparation of findings and judgment, and that it automatically terminates the period of payment of interest prior to judgment. United Taxpayers Co. v. San Francisco, 55 Cal.App. 239 [ 203 P. 120 ], does not sustain such suggestion. At page 243 the court said: “An order for judgment is not a judgment. (Delger v. Jacobs, 19 Cal.App. 197 [ 125 P. 258 ] ; Canadian etc. Co. v. Clarita etc. Co., 140 Cal. 672 [ 74 P. 301 ].) Interest, by the express language of section 1920 of the Civil Code, is allowable upon judgments from the date of their entry only. ’ ’ In Walters v. Bank of America etc. Assn., 9 Cal.2d 46, 58 [ 69 P.2d 839 ], the court stated: “The trial court allowed interest from May 10,1930, the date of the attachment. The respondent’s right to interest did not accrue until July 14, 1930, the date of the judgment. The judgment should be modified to correct that error.” (See, also, Bibend v. Liverpool & London F. & L. Ins. Co., 30 Cal. 78 ; Clark v. deSaisset, 5 Cal.App.2d 23 [ 41 P.2d 945 ] ; Wells Fargo & Co. v. City etc. of San Francisco, 25 Cal.2d 37 [ 152 P.2d 625 ].) In Gillanders v. Da Silva, 212 Cal. 626 [ 299 P. 722 ], an action to reform a liability indemnity insurance policy, the form of the judgment resulted in a compounding of interest on the original judgment. The court said (p. 632): “Obviously this was an allowance of interest on interest for which there appears to be no authority in law in such a case. ’ ’ The order of the trial court was affirmed after modification of the amount. Whatever interest may be due in this case it will be necessary to order a modification, though the date November 25, 1943, assumed to be the date of the order for judgment, is not of great importance as the interest rule applies in this ease.

The first matter to be considered on the subject of damages is whether the compound interest was proper in this ease. The compounding of interest has not been approved, legislatively or judicially, in this state in a case like the present. (Doe v. Vallejo, 29 Cal. 385 ; Yndart v. Den, 116 Cal. 533 [ 48 P. 618 , 58 Am.St.Rep. 200 ] ; Schneider v. Turner, 10 Cal.2d 771 [ 76 P.2d 668 ].)

The legal rate of interest in this state is seven per centum. (Cal. Const, art. XX, § 22.) The general rule is that interest may not be computed on accrued interest unless by special statutory provision, or by stipulation of the parties, and in the latter event the amount may not be fixed in conflict with statutory provisions. (Yndart v. Den, supra ; Usury Law, Stats. 1919, p. lxxxiii and Deering’s Cal. Gen. Laws, Act 3757, et seq. ; Schneider v. Turner, supra.)

In City of Los Angeles v. Aitken, 32 Cal.App.2d 524 [ 90 P.2d 377 ], 531-532, a condemnation proceeding, it was held that the interlocutory decree “becomes a ‘judgment’ within the meaning of section 22, article XX, of the Constitution, and that pending an appeal by the condemnor, such judgment bears interest at the legal rate from the expiration of thirty days after its entry until paid. As we have stated, this is the precise situation which is found in any ordinary action for the recovery of a money judgment, and we see no valid reason why interest upon the judgment here should not be recovered as it is recovered in other eases.”

The court explicitly found Bucher joined and entered into said conspiracy shortly after the time he became counsel of State Compensation Insurance Fund on or about January 27, 1937, and decreed that while the judgment against Day should be in the sum of $8,171.58, Bucher should be held liable for a lesser amount—$6,962.56.

Respondents at the time of oral argument admitted that appellant “might be” right on the question of compound interest. Under the cited cases and code sections it appears that simple interest at the legal rate may be charged against Bucher, but not compound interest.

The trial court evidently adopted the view that the fund was deprived of the use of $6,962.56 — the amount of the commutation wherein Bucher played a part—on February 8,1937. The respondents did not appeal from the amount of the judgment against Bucher, and hence may not object to it in that respect. The court fixed the date for the commencement of interest on the $6,962.56 as February 8, 1937. The record does not disclose that plaintiffs requested interest from about February 6, 1936, the inception of the conspiracy. The allowance of interest in a fraud case prior to judgment is in the discretion of the trial court. Though Day and Bucher were equally culpable from the inception of the conspiracy, the particular sum of $6,962.56 was not paid out until February 8, 1937. The fund may have been deprived of other money prior to that date, for which Day may have been responsible as a conspirator, and Bucher as a subsequent aider and abettor. But, right or wrong, the trial court has seen fit to hold Bucher only for the $6,962.56, the amount of the commuted award. Since the state was deprived of that sum on February 8, 1937, it is quite clear that interest, which the court in its discretion has determined should be paid, should start on that date. Since the trial court has seen fit, right or wrong, to exonerate Bucher for liability for the other principal sum involved, and the respondents have not appealed, it would appear that Bucher could not be made to pay interest on that principal sum for which he was held not liable.

The trial court is directed to modify the findings and the judgment against Bucher by striking out all amounts representing compound interest and inserting in lieu thereof simple interest at the legal rate from February 8, 1937, continuing until the judgment is paid. When so modified under the direction of the trial court, the judgment will stand affirmed; each side to pay its own costs.

Peters, P. J., and Schottky, J. pro tern., concurred.